L1 Technologies, Inc. v. Chekanov

District Court, S.D. California·Decided October 16, 2020·No. 3:20-cv-00259·Unknown

Opinion

L1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; Case No.: 20-cv-00259-H-JLB SYNCWISE, LLC; and PIXELS MATTER, LLC, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND Plaintiffs, THE COMPLAINT v. SERHII CHEKANOV; DMITRY [Doc. No. 18.] FATEEV; ROMAN KOLESNIKOV; and VEBERFOC, INC., Defendants.

On February 11, 2020, Plaintiffs L1 Technologies, Inc., Syncwise, LLC, and Pixels Matter, LLC (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendants Serhii Chekanov, Dmitry Fateev,1 Roman Kolesnikov, and VeberFOC, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. No. 1.) On September 15, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave

1 On June 16, 2020, Fateev filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. (Doc. No. 6.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs and Fateev settled, with both agreeing to release all claims they had against one another. (Doc. to amend their complaint, seeking leave to add causes of action for defamation and trade libel. (Doc. No. 18 at 1; see also Doc. No. 19, Proposed Amended Compl. ¶¶ 31-33, 90- 95.) Defendant filed a response in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion on September 22, 2020. (Doc. No. 21.) Plaintiffs did not file a reply. For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their complaint. On February 11, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants. (Doc. No. 1.) In the complaint, Plaintiffs alleged claims against Chekanov for: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) fraud and concealment; (4) negligent misrepresentation; and (5) breach of fiduciary duty. (Id.) Plaintiffs also alleged claims against Defendants for: (6) conspiracy; (7) conversion; (8) misappropriation by acquisition; (9) unjust enrichment; (10) unfair and deceptive trade practices; (11) unfair competition in violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq.; and (12) intentional interference with contracts. (Id.) According to Plaintiffs, since the filing of their complaint, Defendants have repeatedly commented false statements on Plaintiffs’ customers’ social media platforms. (Doc. No. 19, Proposed Amended Compl. ¶¶ 31-32.) Plaintiffs provide several examples of these activities in Exhibit 6 of their proposed amended complaint. (Id. Ex. 6.) For example, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants commented the following message on one of Plaintiffs’ customer’s LinkedIn posts: The level of specialists L1 Technologies [sic] is very low . . . . Developers are engaged in theft and copying of branded electrical and GPS devices while presenting the development as their own. Also, the main boss turns out to be violates for women [sic] as evidenced by several lawsuits from women against him in the USA! I will not advise this disgusting company. (Id.) Plaintiffs’ customers have contacted them about these comments, complaining that it is a nuisance to continuously monitor and delete these false statements. (Id. ¶ 32.) Also, Defendants allegedly made false statements about Plaintiffs’ business operations to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). (Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint attaches an IRS information referral form (Form 3949-A), allegedly filed by Chekanov, in which Chekanov reported Plaintiffs for suspected tax law violations.2 (Id. Ex. 7.) According to the exhibit, Chekanov reported t that Plaintiffs were hiding their income by and through their various affiliate businesses and overseas operations. (Id.) Based on these new allegations, Plaintiffs now seek to amend their complaint to add claims for defamation and trade libel against Defendants. (Doc. No. 18 at 1.) Chekanov’s response in opposition to Plaintiffs motion was largely nonresponsive. (See Doc. No. 21 at 1-2.) Chekanov did state, however, that he had “no relationship” to the alleged correspondence with Plaintiffs’ customers on social media3 and that “it is not worth connecting” these activities with his statements to the IRS. (See id. at 1.) Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” The “court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. “[T]his policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990)). “Generally, this determination should be performed with all inferences in favor of granting the motion.” Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp., Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999). Courts may not decline to grant leave to amend absent a strong showing of “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment, etc.” Sonoma Cnty. Ass'n of Retired Emples. v. Sonoma Cnty., 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013) (alteration

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