1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LABYRINTH, INC., a Maryland Case No.: 3:23-cv-02212-WQH-VET corporation, 12 ORDER GRANTING ORAL Plaintiff, 13 DISCOVERY MOTION v. 14
KATHRYN PICKETT, individually and 15 d/b/a PICKETT’S CHARITY
16 SERVICES,
17 Defendant. 18 19 20 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Oral Discovery Motion (“Motion”), made on the 21 record during a Discovery Conference regarding the confidential designation attached to 22 Defendant’s October 8, 2024 deposition testimony. See Doc. Nos. 40–41. Plaintiff objects 23 to the confidentiality designation attached to certain portions of Defendant’s deposition 24 testimony and moves for an order finding that those portions do not constitute confidential 25 information. Based on review of the deposition testimony at issue, and for the reasons 26 stated below, the Court GRANTS the Motion. 27 28 1 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff deposed Defendant on October 8, 2024. Pursuant to the Court’s Protective 3 Order, see Doc. No. 13, Defendant’s prior legal counsel designated as “CONFIDENTIAL” 4 the entirety of Defendant’s deposition testimony. On December 6, 2024, the parties 5 contacted the Court concerning a challenge by Plaintiff to certain aspects of this 6 confidential designation. Doc. No. 39. The Court held a Discovery Conference on this issue 7 on December 10, 2024. Doc. No. 40. 8 During the Discovery Conference, Plaintiff formally raised the instant Motion. 9 Plaintiff seeks to include portions of Defendant’s deposition in support of a motion for fees 10 and costs associated with the deposition. Citing the Protective Order, Plaintiff contends 11 that the deposition testimony does not disclose or otherwise pertain to confidential 12 information such as business operations. See Doc. No. 13 at 4. 13 The Court provided Defendant, now proceeding pro se, multiple opportunities to 14 articulate why the confidentiality designation is appropriate and should not be removed. 15 Defendant explained that she was not comfortable with effectively undoing her prior 16 counsel’s actions. Defendant did not provide additional reasoning, despite having the 17 opportunity to do so. The Court also gave Defendant the opportunity to submit briefing, 18 but she declined and instead asked the Court to decide the issue. 19 Following the Discovery Conference, Plaintiff lodged a copy of Defendant’s 20 deposition transcript for in camera review, highlighting for the Court the approximately 21 seventeen (17) pages at issue in the instant Motion. 22 II. LEGAL STANDARD 23 “[I]t is well-established that the fruits of pretrial discovery are, in the absence of a 24 court order to the contrary, presumptively public.” Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. 25 Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002). As such, “the public is permitted access 26 to litigation documents and information produced during discovery.” In re Roman Catholic 27 Archbishop of Portland, 661 F.3d 417, 423 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Phillips ex rel. Estates 28 of Byrd, 307 F.3d at 1210). However, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, “[t]he 1 court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, 2 embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1); see also 3 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984) (“Because of the liberality of pretrial 4 discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(1), it is necessary for the trial court to have the authority 5 to issue protective orders conferred by Rule 26(c). It is clear from experience that pretrial 6 discovery . . . has a significant potential for abuse.”). Thus, “Rule 26(c) authorizes a district 7 court to override this presumption [of access to discovery] where ‘good cause’ is shown.” 8 Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd, 307 F.3d at 1210. 9 “While courts generally make a finding of good cause before issuing a protective 10 order, a court need not do so where (as here) the parties stipulate to such an order.” In re 11 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 661 F.3d at 417; see also Doc. No. 13. Blanket 12 protective orders, such as the protective order in this case, “are inherently subject to 13 challenge and modification, as the party resisting disclosure generally has not made a 14 particularized showing of good cause with respect to any individual document.” San Jose 15 Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct.--N. Dist. (San Jose), 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 16 1999) (citing Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992)). 17 “Ninth Circuit precedent strongly favors disclosure to meet the needs of parties in pending 18 litigation.” Verizon Cal. Inc. v. Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, L.P., 214 F.R.D. 583, 586 19 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting Beckman Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d at 475). 20 When a party challenges a confidentiality designation, the court conducts a two-step 21 analysis. Harmon v. City of Santa Clara, 323 F.R.D. 617, 623 (N.D. Cal. 2018); see also 22 Todd v. Tempur-Sealy Int’l, Inc., No. 13-cv-04984, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27803, at *6 23 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015). “First, it must determine whether particularized harm will result 24 from disclosure of the information to the public.” Todd, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27803, at 25 *6. The party asserting good cause bears the burden, for each document it seeks to protect, 26 of showing that specific prejudice or harm will result if the designation is removed. See 27 Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003). The party 28 “cannot meet [its] burden with [b]road allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific 1 examples or articulated reasoning.” Harmon, 323 F.R.D. at 623 (internal quotations 2 omitted). 