Kvale v. Commissioner of Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedJune 6, 2024
Docket3:23-cv-02650
StatusUnknown

This text of Kvale v. Commissioner of Social Security (Kvale v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kvale v. Commissioner of Social Security, (N.D. Tex. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

J.D.K. o/b/o E.M.J. (Minor),1 § § Plaintiff, § § v. § 3:23-CV-2650-BR § MARTIN O’MALLEY, Acting § Commissioner of the Social Security § A dministration,2 § § Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff J.D.K. o/b/o E.M.J. (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant”), who denied Plaintiff’s claim for Child’s Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). (ECF 1; ECF 11-1 at 5–30). The parties voluntarily consented to have the undersigned conduct all proceedings in this case to disposition in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. (ECF 5; ECF 8). After considering the pleadings, briefs, and administrative record, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.

1 It is the undersigned’s practice to identify the plaintiff using only the first and last initial in filings in social security disability cases. This ensures that the public maintains access to the opinions (in compliance with Rule 5.2(c)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the E-Government Act of 2002) while still protecting the privacy of non- government parties’ identities within the opinion.

2 Martin O’Malley became the Commissioner of Social Security on December 20, 2023. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Martin O’Malley is “automatically substituted” for Kilolo Kijakazi as the defendant in this suit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action instituted in accordance with this subsection shall survive notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social Security or any vacancy in such office.”). I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff J.D.K., on behalf of his minor son—E.M.J.—filed a claim for SSI. (ECF 11-1 at 18). E.M.J. was an adolescent when his application was filed and when his SSI claim was denied. (ECF 11-1 at 19). The ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim on July 13, 2023, finding E.M.J.’s impairments did not functionally equal the Listings. (ECF 11-1 at 18–29). The Appeals Council denied his

request for review on October 2, 2023. (ECF 11-1 at 5). Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Plaintiff seeks judicial review on behalf of E.M.J. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court's “review of Social Security disability cases ‘is limited to two inquiries: (1) whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standard.’” Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005)). “Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla and less than a preponderance.’” Id. (citation omitted). “It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The Commissioner [of the Social Security Administration], and not the courts, resolves conflicts in the evidence; thereafter, the Court may not ‘reweigh the evidence or try the issues de novo.’” Tomisha M.W. ex rel. T.M.W. v. Saul, 2020 WL 1513453, at *2 (quoting Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)). “Accordingly, the Court may not substitute its own judgment for the Commissioner's, and it may affirm only on the grounds that the Commissioner stated to support his decision.” Id. (citing Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923). “The Commissioner's decision is granted great deference and will not be disturbed unless the reviewing court cannot find substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's decision or finds that the Commissioner made an error of law.” Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir.1995) (footnotes omitted). In sum, the district court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner; however, the district court must scrutinize the entire record to ascertain whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s findings. See Fields v. Bowen, 805 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir.1986) (per curiam).

III. DISCUSSION To determine whether a minor has a disability, an ALJ engages in a three-step process: “(1) whether the child is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the child has an impairment that is severe; and (3) whether the child's impairment is medically or functionally equivalent in severity to the impairments listed in the disability regulations.” Swist ex rel. Green v. Barnhart, 177 F. App'x 414, 416 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, J.D.K. does not contest the ALJ’s findings that E.M.J. is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, and that E.M.J. has severe impairments: autism spectrum disorder, anxiety, and

depression. (ECF 11-1 at 19; ECF 12 at 4). Instead, J.D.K. contests the ALJ’s findings with respect to step three. (See ECF 12). At step three, the ALJ found that E.M.J. has a “marked” limitation in the functional domain of “caring for yourself” but “less than marked” or “no” limitations in the other functional domains. (ECF 11-1 at 22). At this step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant's impairment leads to “a marked limitation” in two, “or an extreme limitation in one,” of the following six domains: “(1) acquiring and using information; (2) attending and completing tasks; (3) interacting and relating with others; (4) moving about and manipulating objects; (5) caring for oneself; and (6) health and physical well-being.” Swist, 177 F. App'x at 416 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1)). The ALJ “will find” that the child has a “marked” limitation in a domain “…when your impairment(s) interferes seriously with your ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. Your day-to- day functioning may be seriously limited when your impairment(s) limits only one activity or when the interactive and cumulative effects of your impairment(s) limits several activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Kvale v. Commissioner of Social Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kvale-v-commissioner-of-social-security-txnd-2024.