L. Bryan Carr Co., L.P.A. v. LaForge

2025 Ohio 4419

Opinion

[Cite as L. Bryan Carr Co., L.P.A. v. LaForge, 2025-Ohio-4419.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GEAUGA COUNTY

L. BRYAN CARR CO., L.P.A., et al., CASE NO. 2025-G-0008

Plaintiffs-Appellees, Civil Appeal from the - vs - Court of Common Pleas

MARILYN A. LAFORGE, f.k.a. DEL ZOPPO, et al., Trial Court No. 2020 F 000495

Defendant-Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Decided: September 22, 2025 Judgment: Appeal dismissed; judgment vacated and remanded

Brian J. Green and Sean Burke, Shapero & Green, LLC, Signature Square, Building II, 25101 Chagrin Boulevard, Suite 220, Beachwood, OH 44122 (For Plaintiffs-Appellees).

Andrew M. Engel, Marc E. Dann, Brian D. Flick, Whitney E. Kaster and Marita I. Ramirez, Dann Law, 15000 Madison Avenue, Lakewood, OH 44107 (For Defendant-Appellant Marilyn A. LaForge).

Kristen Rine, Assistant Prosecutor, Courthouse Annex, 231 Main Street, 3rd Floor, Chardon, OH 44024 (For Defendant Geauga County Treasurer).

Casey P. O’Brien, Ibold & O’Brien, 401 South Street, Chardon, OH 44024 (Intervenor).

MATT LYNCH, J.

{¶1} Appellant, Marilyn A. LaForge, f.k.a. Del Zoppo, appeals the judgment of

the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas confirming the sale of her real property and

ordering the delivery of the deed and the distribution of the proceeds. Because the trial

court did not follow our remand instructions following LaForge’s appeal in L. Bryan Carr

v. LaForge, 2025-Ohio-889 (11th Dist.) (“Carr I”), and failed to issue a final judgment entry of foreclosure, we dismiss the instant appeal for lack of a final appealable order, vacate

the trial court’s order confirming the sale, and remand the matter for the trial court to follow

the law of the case and proceed with a final judgment entry of foreclosure that determines

the validity and priority of all the liens/lienholders.

{¶2} On February 21, 2025, while Carr I was pending, the trial court issued a

judgment confirming the sale and ordering the delivery of the deed and the distribution of

the proceeds. On March 7, 2025, the trial court issued a “corrected entry confirming sale

and ordering deed and distribution,” to correct the amount due to the auditor and the

deed’s number of pages. LaForge appealed on March 13, 2025, and we issued our

decision in Carr I on March 17, 2025.

{¶3} In Carr I, we determined the final judgment entry of foreclosure was not a

final appealable order because the court omitted a lien/lienholder and thus failed to

determine the validity and priority of all liens/lienholders. Id. at ¶ 8. We further determined

the trial court’s attempt to correct the missing lien/lienholder via a nunc pro tunc judgment

entry was a nullity because such a substantive change was outside the scope of a clerical

error. Id. at ¶ 12. We dismissed LaForge’s appeal, vacated the nunc pro tunc judgment

entry of foreclosure, and remanded the matter for the trial court to issue a proper final

judgment entry of foreclosure. Id. at ¶ 13.

{¶4} At the outset, we note this court and the trial court are bound by the law-of-

the-case doctrine, which “provides that legal questions resolved by a reviewing court in a

prior appeal remain the law of that case for any subsequent proceedings at both the trial

and appellate levels.” Farmers State Bank v. Sponaugle, 2019-Ohio-2518, ¶ 22

(“Sponaugle III”). “The rule ensures consistent results in a case, avoids endless litigation

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Case No. 2025-G-0008 by settling the issues, and preserves the constitutional structure of superior and inferior

courts.” Id.

{¶5} Following the law of the case here, there is no final judgment entry of

foreclosure. See Carr I, 2025-Ohio-889, at ¶ 8 (11th Dist.). Thus, we must determine

whether the trial court’s order executing the foreclosure decree and confirming the sale

of LaForge’s property is a final appealable order.

{¶6} Article IV, Section 3(B)(2) of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2505.03(A)

restrict the appellate jurisdiction of courts of appeals to the review of final orders,

judgments, or decrees. Flynn v. Fairview Village Retirement Community, Ltd., 2012-

Ohio-2582, ¶ 5. In the absence of a final order, an appellate court has no jurisdiction.

Gehm v. Timberline Post & Frame, 2007-Ohio-607, ¶ 14. An order is final and appealable

only if it meets the requirements of R.C. 2505.02 and, if applicable, Civ.R. 54. Id. at ¶ 15;

CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Roznowski, 2014-Ohio-1984, ¶ 10.

{¶7} Pursuant to R.C. 2505.02(B), an order is a final order when it is one of the

following:

(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment;

(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment;

(3) An order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial;

(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy . . . ;

(5) An order that determines that an action may or may not be maintained as a class action;

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Case No. 2025-G-0008 (6) An order determining the constitutionality of any changes to the Revised Code made by Am.Sub.S.B. 281 of the 124th general assembly . . .;

(7) An order in an appropriation proceeding that may be appealed pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 163.09 of the Revised Code;

(8) An order restraining or restricting enforcement . . . of any state statute or regulation . . . {¶8} For an order to be final under R.C. 2505.02(B)(1), the order “‘must dispose

of the whole merits of the cause or some separate and distinct branch thereof and leave

nothing for the determination of the court.’” Natl. City Commercial Capital Corp. v. AAAA

at Your Serv., Inc., 2007-Ohio-2942, ¶ 7, quoting Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation

& Dev. Disabilities v. Professionals Guild of Ohio, 46 Ohio St.3d 147, 153 (1989).

