KUSKO v. KIJAKAZI, ACTING COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedAugust 18, 2023
Docket2:22-cv-00095
StatusUnknown

This text of KUSKO v. KIJAKAZI, ACTING COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (KUSKO v. KIJAKAZI, ACTING COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
KUSKO v. KIJAKAZI, ACTING COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, (E.D. Pa. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

STACY ANN KUSKO : CIVIL ACTION : v. : : KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting : NO. 22-95 Commissioner of Social Security :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ELIZABETH T. HEY, U.S.M.J. August 18 , 2023

Stacy Ann Kusko (“Plaintiff”) seeks review of the Commissioner’s decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is not supported by substantial evidence and remand for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff protectively filed for DIB on September 12, 2019, alleging that her disability began on August 15, 2014, as a result of wrist and elbow injuries and multiple surgeries, limited mobility of the right wrist and elbow, chronic back issues, plantar fasciitis, anxiety, and depression. Tr. at 70, 152, 176.1 Plaintiff later amended her

1To be entitled to DIB, Plaintiff must establish that she became disabled on or before her date last insured (“DLI”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.131(b). The Certified Earnings Record indicates and the ALJ found that Plaintiff was insured through December 31, 2019. Tr. at 15, 162. alleged onset date to September 19, 2019. Id. at 258.2 Plaintiff’s application was denied initially, id. at 84-87, and on reconsideration, id. at 89-91, and Plaintiff requested a

hearing before an ALJ. Id. at 92-93. After holding a hearing on April 22, 2021, id. at 35- 62, the ALJ found on May 25, 2021, that Plaintiff was not disabled. Id. at 15-29. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on December 2, 2021, id. at 1-3, making the ALJ’s May 25, 2021 decision the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. Plaintiff commenced this action in federal court on January 10, 2022, Doc. 1, and

the matter is now fully briefed and ripe for review. Docs. 6-8.3 II. LEGAL STANDARDS To prove disability, a claimant must demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for . . . not less than twelve

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1). The Commissioner employs a five-step process, evaluating: 1. Whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity;

2. If not, whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” that significantly limits her physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities;

2The ALJ did not acknowledge the change in alleged onset date. See tr. at 15 (ALJ’s opinion noting alleged onset date of August 15, 2014). 3The parties consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See Standing Order, In RE: Direct Assignment of Social Security Appeals to Magistrate Judges – Extension of Pilot Program (E.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 2020); Doc. 4. 3. If so, whether based on the medical evidence, the impairment meets or equals the criteria of an impairment listed in the listing of impairments (“Listings”), 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, which results in a presumption of disability;

4. If the impairment does not meet or equal the criteria for a listed impairment, whether, despite the severe impairment, the claimant has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform her past work; and

5. If the claimant cannot perform her past work, then the final step is to determine whether there is other work in the national economy that the claimant can perform.

See Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2014); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, while the burden shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step to establish that the claimant is capable of performing other jobs in the local and national economies, in light of her age, education, work experience, and RFC. See Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 2007). The court’s role on judicial review is to determine whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). Therefore, the issue in this case is whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled. Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” and must be “more than a mere scintilla.” Zirnsak, 777 F.2d at 610 (quoting Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005)); see also Biestek v. Berryhill, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (substantial evidence “means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion’”) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305

U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The court has plenary review of legal issues. Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 431. III. DISCUSSION A. ALJ’s Findings and Plaintiff’s Claims The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s dysfunction of the right upper extremity was severe, tr. at 17, but that her obesity, plantar fasciitis, disorders of the cervical and lumber

back, depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder were non-severe because “the record does not evidence more than minimal limitations arising out of any of these conditions,” and the treatment notes indicate that they were “sporadic or acute in nature” or were “stable and controlled.” Id. at 17-18. Through Plaintiff’s date last insured, the ALJ found that she did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met the Listings, id.

at 18, and that she had the RFC to perform light work, except that she could occasionally reach overhead but have no constant repetitive use of the right, dominant hand; and needed the opportunity to alternate positions from sitting or standing every 30 minutes, requiring that Plaintiff be able to perform the job either sitting or standing at her choosing. Id. at 20. Based on the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ

found that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work as a lifeguard and physical/swimming instructor, but could perform the jobs of survey worker, recreation aide, and information clerk. Id. at 27-28. Therefore, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled through December 31, 2019, her date last insured. Id. at 29. Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff was capable of performing frequent reaching and handling with her right upper extremity, Doc. 6 at 8-

11; Doc. 8 at 4-5, and finding her plantar fasciitis, sleep apnea, and obesity non-severe, Doc. 6 at 3-8; Doc.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
KUSKO v. KIJAKAZI, ACTING COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kusko-v-kijakazi-acting-commissioner-social-security-administration-paed-2023.