Lachapelle v. Lachapelle, No. Fa91 0119704 S (Jan. 28, 1993)

1993 Conn. Super. Ct. 572
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJanuary 28, 1993
DocketNo. FA91 0119704 S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1993 Conn. Super. Ct. 572 (Lachapelle v. Lachapelle, No. Fa91 0119704 S (Jan. 28, 1993)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lachapelle v. Lachapelle, No. Fa91 0119704 S (Jan. 28, 1993), 1993 Conn. Super. Ct. 572 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] MEMORANDUM OF DECISION This case comes to this court as a fully contested dissolution of marriage. CT Page 573

The plaintiff and defendant were married on May 14, 1980 and have been separate and apart since approximately August of 1991. The defendant (hereinafter called the wife or mother), is 38 years old and the plaintiff (hereinafter called the husband or father), is 39 years old. There are two minor children who have been born of the marriage. Rommel Rakeem born April 15, 1980 and Raphael Tyrrell born January 27, 1988.

Neither the husband nor the wife completed high school in the ordinary course. The wife, however, did obtain thereafter her high school equivalency diploma. The husband is in good health. The wife has bone and joint problems and is currently awaiting a decision on her claim for a social security disability.

The parties, by their pleadings and testimony and claims for relief agree that they should have joint legal custody of the oldest son Rommel with physical residence with the plaintiff father. While both parties agree on joint legal custody of the younger son Raphael, there is disagreement as to his primary physical residence. The father has requested that both children have their physical residence with him and that extensive and liberal rights of visitation be granted to the mother. The mother requests that Raphael's physical residence be with her allowing liberal visitation to the father.

The court heard the parties' evidence and received their simultaneous briefs approximately November 17, 1992.

The briefs were requested by the court to address the issue of split custody. The court was concerned whether the court had the power to separate children and if so, under what circumstances should it do so.

1. The Standard for Determining Custody in Connecticut

In Connecticut the court is guided by the best interest of the child in making custody orders. Connecticut General Statutes 46b-56(b) provides as follows:

"In making or modifying any order with respect to custody or visitation, the court shall be guided by the best interests of the child, giving consideration to the wishes of the child if he is of sufficient age and capable of forming an intelligent preference, provided in making the initial order the court may take into CT Page 574 consideration the causes for dissolution of the marriage or legal separation if such cause are relevant in a determination of the best interests of the child."

The statute also provides that the court shall give consideration to the wishes of a child of sufficient maturity and to the causes for the dissolution of the marriage if such causes are relevant to the best interest of the child's determination. The statute makes no provision that the court avoid separating siblings or only doing so under certain circumstances. There are no Connecticut court decisions that have formerly established any standards for or against split custody. Therefore, whether custody should be split in a particular case, is a factor that may be considered along with other non-mandatory factors in determining what is in the best interest of the child. The custody of each child must undergo a best interest analysis and that what may be the best for one sibling may not necessarily be what is in the best interest of the other sibling.

II. Split Custody

"Split custody" has been defined to refer to arrangements where one parent has sole, legal and physical custody of one or more children and the other parent has sole, legal and physical custody of the remaining children. See, 8 Rutkin. Effron and Hogan, Connecticut Practice Bk. 41.10 at p. 162 (1991). However, some courts have also used the term to refer to a situation where the parties disagree as to split physical custody although they agree to joint legal custody. Split legal custody is not the issue here, as both parents agree that they should have joint legal custody of both children. What the parents in this case disagree about is whether there should be split physical custody of the two children.

In an attempt to assist the court, the attorney for the mother has cited the case of Montanaro v. Montanaro, FA87-0088610 for the proposition that split custody is recognized in Connecticut. The court has reviewed the Montanaro case and finds that after the court took into consideration the testimony of the parties and their expert witnesses, Judge Hauser found that both children were flourishing despite their separation and ordered that the status quo of separate custody with each parent be maintained.

In a divorce involving more than one child, the court has the power and discretion to separate the children by awarding them to CT Page 575 different custodians. 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce, 991 (1983). Such awards have been upheld by Appellate Courts, McDonald v. McDonald, 821 S.W.2d 458 (Tex.App. 1992). The reluctance to separate siblings is prompted by the desire to avoid severing the emotional ties between these children. In several states the interest in keeping children of broken homes together has resulted in the adoption of specific standards that must be met prior to allowing siblings to be separated. In Iowa for instance, it must appear that the separation "may better promote the long range interest of the children." In Re Marriage of Kurth,438 N.W.2d 852, 854 (Iowa App. 1989). In South Dakota and Pennsylvania there must be "compelling reasons". Schmidt v. Schmidt, 444, N.W.2d 367, 370 (S.D. 1989). In that situation, a fourteen year old boy's preference and bad influence of certain friends where he lived held to be sufficiently compelling to separate him from two brothers ages 11 and 9. In McAnallen v. McAnallen, 446 A.2d 918,923 (Pa.Super. 1982), there were two sisters involved, two and one-half years apart in age who were thriving though living separately. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court that ordered the children together.

Courts have ordered separate custody of siblings where the children have been living apart, each with a different parent for some time prior to the decree and each child was doing well, so that there was no valid reason to disturb such established relationships. In Sefko v. Sefko, 427 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. 1988), the court split custody of sisters awarding primary physical custody of the five year old daughter to the father and the two year daughter to the mother because it considered that the factors such as bonding to the parent and stability of home environment were more important than the need for the sisters to live together. At the time of the initial trial the sisters had been living apart for one year each with the parent who ultimately was awarded custody. The court stressed the importance of parental stability in the life of a young child. See also, M.D. v. B.D., 336 Pa. Super. 298,485 A.2d 813 (1984) (the children were living separately for almost two years). Wallace v. Wallace, 420 So.2d 1326 (La.App. 1982) (children living separately for fourteen months). In Davis v.

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Related

In Re the Dissolution of the Marriage of Bainer
556 P.2d 1377 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1976)
Davis v. Davis
372 A.2d 231 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1977)
Grace v. Grace
380 N.W.2d 280 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1986)
In Re the Marriage of Kurth
438 N.W.2d 852 (Court of Appeals of Iowa, 1989)
Wallace v. Wallace
420 So. 2d 1326 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1982)
Marriage of Sefkow v. Sefkow
427 N.W.2d 203 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1988)
Schmidt v. Schmidt
444 N.W.2d 367 (South Dakota Supreme Court, 1989)
McAnallen v. McAnallen
446 A.2d 918 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1982)
MacDonald v. MacDonald
821 S.W.2d 458 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1992)
Marriage of Griggs v. Griggs
707 S.W.2d 488 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1986)
Benavides v. Benavides
526 A.2d 536 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1987)

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1993 Conn. Super. Ct. 572, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lachapelle-v-lachapelle-no-fa91-0119704-s-jan-28-1993-connsuperct-1993.