L. E. Beaudin Shoe Co. v. Millen

Connecticut Superior Court

L. E. Beaudin Shoe Co. v. Millen

12 Conn. Super. Ct. 33, 12 Conn. Supp. 33, 1943 Conn. Super. LEXIS 36

CourtConnecticut Superior Court

DecidedJanuary 20, 1943

DocketFile 58515

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 12 Conn. Super. Ct. 33 (L. E. Beaudin Shoe Co. v. Millen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

L. E. Beaudin Shoe Co. v. Millen, 12 Conn. Super. Ct. 33, 12 Conn. Supp. 33, 1943 Conn. Super. LEXIS 36 (Colo. Ct. App. 1943).

Pincite

Opinion

QUINLAN, J.

Examination of Boothe vs. Armstrong, 76 Conn. 530; Hubley Mfg. & Supply Co. vs. Ives, 81 id. 244, and Downing vs. Wilcox, 84 id. 437, give a fair historical re' view of the liberal development under our Practice Act and decisions of counterclaims, which may embrace set-offs and recoupment. Notwithstanding that the right of set-off has always been confined to rights of action arising from contract, it has been recognised that if the subject matter is so connected with the matter in controversy under the original complaint that its consideration is necessary for a full determination of the rights of the parties even tort may be counterclaimed.

Here the complaint is in contract, but the idea of mutual debts has been extended in signification. See Hubley Mfg. & Supply Co. vs. Ives, supra. Moreover, for many years it has been a recognised principle “that two suits shall not be brought for the determination of matters in controversy between the same parties, whether relating to legal or equitable rights, or to both, when such determination can be had as effectually and properly in one suit.” Welles vs. Rhodes, 59 Conn. 498, 503.

This plaintiff has submitted its cause to this jurisdiction. Why should the defendants be required to go to another state? Hubley Mfg. & Supply Co. vs. Ives, supra, p. 247.

Again, the defendants allege a general 'course of business dealings. Whether that can be proved or not remains to be seen, but that is the pleading. Even if regarded as a claim of a wholly independent character, neither Harral vs. Leverty, 50 Conn. 46, 63, nor Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. vs. Riverside Trust Co., 123 id. 616, 630, bar a set-off by way of counterclaim, as long as it is not a claim against a co-defendant. And finally, recoupment for breach of warranty under our *35 present practice is to be pleaded as a counterclaim, and reference is made to sections 4689 and 5511 of the General Statutes, Revision of 1930, as well as to Capitol Coal Co. vs. Greenberg, 114 Conn. 422.

The motion to strike out is denied.

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QUINLAN, J.

Examination of Boothe vs. Armstrong, 76 Conn. 530; Hubley Mfg. & Supply Co. vs. Ives, 81 id. 244, and Downing vs. Wilcox, 84 id. 437, give a fair historical re' view of the liberal development under our Practice Act and decisions of counterclaims, which may embrace set-offs and recoupment. Notwithstanding that the right of set-off has always been confined to rights of action arising from contract, it has been recognised that if the subject matter is so connected with the matter in controversy under the original complaint that its consideration is necessary for a full determination of the rights of the parties even tort may be counterclaimed.

Here the complaint is in contract, but the idea of mutual debts has been extended in signification. See Hubley Mfg. & Supply Co. vs. Ives, supra. Moreover, for many years it has been a recognised principle “that two suits shall not be brought for the determination of matters in controversy between the same parties, whether relating to legal or equitable rights, or to both, when such determination can be had as effectually and properly in one suit.” Welles vs. Rhodes, 59 Conn. 498, 503.

This plaintiff has submitted its cause to this jurisdiction. Why should the defendants be required to go to another state? Hubley Mfg. & Supply Co. vs. Ives, supra, p. 247.

Again, the defendants allege a general 'course of business dealings. Whether that can be proved or not remains to be seen, but that is the pleading. Even if regarded as a claim of a wholly independent character, neither Harral vs. Leverty, 50 Conn. 46, 63, nor Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. vs. Riverside Trust Co., 123 id. 616, 630, bar a set-off by way of counterclaim, as long as it is not a claim against a co-defendant. And finally, recoupment for breach of warranty under our *35 present practice is to be pleaded as a counterclaim, and reference is made to sections 4689 and 5511 of the General Statutes, Revision of 1930, as well as to Capitol Coal Co. vs. Greenberg, 114 Conn. 422.

The motion to strike out is denied.

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12 Conn. Super. Ct. 33, 12 Conn. Supp. 33, 1943 Conn. Super. LEXIS 36, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/l-e-beaudin-shoe-co-v-millen-connsuperct-1943.

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