{¶9} The foreclosure process consists of two stages that result in final

appealable orders: (1) the final foreclosure decree and (2) the judgment confirming the

sale. See Sponaugle III, 2019-Ohio-2518, at ¶ 18.

{¶10} A foreclosure decree is a final appealable order when each party’s rights

and responsibilities are fully set forth and all that remains is for the trial court to perform

the ministerial task of calculating the final amounts that would arise during confirmation

proceedings. See Roznowski, 2014-Ohio-1984, at ¶ 20.

{¶11} The confirmation of sale, which is at issue here, “is an ancillary proceeding

limited to whether the sheriff’s sale conformed to law. . . . If the trial court, after examining

the proceedings, finds that the sale conformed with R.C. 2329.01 through 2329.61,

inclusive, then the court enters an order confirming the sale and orders the dispersal of

the proceeds [pursuant to R.C. 2329.31].” Sponaugle III at ¶ 19. “An appeal of the

confirmation of sale is limited to challenging the confirmation order itself and to issues

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Case No. 2025-G-0008 related to confirmation proceedings—for example, computation of the final total amount

owed by the mortgagor, accrued interest, and amounts advanced by the mortgagee for

inspections, appraisals, property protection, and maintenance.” Id., citing Roznowski at

¶ 40. “The trial court’s decision to confirm a sheriff’s sale of property will not be reversed

absent an abuse of discretion.” Id.

{¶12} In Farmers State Bank v. Sponaugle, 2017-Ohio-4322 (2d Dist.)

(“Sponaugle II”), the Second District reviewed that it had determined in a prior appeal that

the foreclosure decree was not a final appealable order because the decree did not state

the amount due on all the liens. Id. at ¶ 10, citing Farmers State Bank v. Sponaugle, 2d

Dist. Darke No. 16CA2 (“Sponaugle I”). Just as in the instant case, while the first appeal

was pending, the appellants failed to post a supersedeas bond and a sheriff’s sale was

conducted. Id. at ¶ 8. The trial court denied the appellants’ motion to vacate the sale

and, on the same day in a separate entry, confirmed the sale and ordered the distribution

of the proceeds and the delivery of the deed. Id. at ¶ 11-12. Appellants appealed the

confirmation of sale, and the appellate court concluded the trial court erred when it

confirmed the sale without a final appealable decree of foreclosure. Id. at ¶ 31. The

Second District reversed the order confirming the sale and remanded the matter for the

trial court to vacate the confirmation order and enter a final judgment of foreclosure that

was a final appealable order. Id. at ¶ 33.

{¶13} The Supreme Court of Ohio disagreed that the final judgment entry of

foreclosure was not a final appealable order because, unlike the instant case, it

“determined the extent of each lienholder’s interest, set out the priority of the liens, and

determined the rights and responsibilities of each party.” Sponaugle III, 2019-Ohio-2518,

at ¶ 32. All that remained was mathematics, and the trial court simply had to set forth the PAGE 5 OF 7

Case No. 2025-G-0008 amounts of the taxes after the sale of the property. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the

Second District’s judgment in Sponaugle II and reinstated the trial court’s confirmation of

sale. Id. at ¶ 34. And while the concurrence in Sponaugle III concludes that a foreclosure

decree does not always have to be a final appealable order for the order confirming the

sale to be a final appealable order, it did so on the grounds that the “trial court had fully

determined the obligations of each party,” id. at ¶ 54 (DeWine, J., concurring).

{¶14} In Carr I, 2025-Ohio-889, at ¶ 8 (11th Dist.), we determined the trial court’s

final judgment entry of foreclosure was not a final appealable order because it failed to

determine the obligations and/or rights and responsibilities of all the parties. It did not

merely have to enter the amounts due like the final judgment of foreclosure at issue in

Sponaugle III. Thus, in this case, the judgment confirming the sale and ordering the

delivery of the deed and distribution of the proceeds is not a final appealable order without

a final judgment of foreclosure. Although we lack jurisdiction to review its merits, the law

of the case requires that we vacate this confirmation order as it was entered without the

necessary predicate final judgment of foreclosure.

{¶15} Accordingly, we dismiss the instant appeal for lack of a final appealable

order, vacate the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas’ order confirming the sale and

remand the matter for the trial court to follow the law of the case and first issue a valid

final judgment of foreclosure that determines the validity and priority of all the

liens/lienholders.

ROBERT J. PATTON, P.J.,

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,

concur. PAGE 6 OF 7

Case No. 2025-G-0008 JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the memorandum opinion of this court, we dismiss the

instant appeal for lack of a final appealable order, vacate the Geauga County Court of

Common Pleas’ order confirming the sale and remand the matter for the trial court to

follow the law of the case and first issue a valid final judgment of foreclosure that

determines the validity and priority of all the liens/lienholders.

Costs to be taxed against the parties equally.

JUDGE MATT LYNCH

PRESIDING JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON, concurs

JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI, concurs

THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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Case No. 2025-G-0008