Labarrere-Abreu v. Carvana Co.

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Mexico
DecidedApril 15, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-00299
StatusUnknown

This text of Labarrere-Abreu v. Carvana Co. (Labarrere-Abreu v. Carvana Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Mexico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Labarrere-Abreu v. Carvana Co., (D.N.M. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

ISMARA LABARRERE-ABREU, Plaintiff, v. No. 1:25-cv-00299-SCY CARVANA CO. d/b/a CARVANA LLC and ERNEST C. GARCIA III, Defendants. ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND ORDER TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT This matter comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff’s Civil Rights Complaint Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Doc. 1, filed March 24, 2025 (“Complaint”), and Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs, Doc. 2, filed March 24, 2025 (“Application”). Order Granting Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis The statute for proceedings in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), provides that the Court may authorize the commencement of any suit without prepayment of fees by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets the person possesses and that the person is unable to pay such fees. When a district court receives an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, it should examine the papers and determine if the requirements of [28 U.S.C.] § 1915(a) are satisfied. If they are, leave should be granted. Thereafter, if the court finds that the allegations of poverty are untrue or that the action is frivolous or malicious, it may dismiss the case[.]

Menefee v. Werholtz, 368 F. App’x 879, 884 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Ragan v. Cox, 305 F.2d 58, 60 (10th Cir. 1962). “The statute [allowing a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis] was intended for the benefit of those too poor to pay or give security for costs . . . .” Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 344 (1948). While a litigant need not be “absolutely destitute,” “an affidavit is sufficient which states that one cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for the costs and still be able to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life.” Id. at 339. The Court grants Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying

Fees or Costs. Plaintiff signed an affidavit stating he is unable to pay the costs of these proceedings and stated: (i) Plaintiff’s average monthly income amount during the past 12 months is $3,000.00; and (ii) his monthly expenses total $4,997.82 to $5,097.82.00. Thus, Plaintiff is unable to pay the costs of these proceedings because his monthly expenses exceed his monthly income. Order to Show Cause Plaintiff alleges that he: lawfully tendered a Bill of Exchange (a negotiable instrument) in good faith to settle an alleged auto financing obligation, in accordance with 12 C.F.R. § 201.108, UCC § 3-310, and GAAP accounting principles. . . Respondents refused to honor the payment . . . continued to report the account as delinquent . . . imposed a lien on Petitioner’s automobile without valid authorization and are now attempting repossession . . . Respondents have failed to act in good faith, violating federal banking laws, financial disclosure regulations, and tax reporting requirements. Furthermore, their legal representatives, acting in bad faith, have advised them to continue these deceptive practices in violation of 12 C.F.R. § 37.3(b) (misrepresentation of banking transactions) and 26 C.F.R. § 1.6050P-1 (failure to discharge a debt). . . . .

2. [Defendants] [f]ailed to honor the negotiable instrument, violating UCC § 3- 310, 12 C.F.R. § 201.108, and GAAP Rule ASC 405-20-40-1, which require proper processing of financial instruments.

3. [Defendants] [d]id not issue a required IRS Form 1099-C, which is mandated when a debt is discharged, violating 26 C.F.R. § 1.6050P-1. Complaint at 3, 5 (emphasis omitted). Plaintiff invokes federal question jurisdiction over his claims. However, the Court notes several deficiencies with the federal law claims. First, the Complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 201.108. Plaintiff alleges Section 201.108 “require[s] proper processing of financial instruments” and that Defendants “failed to honor the negotiable instrument.” Complaint at 5. Section 201.108,

however, does not set forth any processing requirements for financial instruments; it only identifies “the principal agency obligations eligible as collateral for advances.” 12 C.F.R. § 201.108. Second, the Complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 37.3(b). “A national bank is authorized to enter into debt cancellation contracts and debt suspension agreements and charge a fee therefor, in connection with extensions of credit that it makes.” 12 C.F.R. § 37.1 (stating Part 37 “sets forth the standards that apply to debt cancellation contracts and debt suspension agreements entered into by national banks” and that the “purpose of these standards is to ensure that national banks offer and implement such contracts and agreements consistent

with safe and sound banking practices, and subject to appropriate consumer protections”). Section 37.3(b) prohibits certain contract terms and practices such as misrepresentations. Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated 12 C.F.R. § 37.3(b) by “fraudulent omission of material facts regarding the securitization1 of the auto loan.” Complaint at 5. However, the Complaint contains no allegations that either Defendant Carvana or Defendant Ernest C. Garcia

1 “Securitize” means “[t]o convert (assets) into negotiable securities for resale in the financial market, allowing the issuing financial institution to remove assets from its books, and thereby improve its capital ratio and liquidity, and to make new loans with the security proceeds if it so chooses.” Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). are a “national bank” for purposes of Part 37 or that Defendants entered into a debt cancellation contract and debt suspension agreement with Plaintiff. Third, the Complaint fails to state a claim under 26 C.F.R. § 1.6050p-1, which requires that certain entities that discharge an indebtedness of any person must file an information return on Form 1099-C with the Internal Revenue Service. See Heredia v. Capital Mgmt. Services, L.P.,

942 F.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2019) (“The Internal Revenue Service requires a creditor to file a 1099C form if it has forgiven at least $600 in principal”). There are no allegations that Defendants discharged2 Plaintiff’s debt.

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Related

Adkins v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.
335 U.S. 331 (Supreme Court, 1948)
City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Companies, Inc.
264 F.3d 1245 (Tenth Circuit, 2001)
Yang v. Archuleta
525 F.3d 925 (Tenth Circuit, 2008)
Menefee v. Werholtz
368 F. App'x 879 (Tenth Circuit, 2010)
Davison v. Grant Thornton LLP
582 F. App'x 773 (Tenth Circuit, 2014)
Banker v. Gold Resource Corp.
776 F.3d 1103 (Tenth Circuit, 2015)
Mabel Heredia v. Capital Management Services, L
942 F.3d 811 (Seventh Circuit, 2019)
Barnett v. Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable
956 F.3d 1228 (Tenth Circuit, 2020)

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Bluebook (online)
Labarrere-Abreu v. Carvana Co., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/labarrere-abreu-v-carvana-co-nmd-2025.