Kyles v. Celadon Trucking Services, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Missouri
DecidedSeptember 28, 2017
Docket6:15-cv-03193
StatusUnknown

This text of Kyles v. Celadon Trucking Services, Inc. (Kyles v. Celadon Trucking Services, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kyles v. Celadon Trucking Services, Inc., (W.D. Mo. 2017).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOHNNY W. KYLES, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 15-3193-CV-S-DPR ) CELADON TRUCKING ) SERVICES, INC., et al., ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Daubert Motion to Exclude Charles E. Bain, Daubert Motion to Exclude Andrew J. Sievers, and Daubert Motion to Exclude Portions of Dr. Luke Knox’s Opinions (Docs. 131, 132 and 133.) Also before the Court is Defendants’ Daubert Motion to Exclude Dr. Robert W. Gaines. (Doc. 140.) The Court decides the Motions as follows: I. Plaintiff’s Daubert Motion to Exclude Charles E. Bain Pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993), Plaintiff moves to exclude the opinion testimony of Defendants’ expert witness Dr. Charles E. Bain. Dr. Bain is a medically and engineering educated consultant retained by Defendants to provide an injury causation analysis (“ICA”) opinion in this matter. Plaintiff argues that Dr. Bain is not qualified to testify as an expert in biomechanics or spinal injuries. Plaintiff also asserts that Dr. Bain’s opinions are based on speculation and unreliable statistics. Lastly, Plaintiff claims that Dr. Bain has a substantial history of his testimony being excluded by courts for one or both of the prior reasons. As set forth in Defendants’ Response, however, the Court agrees that Dr. Bain is qualified to testify both as a medical expert on the subject of spinal injuries, and as an expert in the field of biomechanics. (Doc. 196 at 6-12.) Furthermore, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s contention that Dr. Bain has no reliable basis for his opinions. As asserted by Defendants, Dr. Bain based his ICA opinion on sufficient facts or data, ICA is a reliable method, and Dr. Bain

has reliably applied ICA to the facts of this case. Id. at 12-17. The fact that other courts have excluded or limited Dr. Bain’s testimony does not alter the above conclusions.1 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Daubert Motion to Exclude Charles E. Bain will be denied. II. Plaintiff’s Daubert Motion to Exclude Andrew J. Sievers Pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert, Plaintiff moves to exclude Defendants’ expert witness Andrew J. Sievers from offering any opinion related to sleep apnea in this case. Mr. Sievers is a trucking safety consultant retained by Defendants to testify as an expert on their behalf. Mr. Sievers has prepared a report, in which he offers the following opinions: (1)

Defendant Dwight Jones’ sleep apnea was diagnosed and treated; (2) Defendant Celadon Trucking Services, Inc. (“Celadon”) was aware of and appropriately monitored Jones’ sleep apnea; and (3) there is no evidence that sleep apnea played any causative role in the collision at issue. Plaintiff challenges these opinions, arguing that Mr. Sievers is not an expert in sleep apnea or in the treatment of sleep apnea, and that he has no reliable basis for his opinion that Jones’ sleep apnea was effectively treated. However, as asserted by Defendants in their Response, the testimony at issue is neither scientific nor technical knowledge, but rather is “other specialized knowledge” under F.R.E. 702

1 Plaintiff cites to Johnny v. Bornowsky, No. 10–04008–CV–W–FJG, 2011 WL 3794082 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 24, 2010) as an example of a case in which Dr. Bain was excluded. However, Dr. Bain’s testimony was excluded in Johnny because his designation was untimely, not because he was unqualified or his testimony was unreliable. regarding the Federal Motor Carriers Safety Regulations (“FMCSRs”) and standards within the trucking industry, subjects on which Mr. Sievers is certainly qualified to offer opinions. (Doc. 197 at 8-9.) His opinions that Jones’ sleep apnea was diagnosed and treated and that Celadon was aware of and appropriately monitored Jones’ sleep apnea are made from the perspective of a motor carrier, and not as a medical expert. Furthermore, as in Defendants’ Response, the Court

concurs that Mr. Sievers is qualified to offer, and has a reliable basis for, the opinion that there is no evidence that sleep apnea played any causative role in the collision. Id. at 13-14. For these reasons, and for the additional reasons presented by Defendants in their Response, Plaintiff’s Daubert Motion to Exclude Andrew J. Sievers will be denied. III. Plaintiff’s Daubert Motion to Exclude Portions of Dr. Luke Knox’s Opinions Pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert, Plaintiff moves to exclude portions of the opinion testimony of Defendants’ expert witness Dr. Luke Knox. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to exclude Dr. Knox’s opinions: (1) regarding the severity of the crash; and (2) that Plaintiff is malingering and exaggerating symptoms in the description of his

pain and injuries. Dr. Knox is a medical doctor engaged in the practice of spine surgery, who has been retained by Defendants to review and evaluate the medical records of Plaintiff and provide orthopedic and neurological opinions in this action. First, as for his opinion that “(t)he accident was by no means a severe incident,” the Court agrees that Dr. Knox does not appear qualified under Rule 702 to render such an opinion, which will be excluded. (Doc. 133 at 5.) Regarding Dr. Knox’s opinion that Plaintiff is malingering and exaggerating, Dr. Knox states that he tested and observed four of five Waddell’s signs during his examination of Plaintiff. (Doc. 198-1.) “Waddell’s signs are a group of physical signs [] in patients with low back pain. They are thought to be indicators of a non-organic or psychological component to pain. Historically they have been used to detect ‘malingering’ patients with back pain.” McMurray v. Astrue, No. 08–5044–CV–SW–REL–SSA, 2009 WL 3052204 at *7 n.4 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 20, 2009). He compared these test results with Plaintiff’s prior medical records and determined that Plaintiff showed “malingering and symptom magnification propensity.” Id.

Plaintiff asserts this is an inappropriate attack on Plaintiff’s credibility, as “[w]eighing evidence and determining credibility are tasks exclusive to the jury, and an expert should not offer an opinion about the truthfulness of witness testimony.” Nichols v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875, 883 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Hale County A & M Transp., LLC v. City of Kansas City, Mo., F.Supp.2d 838, 845 (W.D. Mo. 2014) (“an expert is not allowed to impugn or bolster the credibility of fact witnesses under the guise of rendering his expert opinion.”) In accordance with the Eighth Circuit’s guidance in Nichols, the Court agrees that an opinion of this type “create[s] a serious danger of confusing or misleading the jury, see Fed. R. Evid. 403, causing it to substitute the expert’s credibility assessment for its own common sense

determination.” Nichols, 154 F.3d at 883. Therefore, Dr.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
509 U.S. 579 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Alexandra Rodriguez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
159 A.3d 914 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2017)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Kyles v. Celadon Trucking Services, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kyles-v-celadon-trucking-services-inc-mowd-2017.