Kyle Shaw Residential Properties LLC v. City of Lansing

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedNovember 4, 2021
Docket354760
StatusUnpublished

This text of Kyle Shaw Residential Properties LLC v. City of Lansing (Kyle Shaw Residential Properties LLC v. City of Lansing) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kyle Shaw Residential Properties LLC v. City of Lansing, (Mich. Ct. App. 2021).

Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

KYLE SHAW RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES, LLC, UNPUBLISHED November 4, 2021 Petitioner-Appellant,

v No. 354760 Tax Tribunal CITY OF LANSING, LC No. 20-000404-TT

Respondent-Appellee.

Before: RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J., and CAMERON and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner Kyle Shaw Residential Properties, LLC, appeals the final judgment of the Michigan Tax Tribunal (MTT), which determined the value of petitioner’s property in Lansing, Michigan, for the 2020 tax year. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In August 2018, the subject property was sold to JP Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corporation (JP Morgan) in a foreclosure sale for $39,847. JP Morgan later listed the property for sale, and petitioner purchased it for $42,500 in September 2019. Respondent City of Lansing valued the true cash value (TCV) of the property at $152,600, resulting in a taxable value (TV) of $76,300 for the 2020 tax year. Petitioner disagreed with these values and petitioned the Board of Review (BOR) for relief. The March 2020 BOR found that the property was properly valued and left the TCV and TV unchanged.

Petitioner appealed this decision to the MTT, arguing that the TCV of the property was $50,000 and that the TV of the property was $25,000. Respondent filed an answer and requested that the MTT affirm the BOR’s decision. However, respondent later changed its position and asserted that the TCV of the property was $112,500. After holding a hearing and considering the evidence submitted by the parties, the MTT concluded that the TCV of the property was $115,000 and that the TV was $57,500 for the 2020 tax year. This appeal followed.

-1- II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

In New Covert Generating Co, LLC v Twp of Covert, 334 Mich App 24, 45; ___ NW2d ___ (2020), this Court observed:

This Court’s review of agency decisions involving property tax valuations is quite limited: “In the absence of fraud, error of law or the adoption of wrong principles, no appeal may be taken to any court from any final agency provided for the administration of property tax laws from any decision relating to valuation or allocation.” Const 1963, art 6, § 28 . . . . This Court reviews de novo whether the Tax Tribunal erred as a matter of law when interpreting and applying statutes. Makowski v Governor, 317 Mich App 434, 441; 894 NW2d 753 (2016). Agency interpretations of a statute are entitled to “respectful consideration, but they are not binding on courts and cannot conflict with the plain meaning of the statute.” In re Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Mich, 482 Mich 90, 117-118; 754 NW2d 259 (2008).

“When the Tribunal’s findings of fact are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record, those findings are conclusive.” Estate of Schubert v Dep’t of Treasury, 322 Mich App 439, 447; 912 NW2d 569 (2017). “Substantial evidence must be more than a scintilla of the evidence, although it may be substantially less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Forest Hills Coop v City of Ann Arbor, 305 Mich App 572, 588; 854 NW2d 172 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Petitioner argues that the TV for the 2020 tax year is inaccurate because the property’s TCV was improperly assessed. We disagree. MCL 211.27a provides in relevant part as follows:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, property shall be assessed at 50% of its true cash value under section 3 of article IX of the state constitution of 1963.

* * *

(3) Upon a transfer of ownership of property after 1994, the property’s taxable value for the calendar year following the year of the transfer is the property’s state equalized valuation for the calendar year following the transfer.

“[TCV] is synonymous with fair market value.” WPW Acquisition Co v City of Troy, 250 Mich App 287, 298; 646 NW2d 487 (2002). “Therefore, the assessment must reflect the probable price that a willing buyer and a willing seller would arrive at through arm’s length negotiation.” Huron Ridge LP v Ypsilanti Twp, 275 Mich App 23, 28; 737 NW2d 187 (2007). An arm’s-length negotiation “is characterized by three elements: it is voluntary, i.e., without compulsion or duress; it generally takes place in an open market; and the parties act in their own self-interest.” Mackey v Dep’t of Human Servs, 289 Mich App 688, 699; 808 NW2d 484 (2010) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

-2- [T]o determine [TCV], the property must be assessed at its highest and best use. . . . Highest and best use is defined as the most profitable and advantageous use the owner may make of the property even if the property is presently used for a different purpose or is vacant, so long as there is a market demand for such use. [Menard, Inc v City of Escanaba, 315 Mich App 512, 522; 891 NW2d 1 (2016) (alteration in original; emphasis, quotation marks, and citations omitted).]

While “[e]vidence of the selling price of property is relevant in determining the [TV] of property,” Prof Plaza, LLC v City of Detroit, 250 Mich App 473, 476; 647 NW2d 529 (2002), “the purchase price paid in a transfer of property is not the presumptive [TCV] of the property transferred,” MCL 211.27(6).

Indeed, there is no single statutorily required method for determining TCV. Great Lakes Div of Nat’l Steel Corp v City of Ecorse, 227 Mich App 379, 390; 576 NW2d 667 (1998). Rather, the MTT must “apply its expertise to the facts of a case in order to determine the appropriate method of arriving at the [TCV] of property, utilizing an approach that provides the most accurate valuation under the circumstances.” Id. at 389. The MTT must make its own, independent determination of TCV, and it is free to accept or reject either party’s valuations or to combine the approaches. Id. at 389-390. The three most common approaches to valuation are: “the capitalization-of-income approach, the sales-comparison or market approach, and the cost-less- depreciation approach.” Id. at 390.

In this case, respondent presented evidence of all three approaches. According to respondent, the capitalization-of-income approach supported valuing the property at $146,000, the sales-comparison approach supported valuing the property at $112,500, and the cost-less- depreciation approach supported valuing the property at $198,100. In contrast, petitioner’s assertion of valuation was supported by the purchase price of the property and a sampling of purportedly comparable properties in the area. Petitioner also provided evidence that the property had been “deemed unsafe for occupancy” and required extensive “rehabilitation.” Petitioner argued that, based on this evidence, the property’s TCV was $50,000. The MTT conducted an independent review of this evidence, as well as other evidence that was presented by the parties. Based on this review, the MTT concluded that respondent’s evidence of the sales-comparison approach was the most reliable evidence of the property’s TCV and that it was appropriate to assign minimal weight to respondent’s capitalization-of-income approach. The MTT then valued the TCV of the property at $115,000 for the 2020 tax year, resulting in a TV of $57,500.

On appeal, petitioner argues that the MTT incorrectly applied the law by failing to consider the purchase price of the property. Specifically, petitioner argues that the MTT improperly concluded that the sale was not an arm’s-length transaction and, consequently, refused to consider the purchase price of the property.

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Related

In Re Complaint of Rovas Against Sbc
754 N.W.2d 259 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2008)
Professional Plaza, LLC v City of Detroit
647 N.W.2d 529 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2002)
Great Lakes Div. v. City of Ecorse
576 N.W.2d 667 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1998)
Huron Ridge LP v. Ypsilanti Township
737 N.W.2d 187 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2007)
Meijer, Inc v. City of Midland
610 N.W.2d 242 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2000)
WPW Acquisition Co. v. City of Troy
646 N.W.2d 487 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2002)
Menard, Inc v. City of Escanaba
891 N.W.2d 1 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2016)
Makowski v. Governor
894 N.W.2d 753 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2016)
Estate of Marguerite Schubert v. Department of Treasury
912 N.W.2d 569 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2017)
Rovas v. SBC Michigan
482 Mich. 90 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2008)
Great Lakes Division of National Steel Corp. v. City of Ecorse
227 Mich. App. 379 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1998)
Mackey v. Department of Human Services
808 N.W.2d 484 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2010)
Drew v. Cass County
830 N.W.2d 832 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2013)
Forest Hills Cooperative v. City of Ann Arbor
305 Mich. App. 572 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2014)

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Bluebook (online)
Kyle Shaw Residential Properties LLC v. City of Lansing, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kyle-shaw-residential-properties-llc-v-city-of-lansing-michctapp-2021.