La Croix v. Recknagel

89 So. 2d 363, 230 La. 842, 1956 La. LEXIS 1467
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedJune 29, 1956
Docket42291
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 89 So. 2d 363 (La Croix v. Recknagel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
La Croix v. Recknagel, 89 So. 2d 363, 230 La. 842, 1956 La. LEXIS 1467 (La. 1956).

Opinion

SIMON, Justice.

By this suit plaintiff-appellant seeks the rescission and annulment of a contract of lease for a motion-picture theater and of a sale of motion-picture equipment and damages allegedly incurred in the operation of the leased premises, plus attorney fees, or for the total sum of $8,305.93, with legal interest from date of judicial demand. In an álternative plea, plaintiff-appellant seeks judgment in the sum of $4,475.

Plaintiff alleges that through defendants’ fraudulent representations he was induced into purchasing motion-picture equipment and entering into a contract of lease for a term of five years for the property known as the Isis Theater; that the said false and fraudulent representations related to and concerned the revenues of said theater, this being his principal motive for entering into said contract of lease and venturing into the business of operating a motion-picture theater, and that, relying thereon, he suffered the damages complained of.

By supplemental and amended petition plaintiff alleges that the lessor failed to *845 cause him to be in a peaceable possession of the premises, the theater having been ordered closed by the fire marshal of the State of Louisiana due to hazardous defects and violations of laws and ordinances pertaining thereto; that the building as rented to him was considered unsafe for occupancy as a motion-picture theater, to the knowledge of lessors, which information was withheld or concealed. He further alleges that the motion-picture equipment purchased by him under separate transfer was useless to him and prays for the rescission of said sale and a reimbursement of the purchase price.

Defendants admit the contract of lease for the rental of the theater property and the sale of said equipment, but in effect generally deny all actionable charges.

On the day of trial it was agreed, by stipulation of counsel, that the contract of lease should be and it was cancelled effective March 3, 19S4, without prejudice to the rights of the parties thereto. Judgment was rendered dismissing plaintiff’s suit, and he has appealed.

The actionable charges of fraud, misrepresentation and induced error necessarily resolve themselves into purely an issue of fact. The record discloses that the defendants herein, owners of the theater property, had rented same to Rex Amusement Company for the rental of $300 per month or 10% of the gross revenues, whichever was the greater. A cancellation • clause contained in said lease provided that should the owner not receive the average of $300 per month for any three consecutive months’ period, either party to the lease could cancel same upon giving a 60-day notice in writing. Upon the parties hereto having availed themselves of the rights of the cancellation clause, the theater property was advertised for rent in the daily press. Having seen the advertisement, plaintiff immediately contacted the owners to negotiate for the rental of the theater. He alleges that the defendants represented to him that their actual rental revenue under the terms of their lease with Rex Amusement Company averaged each month from $600 to $700, based on the gross revenue of the theater which was in excess of $6,000 per month. However, not only is this alleged representation flatly contradicted in all details by defendant, but the testimony of plaintiff miserably fails to sustain his contention but discloses that the defendants informed him that the rental received from the theater under the contract of lease with Rex Amusement Company was inadequate, being then no more than $300, which inadequacy was the reason for its cancellation.

The record further discloses that plaintiff sought and obtained advice and made an independent investigation of the possibility and probability of the box office receipts and revenues of said theater. By his testimony and testimony of witnesses it *847 is irrefutably shown that plaintiff was cautioned that the theater was not a profitable business venture; that notwithstanding this warning he preferred to “take a gamble”; that his sole .interest was to become engaged in the motion-picture business; and that he believed that with sound management and proper advertisement the gross revenues of the theater could be increased to the desired sum of $6,000 to $7,000 a month. Plaintiff knew that at the time he was negotiating for the rental of this theater the box office receipts and other revenues were inadequate to yield on a percentage basis a rental of $600 or $700 a month, but that in truth and in fact the rental actually being paid by the lessee under the terms of its lease was the minimum of $300 per month.

The record further discloses that the plaintiff was advised by his brother-in-law, one experienced in the operation of motion-picture theaters, that the Isis Theater was not a good business venture and that it would not produce the revenue anticipated by plaintiff. Plaintiff’s business financier, from whom he borrowed $3,500 for the purchase of the equipment, advised him against entering into this particular business venture, on the basis that the Isis Theater would not prove profitable. Mr. Bluestone, a theater representative or buyer and booker for theaters with 15 years’ experience, informed him that it was generally “known in the trade” that the Isis was not doing satisfactory business and also advised him against entering into the lease of the theater for its operation. Plaintiff was totally indifferent to and unaffected by all this advice given to him and disregarded it, being confident that with good management and advertisement he could successfully operate said theater.

Plaintiff further complains that he was not held in peaceable possession of the leased premises, but that on May 14, 1953, after only three months’ operation thereof by plaintiff, the theater was ordered closed by the state fire marshal, due to hazardous defects contained therein, in violation of laws and ordinances, a condition which rendered the theater unsafe for occupancy by the public. He specifies such complaints as the gas heater not being vented to the outside of the building in accordance with law, defective electric wiring, various openings in the walls in the area near the projection roof, torn floor-covering in the aisles, fabric curtains surrounding the motion-picture screen not being flame repellent, seating arrangement not in accord with the building code, numerous broken and cut seats, exhaust fan in women’s dressing-room not in accordance with law, building not properly secured against unauthorized entry, and an accumulation of trash and rubbish in the area of the projection room. He alleges that the above condition was concealed from him by the defendants, whereas his testimony clearly *849 reveals the fact that he visited the theater prior to executing the lease and examined the premises and was, or should have been, fully aware of the conditions herein complained of and existing on the premises.

Plaintiff also complains that the motion-picture equipment was at the time of the purchase old, outmoded and useless. This contention is refuted by the facts. He operated the theater for a period of three months, using said equipment, and became dissatisfied when under his management the revenues were not as he had hoped or that defendant allegedly said they would be.

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Bluebook (online)
89 So. 2d 363, 230 La. 842, 1956 La. LEXIS 1467, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/la-croix-v-recknagel-la-1956.