Kyocera Industrial Ceramics Corp. v. United States

293 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 27 Ct. Int'l Trade 1703, 27 C.I.T. 1703, 25 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2385, 2003 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 150
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedNovember 7, 2003
DocketSlip Op. 03-148; Court 02-00705
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 293 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (Kyocera Industrial Ceramics Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kyocera Industrial Ceramics Corp. v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 27 Ct. Int'l Trade 1703, 27 C.I.T. 1703, 25 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2385, 2003 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 150 (cit 2003).

Opinion

Memorandum & Order

AQUILINO, Judge.

The amended complaint filed herein on behalf of the above-encaptioned plaintiff, the corporate name of which its counsel have compressed to “KICC”, contests denial by the U.S. Customs Service 1 of classification of certain ceramic substrates for integrated circuits (“IC substrates”) under subheading 8542.90.00 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) (“Electronic integrated circuits and microassemblies; parts thereof: ... Parts”). The defendant interposed an answer thereto, and its counsel have now filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Action for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction “[pjursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United States Court of International Trade”.

I

Of course, those Rules do not contemplate such a motion subsequent to joinder of issue. Rather, USCIT Rule 12(c) provides:

After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all *1361 material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 2

Here, defendant’s motion for such judgment has engendered submissions outside the pleadings on both sides. Appended to plaintiffs amended complaint is a schedule “A” of 21 enumerated protests to Customs, encompassing many more, individual, listed entries. The parties have produced copies of KICC’s lengthy, written entreaty to the Service Port Director in San Francisco in support of its protests to the effect that the IC substrates are classifiable under HTSUS subheading 8542.90.00 — or, in the alternative, under subheading 6909.11.40. 3 In HQ 964811 (May 1, 2002), the Service issued the following holding (as to KICC protest 280900-100735):

The protest should be GRANTED as to the alternative classification claimed. The blank ceramic substrates referred to as IC substrates are classified in subheading 6909.11.40, which provides for, “Ceramic wares for laboratory, chemical, or other uses ...: ceramic wares for laboratory, chemical or other uses: of porcelain or china: other.”... 4

Whereupon the first affirmative defense pleaded by the government is that this court

lacks jurisdiction over ... this action[ ] because the alternative relief sought in the protests which are the subject of this action was granted.

Defendant’s Answer to Complaint, p. 3. And it moves for judgment on this ground.

A

The plaintiff pleads jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), which states:

*1362 The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to contest the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930.

This statute further provides:

A civil action contesting the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by the person who filed the protest pursuant to section 514 of such Act....

28 U.S.C. § 2631(a). On its face, this enactment reflects the intent of Congress that a partial denial of a protest by Customs be subject to judicial review. Nonetheless, the defendant denies that this action can sustain such review. It refers to Sanyo Electric, Inc. v. United States, 81 Cust.Ct. 114, 115 (1978), which held that

the proper measure of the extent to which a protest has been denied or granted is the extent to which the protest has resulted in a change of the protested decision. When the decision is entirely changed to conform to a decision sought by the protest, that protest has been completely granted. The only logically consistent way to determine whether a protest has been denied in part is to see whether any part of the protested decision remains in effect.

In that matter, the importer had protested Customs classification of its goods under one item (685.50) of the Tariff Schedules of the United States as opposed to preceding item 685.30 in the same tariff schedule 6 and part thereof or, in the alternative, under an item (678.50) in the preceding part (4) of that same schedule. The Service granted the protest and reli-quidated the merchandise under the first-claimed item 685.30. The importer brought suit, which was dismissed upon the court’s conclusion that the

proper procedure would be for the party to advance its preferred alternative claim in a new protest against the revised decision following reliquidation of the entry.

81 Cust-Ct. at 115.

Assuming, as the defendant urges, that KICC could have so proceeded with this matter, the question remains whether it was required to do so. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. United States, 20 CIT 1422, 1424, 948 F.Supp. 1072, 1074 (1996) (“The court must look to what Customs actually did”). Taking such a look herein, this court cannot conclude that the plaintiff was so required. The complaint in Sanyo apparently prayed for a further, modest shift from item 685.30, the basis of the reliquidation, to the second, proposed alternative classification (item 678.50). Here, the gravamen of the controversy is an allegedly-precipitous switch by Customs from one distinct chapter of the HTSUS, 85 (Electrical Machinery and Equipment and Parts Thereof), to another, 69 (Ceramic Products). Paragraph 7 of the amended complaint avers:

Prior to March 10, 1999, blank IC substrates imported by KICC were classified under HTSUS subheading 8542.90, as parts of integrated circuits, based on HQ 088157 (July 2, 1992), i.e., the “Diacon Ruling,” which classified ceramic pieces used as bases for integrated circuits under HTSUS 8542.90, a duty-free classification. The classification determination made in the Diacon Ruling was followed by KICC and Customs until Customs issued N.Y. D88010 (March 10, 1999), which classified blank IC substrates of porcelain under HTSUS 6914.10.8000 as “Other ceramic articles: Of porcelain or china: ... Other,” dutiable at 9% ad valorem, 5

*1363 The first two, numbered protests covered by this pleading encompass entries prior to that day in 1999.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Kyocera Industrial Ceramics Corp. v. United States
469 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (Court of International Trade, 2006)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
293 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 27 Ct. Int'l Trade 1703, 27 C.I.T. 1703, 25 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2385, 2003 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 150, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kyocera-industrial-ceramics-corp-v-united-states-cit-2003.