IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
MORIS LACA, individually and as parent and next friend of R. LACA and A. LACA, minor children; and
SUELA TAFANI, individually and
as parent and next friend of R. LACA and A. LACA, minor children,
Plaintiffs,
v. Case No. 22-CV-00366-SEH-SH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. Department of Veterans Affairs; and
SCOTT W. JONES, Special Agent for the Department of Veterans Affairs,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court is Defendant Scott Jones’ Motion to Dismiss. [ECF No. 51]. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted, and the sole claim against him by Plaintiff, Dr. Moris Laca, is dismissed. I. Factual Allegations in the Complaint Dr. Moris Laca is a physician who was employed at the Ernest Childers
Department of Veterans Affairs Outpatient Clinic (the “VA”) in Tulsa, Oklahoma. [ECF No. 2 at 4]. Scott W. Jones was a Special Agent for the Department of Veterans Affairs. [Id. at 1]. Agent Jones began investigating Dr. Laca in approximately January 2020 for allegedly accessing VA mail that
contained controlled substances and for stealing those controlled substances. See [id. at 4]. Dr. Laca was suspended from his position at the VA on January 30, 2020. [Id.]. Agent Jones later interviewed VA pharmacy tech Stephen Duncan on June 2, 2020, who “confessed to SA Jones and other officers to
diverting narcotics for the last three years.” [Id. at 4–5]. Agent Jones then testified before a federal grand jury, and “lied about the facts of this case to intentionally cause Dr. Laca to be indicted,” including false testimony that “Dr. Laca admitted … that he opened returned mail
belonging to veterans, and specifically, that he stole Tramadol.” [Id. at 5]. Agent Jones further falsely testified “that the paperwork from the opened Tramadol package Dr. Laca was accused of stealing was found in a trash can, in the mail room, when the Tramadol was stolen.” [Id.].
After Agent Jones testified to the grand jury, Dr. Laca was indicted for mail theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708 and diversion of controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(3). United States v. Laca, No. 20- cr-086-JFH-1 (N.D. Okla) (indictment filed at [ECF No. 2]). After the criminal case against Dr. Laca began, he accompanied his attorney, Agent Jones, and
two attorneys for the government in the mail room at the VA where the theft was alleged to have taken place. [ECF No. 2 at 6]. After examining the contents of the evidence bag, they discovered that the envelope addressed to the individual from whom Dr. Laca was alleged to have stolen from was
unopened and that “[n]o drugs had ever been stolen from this veteran nor had his envelope of mail ever been opened.” [Id.]. The criminal case against Dr. Laca was dismissed on September 30, 2020. [Id. at 7]; United States v. Laca, No. 20-cr-086-JFH-1 (N.D. Okla) (order granting the government’s
motion to dismiss filed at [ECF No. 44]). The VA terminated Dr. Laca’s employment on January 6, 2021. [ECF No. 2 at 7]. Since Dr. Laca was terminated, “he has been denied employment as a physician in locations close to Tulsa, Oklahoma; and the only place he has
been able to find work as a physician is in Florida, which forces him to be away from his wife and teenage children.” [Id.]. II. Standard Agent Jones moves to dismiss the claim against him pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive such a motion, “a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 861 F.3d 1081, 1104 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “There is a low bar for
surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,” and a case “may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Griffith v. El Paso Cnty., Colo., 129 F.4th 790, 815 (10th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up).
Although the facts alleged in the operative pleading are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “In other words, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate if
the complaint alone is legally insufficient to state a claim.” Brokers’ Choice, 861 F.3d at 1104–05. Additionally, conclusory allegations need not be accepted. Erikson v. Pawnee Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 263 F.3d 1151, 1154–55 (10th Cir. 2001);
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[C]onclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based.”). III. Discussion Plaintiff asserts only one claim against Agent Jones for a violation of his
constitutional and statutory civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [ECF No. 2 at 14]. Plaintiff specifically alleges that Defendant violated his right “to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, and to be free from arrest without probable cause.” [Id.]. Although Plaintiff explicitly and exclusively relies on
Section 1983 for his claim against Defendant [Id.], he argues that his claim is still viable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). [ECF No. 67 at 6–12]. The Court is skeptical that Plaintiff properly asserts a Bivens claim because of his explicit reliance
on Section 1983 in the complaint, but the Court will nevertheless address this argument in the interest of clarity. A. Section 1983 Section 1983 provides a cause of action against “[e]very person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). In other words, Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal officials who are acting under color of federal law. See Big Cats of Serenity Springs, Inc. v. Rhodes, 843 F.3d 853, 869 (10th Cir. 2016).
