L.A. TERMINALS, INC. et al. v. UNITED NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY

District Court, C.D. California·Decided June 12, 2026·No. 8:19-cv-00286·Unknown

Opinion

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8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California

11 L.A. TERMINALS, INC. et al., Case № 8:19-cv-00286-ODW (PVCx)

12 Plaintiffs, ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEYS’ 13 v. FEES RE: CONTEMPT MOTION 14 UNITED NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 15

Defendant. 16

17 I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 18 This case is a long-running insurance coverage dispute between Plaintiffs L.A. 19 Terminals, Inc. and Soco West, Inc., and their insurer, Defendant United National 20 Insurance Company. (Order Grant Contempt 1, Dkt. No. 266.) On January 7, 2026, 21 the Court found United in civil contempt for violating the Court’s orders directing 22 United to pay Plaintiffs’ underlying defense expenses. (Id. at 12.) As a compensatory 23 sanction, the Court awarded Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs 24 incurred in bringing the successful contempt motion. (Id.) Now, having reviewed 25 Plaintiffs’ request for fees, (Decl. James A. Tabb (“Tabb Decl.”), Dkt. No. 270), and 26 United’s Response, (Resp., Dkt. No. 271), the Court AWARDS Plaintiffs $69,260 in 27 attorneys’ fees. 28 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A court’s inherent authority to compel compliance with its orders affords it 3 “broad equitable power[s] to order appropriate relief in civil contempt proceedings.” 4 SEC v. Hickey, 322 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2003). Among those equitable powers 5 is the authority to award fees and expenses incurred in those proceedings. Perry v. 6 O’Donnell, 759 F.2d 702, 704–06 (9th Cir. 1985). Such an award is limited to those 7 fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in the attempt to enforce compliance. 8 Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1028 (9th Cir. 1985) 9 (affirming award of attorneys’ fees for successful contempt motions). 10 To determine the reasonableness of a party’s fee request, courts use the 11 “lodestar method.” Morales v. San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996). Under 12 the lodestar method, courts multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by a 13 reasonable hourly rate. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 14 2008). The fee applicant bears the initial burden of demonstrating with evidence that 15 the hours worked and rates charged are reasonably necessary. Welch v. Met. Life Ins. 16 Co., 480 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2007). Once the applicant meets its initial burden, 17 the burden shifts to the opposing party to present equally specific countervailing 18 evidence. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397–98 (9th Cir. 1992). The 19 lodestar is presumptively a reasonable fee award.1 Id. at 1397. 20 The court has a “great deal of discretion in determining the reasonableness of 21 the fee.” Id. at 1398. 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 Plaintiffs seek $123,188 in fees for 87.4 hours expended in bringing the 24 contempt motion. (Tabb Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. C (“Billing Breakdown”), Dkt. No. 270-3.) 25 This figure is based on the following hourly rates: Attorney James A. Tabb at $1,595; 26 Attorney Joe C. Bsaibes at $1,350; and Paralegal Tara Villegas at $450. (Tabb Decl. 27

28 1 “If circumstances warrant,” the court may also consider adjusting the lodestar. Camacho, 523 F.3d at 978; Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1995). 1 ¶¶ 3–5; Billing Breakdown.) Plaintiffs do not seek costs. (See generally Tabb Decl.) 2 United objects to the fee request on the grounds that the attorneys’ hourly rates are 3 unreasonable and unsupported. (Resp. 3.) United does not challenge the total hours 4 expended or Villegas’s hourly rate. (See generally id.)2 The Court finds the hours 5 expended reasonable and so focuses solely on the reasonableness of the hourly rates. 6 An attorney’s hourly rate is reasonable if it is in line with the “prevailing market 7 rates in the relevant community.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). Billing 8 rates are “established by reference to the fees that private attorneys of an ability and 9 reputation comparable to that of prevailing counsel charge their paying clients for 10 legal work of similar complexity.” Welch, 480 F.3d at 946. In making this showing, 11 “affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorneys and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in 12 the community, and rate determinations in other cases are satisfactory evidence of the 13 prevailing market rate.” Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979–80 (citation modified). The 14 relevant community is typically that “in which the district court sits.” Schwarz v. 15 Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 906 (9th Cir. 1995). In assessing 16 whether the rates are reasonable, a district court may rely on its “own knowledge of 17 customary rates” and its “familiarity with the legal market.” Ingram v. Oroudijian, 18 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011). 19 A. Attorney James A. Tabb 20 Plaintiffs request an hourly rate of $1,595 for Tabb. (Billing Breakdown.) In 21 support, Plaintiffs submit Tabb’s declaration and firm biography providing that he is 22 Counsel at Latham & Watkins and has twenty-seven years of experience in complex 23 commercial litigation with an emphasis in insurance litigation. (Tabb Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A 24 (“Tabb Bio”), Dkt. No. 270-1.) However, Plaintiffs submit no evidence at all that the 25 requested rate is “in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services 26 by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Camacho, 27

28 2 United also broadly opposes awarding Plaintiffs’ fees on the grounds that the contempt order is wrong. (Resp. 3.) 1 523 F.3d at 980. Tabb does not even declare that he believes his rate is reasonable. 2 (See generally Tabb Decl.) The cases Plaintiffs cite also do not support Tabb’s rate. 3 (Id. ¶ 8.) For instance, Beryl v. Navient Corp. involved a complex ERISA dispute in 4 which the court approved an hourly rate of $1,200 for an attorney with thirty-four 5 years of extensive ERISA experience, where the movant supported the requested rates 6 with additional declaration evidence. No. 20-cv-05920-LB, 2023 WL 4570626, at *1, 7 3–4 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2023). First, the instant case is not a complex ERISA dispute 8 in the Northern District; it is a fairly standard insurance defense dispute in the Central 9 District of California. Further, Tabb is not as experienced or specialized as the 10 attorney in Beryl. Yet, he seeks a much higher rate while providing substantially less 11 evidentiary support than the movant in Beryl. On the whole, Plaintiffs fail to 12 adequately support Tabb’s requested rate.3 13 United proposes reducing Tabb’s hourly rate to $900 based on a midline of the 14 rates found reasonable in Beryl: between a ten-year associate ($600) and a highly 15 experienced trial attorney ($1,200). (Resp. 6 (citing Beryl, 2023 WL 4570626, at *2).) 16 United deftly points, for comparison, to the highest rate charged by Plaintiffs’ 17 attorneys in the underlying environmental litigation: $780 per hour for an attorney 18 with more than forty years of environmental litigation experience.

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L.A. TERMINALS, INC. et al. v. UNITED NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, (C.D. Cal. 2026).

L.A. TERMINALS, INC. et al. v. UNITED NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY (L.A. TERMINALS, INC. et al. v. UNITED NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Blum v. Stenson
465 U.S. 886 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Ingram v. Oroudjian
647 F.3d 925 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp.
768 F.2d 1001 (Ninth Circuit, 1985)
Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
480 F.3d 942 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial, Inc.
523 F.3d 973 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Hickey
322 F.3d 1123 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)
Gates v. Deukmejian
987 F.2d 1392 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)