L. and E. Miller v. . Land and Lumber Co. of N.C.

66 N.C. 503

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: January 5, 1872
• Status: Published

Opinion

RodMAN, J.

We think the defendant exceptions to the instructions given by the Judge below cannot be sustained.

The jury found that the goods were sold by plaintiffs on the credit of the defendant, upon the request of a person representing himself as its agent, that they were sent to and received by défendant, that at or about the time of their receipt, the officers of the company also received invoices sent by plaintiffs, in which the defendant was charged as debtor for the price of the goods, and that afterwards defendant used the goods. We agree with the Judge that with these facts in proof, it was immaterial whether Ambrister was ever authorized to purchase the goods for the company or not, by keeping them with notice that the plaintiff had sold them to the company and upon its credit, the company became liable for the price. If it did not mean to become liable, it should at once on the receipt of the invoices have repudiated the purchase and®refused to receive the goods. Instead of doing so, by silence it allowed the plaintiffs to believe that it consented to the purchase and undertook to pay.

Under such Circumstances, “ qui tacet clamat,” silence is consent. It is no defence to say that the defendant’s officers knew nothing of the representations made by Ambrister to the plaintiffs, and that they were deceived by his representations to them, that he had bought the goods on his own credit. The invoice was notice that the plaintiff sold to, and credited the company. It is also immaterial that Ambrister had no authority to buy for the defendant, and that the officers of the company did not intend to induce the plaintiffs to believe that it had bought and would pay for the goods, or that they would not have kept the goods if they had known that the company was to pay plaintiffs for them. The rule is, that when one by his conduct, unintentionally gives another reasonable ground to believe a certain state of facts, and the other so acts on that belief that he will be damaged if it is not true, the person so conducting is estopped as to the other, afterwards to deny that state~of facts. This rule is so reasonable as not to require the' support of authority.

It is supported however by several, among which, as being very pertinent, we select Cornish v. Abingdon, 4 Hurl & Norman Exch. 549.

The keeping of the goods and the silence of the defendant after the receipt of the invoices were a reasonable ground for the plaintiffs to believe that the Company ratified the sale, and may naturally have prevented them from taking such steps as as they otherwise would have taken for their security.

As to the question of [evidence, the Judge allowed plaintiff to testify that Ambristeratoid them that he had á letter from an officer of the company, authorizing him to purchase the goods for it.' The defendant contended that this was proving the contents of a writing by parol. This is a mistake.

The evidence wasffiot directed to show that there was any genuine letter with such contents, but merely the'representations of Ambrister as the contents of a letter, in confirmation •of the plaintiff’s evidence, that credit had been given to the company and and not to Ambrister. Under the circumstances it was immaterial whether the letter had existed or not..

We think the evidence was admissible.

There is no error.

Pek Curiam. Judgment affirmed.