All of Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant are based on Defendant’s work as a Special Agent for the Department of Veterans Affairs, a federal entity, under color of federal law. Plaintiff does not make any allegations that Defendant acted under color of “any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia.” 42 U.S.C.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
MORIS LACA, individually and as parent and next friend of R. LACA and A. LACA, minor children; and
SUELA TAFANI, individually and
as parent and next friend of R. LACA and A. LACA, minor children,
Plaintiffs,
v. Case No. 22-CV-00366-SEH-SH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. Department of Veterans Affairs; and
SCOTT W. JONES, Special Agent for the Department of Veterans Affairs,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court is Defendant Scott Jones’ Motion to Dismiss. [ECF No. 51]. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted, and the sole claim against him by Plaintiff, Dr. Moris Laca, is dismissed. I. Factual Allegations in the Complaint Dr. Moris Laca is a physician who was employed at the Ernest Childers
Department of Veterans Affairs Outpatient Clinic (the “VA”) in Tulsa, Oklahoma. [ECF No. 2 at 4]. Scott W. Jones was a Special Agent for the Department of Veterans Affairs. [Id. at 1]. Agent Jones began investigating Dr. Laca in approximately January 2020 for allegedly accessing VA mail that
contained controlled substances and for stealing those controlled substances. See [id. at 4]. Dr. Laca was suspended from his position at the VA on January 30, 2020. [Id.]. Agent Jones later interviewed VA pharmacy tech Stephen Duncan on June 2, 2020, who “confessed to SA Jones and other officers to
diverting narcotics for the last three years.” [Id. at 4–5]. Agent Jones then testified before a federal grand jury, and “lied about the facts of this case to intentionally cause Dr. Laca to be indicted,” including false testimony that “Dr. Laca admitted … that he opened returned mail
belonging to veterans, and specifically, that he stole Tramadol.” [Id. at 5]. Agent Jones further falsely testified “that the paperwork from the opened Tramadol package Dr. Laca was accused of stealing was found in a trash can, in the mail room, when the Tramadol was stolen.” [Id.].
After Agent Jones testified to the grand jury, Dr. Laca was indicted for mail theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708 and diversion of controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(3). United States v. Laca, No. 20- cr-086-JFH-1 (N.D. Okla) (indictment filed at [ECF No. 2]). After the criminal case against Dr. Laca began, he accompanied his attorney, Agent Jones, and
two attorneys for the government in the mail room at the VA where the theft was alleged to have taken place. [ECF No. 2 at 6]. After examining the contents of the evidence bag, they discovered that the envelope addressed to the individual from whom Dr. Laca was alleged to have stolen from was
unopened and that “[n]o drugs had ever been stolen from this veteran nor had his envelope of mail ever been opened.” [Id.]. The criminal case against Dr. Laca was dismissed on September 30, 2020. [Id. at 7]; United States v. Laca, No. 20-cr-086-JFH-1 (N.D. Okla) (order granting the government’s
motion to dismiss filed at [ECF No. 44]). The VA terminated Dr. Laca’s employment on January 6, 2021. [ECF No. 2 at 7]. Since Dr. Laca was terminated, “he has been denied employment as a physician in locations close to Tulsa, Oklahoma; and the only place he has
been able to find work as a physician is in Florida, which forces him to be away from his wife and teenage children.” [Id.]. II. Standard Agent Jones moves to dismiss the claim against him pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive such a motion, “a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 861 F.3d 1081, 1104 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “There is a low bar for
surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,” and a case “may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Griffith v. El Paso Cnty., Colo., 129 F.4th 790, 815 (10th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up).
Although the facts alleged in the operative pleading are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “In other words, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate if
the complaint alone is legally insufficient to state a claim.” Brokers’ Choice, 861 F.3d at 1104–05. Additionally, conclusory allegations need not be accepted. Erikson v. Pawnee Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 263 F.3d 1151, 1154–55 (10th Cir. 2001);
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[C]onclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based.”). III. Discussion Plaintiff asserts only one claim against Agent Jones for a violation of his
constitutional and statutory civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [ECF No. 2 at 14]. Plaintiff specifically alleges that Defendant violated his right “to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, and to be free from arrest without probable cause.” [Id.]. Although Plaintiff explicitly and exclusively relies on
Section 1983 for his claim against Defendant [Id.], he argues that his claim is still viable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). [ECF No. 67 at 6–12]. The Court is skeptical that Plaintiff properly asserts a Bivens claim because of his explicit reliance
on Section 1983 in the complaint, but the Court will nevertheless address this argument in the interest of clarity. A. Section 1983 Section 1983 provides a cause of action against “[e]very person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). In other words, Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against federal officials who are acting under color of federal law. See Big Cats of Serenity Springs, Inc. v. Rhodes, 843 F.3d 853, 869 (10th Cir. 2016).
All of Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant are based on Defendant’s work as a Special Agent for the Department of Veterans Affairs, a federal entity, under color of federal law. Plaintiff does not make any allegations that Defendant acted under color of “any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Plaintiff has, therefore, failed to state a claim under Section 1983 against Defendant, and the claim must be dismissed. B. Bivens Although Plaintiff exclusively relies on Section 1983 for his claim against
Defendant, [ECF No. 2 at 6–12], Plaintiff now asserts that his claim can survive under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). [ECF No. 67 at 14]. In Bivens, the Supreme Court “authorized a damages action against
federal officials for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment.” Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 486 (2022). However, the Supreme Court repeatedly declines to extend Bivens to “other alleged constitutional violations.” Id. (citing 11 examples of the Supreme Court declining to extend Bivens). The
Tenth Circuit also routinely emphasizes how disfavored Bivens actions are, going as far as to say that these claims are “all but dead.” Rowland v. Matevousian, 121 F.4th 1237, 1241–42 (10th Cir. 2024); see also Silva v. United States, 45 F.4th 1134, 1140 (10th Cir. 2022) (reading Egbert as
standing for the proposition that a Bivens action is “impermissible in virtually all circumstances.”). Indeed, the “Supreme Court has not recognized a Bivens claim since 1980, and it has unambiguously stated that ‘if [the Court] were called to decide Bivens today, [it] would decline to discover any implied causes of action in the Constitution.’” Rowland, 121 F.4th at 1242.