3 “Second, if the court concludes that such harm will result from the disclosure of the 4 discovery documents, then it must proceed to balance the public and private interest to 5 decide whether maintaining” the confidentiality designation is appropriate. Todd, 2015 6 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27803, at *6–7; see also Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd, 307 F.3d at 7 1211. This balancing test considers the following factors: 8 (1) whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests; (2) whether the 9 information is being sought for a legitimate purpose or for an improper purpose; (3) whether disclosure of the information will cause a party 10 embarrassment; (4) whether confidentiality is being sought over information 11 important to public health and safety; (5) whether the sharing of information among litigants will promote fairness and efficiency; (6) whether a party 12 benefitting from the order of confidentiality is a public entity or official; and 13 (7) whether the case involves issues important to the public. 14 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 661 F.3d at 424 (“We have directed courts 15 doing this balancing to consider the factors identified by the Third Circuit in Glenmede 16 Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995).”).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LABYRINTH, INC., a Maryland Case No.: 3:23-cv-02212-WQH-VET corporation, 12 ORDER GRANTING ORAL Plaintiff, 13 DISCOVERY MOTION v. 14
KATHRYN PICKETT, individually and 15 d/b/a PICKETT’S CHARITY
16 SERVICES,
17 Defendant. 18 19 20 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Oral Discovery Motion (“Motion”), made on the 21 record during a Discovery Conference regarding the confidential designation attached to 22 Defendant’s October 8, 2024 deposition testimony. See Doc. Nos. 40–41. Plaintiff objects 23 to the confidentiality designation attached to certain portions of Defendant’s deposition 24 testimony and moves for an order finding that those portions do not constitute confidential 25 information. Based on review of the deposition testimony at issue, and for the reasons 26 stated below, the Court GRANTS the Motion. 27 28 1 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff deposed Defendant on October 8, 2024. Pursuant to the Court’s Protective 3 Order, see Doc. No. 13, Defendant’s prior legal counsel designated as “CONFIDENTIAL” 4 the entirety of Defendant’s deposition testimony. On December 6, 2024, the parties 5 contacted the Court concerning a challenge by Plaintiff to certain aspects of this 6 confidential designation. Doc. No. 39. The Court held a Discovery Conference on this issue 7 on December 10, 2024. Doc. No. 40. 8 During the Discovery Conference, Plaintiff formally raised the instant Motion. 9 Plaintiff seeks to include portions of Defendant’s deposition in support of a motion for fees 10 and costs associated with the deposition. Citing the Protective Order, Plaintiff contends 11 that the deposition testimony does not disclose or otherwise pertain to confidential 12 information such as business operations. See Doc. No. 13 at 4. 13 The Court provided Defendant, now proceeding pro se, multiple opportunities to 14 articulate why the confidentiality designation is appropriate and should not be removed. 15 Defendant explained that she was not comfortable with effectively undoing her prior 16 counsel’s actions. Defendant did not provide additional reasoning, despite having the 17 opportunity to do so. The Court also gave Defendant the opportunity to submit briefing, 18 but she declined and instead asked the Court to decide the issue. 19 Following the Discovery Conference, Plaintiff lodged a copy of Defendant’s 20 deposition transcript for in camera review, highlighting for the Court the approximately 21 seventeen (17) pages at issue in the instant Motion. 22 II. LEGAL STANDARD 23 “[I]t is well-established that the fruits of pretrial discovery are, in the absence of a 24 court order to the contrary, presumptively public.” Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. 25 Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002). As such, “the public is permitted access 26 to litigation documents and information produced during discovery.” In re Roman Catholic 27 Archbishop of Portland, 661 F.3d 417, 423 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Phillips ex rel. Estates 28 of Byrd, 307 F.3d at 1210). However, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, “[t]he 1 court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, 2 embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1); see also 3 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984) (“Because of the liberality of pretrial 4 discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(1), it is necessary for the trial court to have the authority 5 to issue protective orders conferred by Rule 26(c). It is clear from experience that pretrial 6 discovery . . . has a significant potential for abuse.”). Thus, “Rule 26(c) authorizes a district 7 court to override this presumption [of access to discovery] where ‘good cause’ is shown.” 8 Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd, 307 F.3d at 1210. 9 “While courts generally make a finding of good cause before issuing a protective 10 order, a court need not do so where (as here) the parties stipulate to such an order.” In re 11 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 661 F.3d at 417; see also Doc. No. 13. Blanket 12 protective orders, such as the protective order in this case, “are inherently subject to 13 challenge and modification, as the party resisting disclosure generally has not made a 14 particularized showing of good cause with respect to any individual document.” San Jose 15 Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct.--N. Dist. (San Jose), 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 16 1999) (citing Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992)). 17 “Ninth Circuit precedent strongly favors disclosure to meet the needs of parties in pending 18 litigation.” Verizon Cal. Inc. v. Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, L.P., 214 F.R.D. 583, 586 19 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting Beckman Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d at 475). 20 When a party challenges a confidentiality designation, the court conducts a two-step 21 analysis. Harmon v. City of Santa Clara, 323 F.R.D. 617, 623 (N.D. Cal. 2018); see also 22 Todd v. Tempur-Sealy Int’l, Inc., No. 13-cv-04984, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27803, at *6 23 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015). “First, it must determine whether particularized harm will result 24 from disclosure of the information to the public.” Todd, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27803, at 25 *6. The party asserting good cause bears the burden, for each document it seeks to protect, 26 of showing that specific prejudice or harm will result if the designation is removed. See 27 Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003). The party 28 “cannot meet [its] burden with [b]road allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific 1 examples or articulated reasoning.” Harmon, 323 F.R.D. at 623 (internal quotations 2 omitted). 3 “Second, if the court concludes that such harm will result from the disclosure of the 4 discovery documents, then it must proceed to balance the public and private interest to 5 decide whether maintaining” the confidentiality designation is appropriate. Todd, 2015 6 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27803, at *6–7; see also Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd, 307 F.3d at 7 1211. This balancing test considers the following factors: 8 (1) whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests; (2) whether the 9 information is being sought for a legitimate purpose or for an improper purpose; (3) whether disclosure of the information will cause a party 10 embarrassment; (4) whether confidentiality is being sought over information 11 important to public health and safety; (5) whether the sharing of information among litigants will promote fairness and efficiency; (6) whether a party 12 benefitting from the order of confidentiality is a public entity or official; and 13 (7) whether the case involves issues important to the public. 14 In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 661 F.3d at 424 (“We have directed courts 15 doing this balancing to consider the factors identified by the Third Circuit in Glenmede 16 Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995).”). “However, these factors are 17 neither mandatory nor exhaustive,” and, as such “the district court is best situated to 18 determine what factors are relevant to the dispute.” Harmon, 323 F.R.D. at 623 (quoting 19 Glenmede Trust Co., 56 F.3d at 483). 20 “Importantly, in a challenge to a confidentiality designation under a protective order, 21 the burden of proof remains with the party seeking protection.” Id. (internal quotations 22 omitted) (quoting In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 661 F.3d at 424); see also 23 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d 1068, 1070 (9th Cir. 1992) (person asserting 24 confidentiality has the burden of showing why it applies to given set of documents). 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 As an initial matter, the Court notes that Defendant fails to carry her burden in 27 demonstrating that the testimony at issue warrants protection. While the Court is sensitive 28 to Defendant’s pro se status, she made no effort to articulate why the testimony is sensitive, 1 || private, or otherwise confidential despite having multiple opportunities to do so. Instead, 2 ||she simply relies on her prior legal counsel’s designation decision. However, it appears 3 ||that her prior counsel designated the entirety of Defendant’s deposition testimony as 4 ||confidential without undertaking any analysis to determine whether the entirety or just 5 || portions thereof required protection. 6 Moreover, review of the deposition testimony at issue confirms that the testimony 7 ||does not contain confidential information. The testimony provides details concerning 8 ||Defendant’s search for documents in response to discovery requests, Defendant’s 9 ||document productions, her prior access to Plaintiff's documents, her prior duties while 10 |}employed by Plaintiff, and the collection of clients’ public information. There are no 11 || discussions or references to any sensitive or private information relating to Defendant or 12 ||her business. To the extent any testimony relates to business practices, the testimony 13 ||concerns Plaintiff's business practices. In short, the Court cannot discern any specific 14 prejudice or harm that would result from removing the confidential designation and 15 || disclosing the testimony at issue. 16 CONCLUSION 17 Accordingly, based on a review of the deposition testimony at issue and the record 18 || before it, and good cause appearing, the Court GRANTS the Motion. The following 19 || portions of Defendant’s October 8, 2024 deposition testimony (identified by page and line 20 || from the deposition transcript) are not confidential and any confidential designation shall 21 || be removed: 416:19-420:25; 424:3-426:25; 461:20-479:17. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 (J shK— +<{ a 24 Dated: December 21, 2024 25 United States Magistrate Tudge 26 27 28