K.W. Brock Directories Incorporated v. Arvig Enterprises Incorporated, et al.

D. Arizona

K.W. Brock Directories Incorporated v. Arvig Enterprises Incorporated, et al.

DecidedOctober 24, 2025

Docket3:25-cv-08172

StatusUnknown

This text of K.W. Brock Directories Incorporated v. Arvig Enterprises Incorporated, et al. (K.W. Brock Directories Incorporated v. Arvig Enterprises Incorporated, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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K.W. Brock Directories Incorporated v. Arvig Enterprises Incorporated, et al., (D. Ariz. 2025).

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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 K.W. Brock Directories Incorporated, No. CV-25-08172-PCT-MTL

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Arvig Enterprises Incorporated, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 The Court now considers Defendant Cydni Beck’s motion to set aside entry of 16 default. (Doc. 33.) 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 On October 7, 2025, upon Plaintiff’s motion, the Clerk of Court entered default as 19 to Ms. Beck after she did not respond to the complaint. (Doc. 28.) That same day, Ms. Beck 20 filed an answer. (Doc. 29.) Plaintiff K.W. Brock moved to strike the answer because of 21 Ms. Beck’s default status. (Id.) In response, Ms. Beck moved to set aside the entry of 22 default. (Doc. 33.) 23 II. DISCUSSION 24 “The court may set aside an entry of default for good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). 25 The Ninth Circuit’s standard for granting a motion to set aside entry of default is liberal. 26 Good cause exists where: (1) the movant’s conduct leading to the default was not culpable, 27 (2) the movant alleges facts sufficient to establish a meritorious defense, and (3) setting 28 aside the default would not prejudice non-moving parties. U.S. v. Signed Personal Check 1 No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010). “[A] case should, 2 whenever possible, be decided on the merits.” Id. at 1090. (quoting Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 3 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1984)). 4 A. Culpable Conduct 5 “[A] defendant’s conduct is culpable if he has received actual or constructive notice 6 of the filing of the action and intentionally failed to answer.” TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. 7 Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Egelhoff v. 8 Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) (emphasis in original). Culpability requires 9 more than a conscious choice not to answer; it requires an intention to take advantage of 10 an opposing party, interfere with judicial decision-making, or otherwise act in bad faith. 11 Signed Personal Check, 615 F.3d at 1093 (citation omitted). 12 Ms. Beck states that her failure to respond to the complaint was due to lack of notice. 13 (Doc. 33 at 1-2.) This does not rise to the level of bad faith, so Ms. Beck did not act 14 culpably. 15 B. Meritorious Defense 16 To satisfy the requirement that the movant have a meritorious defense, Ms. Beck 17 must allege facts that, if true, would constitute a defense. Signed Personal Check, 615 F.3d 18 at 1091. “[T]he burden on a party seeking to vacate a default judgment is not extraordinarily 19 heavy.” TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 700. Ms. Beck alleges facts sufficient to constitute a 20 defense, including allegations related to the scope of Ms. Beck’s employment agreement. 21 (Doc. 52.) Ms. Beck alleges sufficient facts to establish a meritorious defense. 22 C. Prejudice 23 “To be prejudicial, the setting aside of a judgment must result in greater harm than 24 simply delaying resolution of the case.” TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 701. “[T]he standard is 25 whether [Plaintiff’s] ability to pursue his claim will be hindered.” Falk, 739 F.2d at 463. 26 Here, setting aside default as to Ms. Beck will not hinder Plaintiff’s ability to pursue 27 its claim. For one, Ms. Beck filed her answer on the same day that default was entered. 28 (Docs. 28, 29); see TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 701 (finding that a party’s appearance one || month after entry of default was timely enough to indicate a lack of prejudice). Notwithstanding Ms. Beck’s tardy response to the complaint (Doc. 1), litigation 1s □□ proceeding as planned. The Court’s hearing on Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary Injunction was not delayed (Doc. 51), and Ms. Beck has diligently worked to provide || briefing on the Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 52). Setting aside 6|| default will not prejudice the non-moving parties. 7 Having considered Defendant Cydni Beck’s motion to set aside entry of default 8 || (Doc. 33), 9 IT IS ORDERED that the motion to set aside entry of default (Doc. 33) is 10 || GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is instructed to set aside default against Ms. Beck at 11 || Docket No. 28. 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to strike Ms. Beck’s answer 13 || (Doc. 30), filed on the basis that default had been entered as to Ms. Beck, is DENIED as 14]| moot. 15 Dated this 24th day of October, 2025. 16

Michael T. Liburdi 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 K.W. Brock Directories Incorporated, No. CV-25-08172-PCT-MTL

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Arvig Enterprises Incorporated, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 The Court now considers Defendant Cydni Beck’s motion to set aside entry of 16 default. (Doc. 33.) 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 On October 7, 2025, upon Plaintiff’s motion, the Clerk of Court entered default as 19 to Ms. Beck after she did not respond to the complaint. (Doc. 28.) That same day, Ms. Beck 20 filed an answer. (Doc. 29.) Plaintiff K.W. Brock moved to strike the answer because of 21 Ms. Beck’s default status. (Id.) In response, Ms. Beck moved to set aside the entry of 22 default. (Doc. 33.) 23 II. DISCUSSION 24 “The court may set aside an entry of default for good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). 25 The Ninth Circuit’s standard for granting a motion to set aside entry of default is liberal. 26 Good cause exists where: (1) the movant’s conduct leading to the default was not culpable, 27 (2) the movant alleges facts sufficient to establish a meritorious defense, and (3) setting 28 aside the default would not prejudice non-moving parties. U.S. v. Signed Personal Check 1 No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010). “[A] case should, 2 whenever possible, be decided on the merits.” Id. at 1090. (quoting Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 3 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1984)). 4 A. Culpable Conduct 5 “[A] defendant’s conduct is culpable if he has received actual or constructive notice 6 of the filing of the action and intentionally failed to answer.” TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. 7 Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Egelhoff v. 8 Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) (emphasis in original). Culpability requires 9 more than a conscious choice not to answer; it requires an intention to take advantage of 10 an opposing party, interfere with judicial decision-making, or otherwise act in bad faith. 11 Signed Personal Check, 615 F.3d at 1093 (citation omitted). 12 Ms. Beck states that her failure to respond to the complaint was due to lack of notice. 13 (Doc. 33 at 1-2.) This does not rise to the level of bad faith, so Ms. Beck did not act 14 culpably. 15 B. Meritorious Defense 16 To satisfy the requirement that the movant have a meritorious defense, Ms. Beck 17 must allege facts that, if true, would constitute a defense. Signed Personal Check, 615 F.3d 18 at 1091. “[T]he burden on a party seeking to vacate a default judgment is not extraordinarily 19 heavy.” TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 700. Ms. Beck alleges facts sufficient to constitute a 20 defense, including allegations related to the scope of Ms. Beck’s employment agreement. 21 (Doc. 52.) Ms. Beck alleges sufficient facts to establish a meritorious defense. 22 C. Prejudice 23 “To be prejudicial, the setting aside of a judgment must result in greater harm than 24 simply delaying resolution of the case.” TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 701. “[T]he standard is 25 whether [Plaintiff’s] ability to pursue his claim will be hindered.” Falk, 739 F.2d at 463. 26 Here, setting aside default as to Ms. Beck will not hinder Plaintiff’s ability to pursue 27 its claim. For one, Ms. Beck filed her answer on the same day that default was entered. 28 (Docs. 28, 29); see TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 701 (finding that a party’s appearance one || month after entry of default was timely enough to indicate a lack of prejudice). Notwithstanding Ms. Beck’s tardy response to the complaint (Doc. 1), litigation 1s □□ proceeding as planned. The Court’s hearing on Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary Injunction was not delayed (Doc. 51), and Ms. Beck has diligently worked to provide || briefing on the Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 52). Setting aside 6|| default will not prejudice the non-moving parties. 7 Having considered Defendant Cydni Beck’s motion to set aside entry of default 8 || (Doc. 33), 9 IT IS ORDERED that the motion to set aside entry of default (Doc. 33) is 10 || GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is instructed to set aside default against Ms. Beck at 11 || Docket No. 28. 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to strike Ms. Beck’s answer 13 || (Doc. 30), filed on the basis that default had been entered as to Ms. Beck, is DENIED as 14]| moot. 15 Dated this 24th day of October, 2025. 16

Michael T. Liburdi 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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