(quoting Egbert, 596 U.S. at 502). Although Bivens actions are disfavored, the Court must still conduct a two-step inquiry to determine whether Plaintiffs’ claim is cognizable. First, the Court must examine whether Plaintiffs’ case “arises in a new Bivens
context, or in other words, analyze whether [Plaintiffs’] case is ‘meaningful[ly]’ different from the three cases in which the Court has implied a damages action.” Id. Second, the Court must “consider whether there are special factors suggesting that the … Judiciary is at least arguably less
equipped than Congress to weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). As a part of the second step, the Court “must ask whether there are alternative remedial schemes in place that address the plaintiff’s complaints.” Id. at 1243.
Notably, “[i]f there are alternative remedial structures in place, that alone, like any special factor, is reason enough to limit the power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens cause of action.” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 493 (quotation marks omitted).
i. Step One As noted above, a Bivens claim has only been recognized in three circumstances: • Bivens itself: This was a Fourth Amendment case in which the plaintiff claimed that FBN agents arrested him in his home without a warrant and “manacled [him] in front of his wife and children, and threatened to arrest the entire family,” which constituted unreasonable force. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
• Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979): This was a case in which the plaintiff served as a deputy administrative assistant for a member of congress. Id. at 230. The plaintiff alleged that the congressman discriminated against her on the basis of her sex in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
• Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980): This was a case in which the plaintiff’s son died in federal prison, and the claim was based on a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 16–17. Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant is based on alleged violations of Plaintiff’s rights “to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, and to be free from arrest without probable cause.” [ECF No. 2 at 14]. These are rights protected by the Fourth Amendment, so the only possible comparison is to Bivens itself. Although Bivens involved the Fourth Amendment, that does not necessarily mean the claim arises in the same context such that the case can move forward. Rowland v. Matevousian, 121 F.4th 1237, 1243 (10th Cir. 2024) (citing Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93, 102 (2020)). “Significant parallels” between one of the Supreme Court’s previous Bivens cases and a new case are not enough to survive, and “[s]mall differences can easily satisfy[y] the new-context inquiry.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). There are meaningful differences between the facts in Bivens and the facts alleged by Plaintiff in this case. The plaintiff in Bivens claimed that he was
arrested in his own home without a warrant and with excessive force. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. Unlike Bivens, Plaintiff’s allegations do not involve a warrantless arrest or the use of excessive force. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant gave false testimony to the grand jury and that his prosecution
was based on the false testimony. Plaintiff’s factual allegations are meaningfully different than the facts in Bivens because they focus on different Fourth Amendment protections. Plaintiff’s case presents a new Bivens context, so dismissal is proper.
ii. Step Two Even assuming Plaintiff’s claim did not present a new Bivens context, the claim also fails at step two because there are “special factors suggesting that the … Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress to weigh
the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.” Rowland, 121 F.4th 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 2024) (quotation marks omitted). The core assertion of Plaintiff’s claim is that Defendant lied to the grand jury and gave false testimony so the government could pursue prosecution. The Tenth
Circuit has cautioned against authorizing Bivens actions that would interfere with the criminal charging process. Williams v. Keller, No. 21-4022, 2021 WL 4486392, at *3–5 (10th Cir. Oct. 1, 2021) (unpublished).1 If Plaintiff’s case were submitted to a jury, the jury “would have to examine the evidence
available to investigators, prosecutors, and the grand jury, then decide whether the grand jury would have voted to indict him without the allegedly false information the defendants provided.” Id. at *3. The Court agrees that allowing Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant to go forward would improperly
delve into executive charging decisions and the secrecy of the grand jury process. Plaintiff’s claim against Agent Jones, therefore, fails at step two of the Bivens inquiry. For that reason, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and dismissal is proper.
C. Other Issues The parties raise several additional issues related to Defendant’s motion to dismiss. However, the Court declines to reach those questions because Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant fail under Section 1983 and Bivens for
the independent reasons set forth above. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Scott Jones’ motion to dismiss [ECF No. 51] is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Scott Jones,
the seventh claim [ECF No. 2 at 14], is DISMISSED WITHOUT
1 The Court acknowledges this order and judgment is unpublished. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). However, the Court cites to it for persuasive value. PREJUDICE. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint if he wishes to do so. If Plaintiff wishes to amend the complaint, he must do so no later than August 27, 2025. Failure to timely amend the complaint may result in dismissal of this action in its entirety.
DATED this 6th day of August, 2025.
Sara E. Hill UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE