Kurfess v. United States

169 Ct. Cl. 486, 1965 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 61, 1965 WL 1444
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedFebruary 19, 1965
DocketNo. 407-60
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 169 Ct. Cl. 486 (Kurfess v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kurfess v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 486, 1965 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 61, 1965 WL 1444 (cc 1965).

Opinion

Laramore, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, while on active duty as an officer of the Naval Deserve, met a Navy Retiring Board on December 13, 1944. That Board found plaintiff entitled to be retired for physical disability by reason of a “Fecal Fistula,” and on March 1, 1945 plaintiff was placed on the disability retired list with disability retired pay entitling him to receive 75. percent of the pay of a commander of the United States Navy. This was the maximum he could have received pursuant to the law then in effect.

On June 1, 1950, pursuant to the Career Compensation Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 802, 823, the Secretary of the Navy, through his delegate, informed plaintiff of his election as to retirement pay benefits under section 411 of that Act. In accordance with that section, and pursuant to the regulations prescribed by the President, Executive Order 10124,3 G.F.R. 315 (1950), the Secretary of the Navy rated his disability at retirement as being 50 percent disabling under Veterans Administration Code 7330.1 This was predicated on the finding by the Retiring Board that his incapacity was due to a “Fecal Fistula.” Under this method plaintiff would be entitled to receive 50 percent of the basic pay of a commander with over 22 years of service. On June 12, 1954, plaintiff exercised his election privilege and elected to continue to receive retired pay under the laws in effect prior to October 1,1949.

On June 9, 1959, plaintiff filed an application with the Board for Correction of Naval Records to correct his records to reflect what he believed to be the correct degree of his disabilities at the time of his separation from the service. [489]*489On April 29, 1960, plaintiff’s application to the Correction Board was denied without a hearing on the ground that the material submitted failed to establish a sufficient basis for further action. On October 20, 1960, plaintiff filed the instant suit, claiming that the Board acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner and contrary to law in denying a hearing.

The threshold issue we are asked to decide is whether plaintiff’s claim is barred by our 6-year statute of limitations, 28 TJ.S.C. §2501 (1958 Ed.). Plaintiff contends that his claim first accrued on April 29, 1960 when the Board for Correction of Naval Becords denied him a hearing. Plaintiff argues that the Correction Board was the first competent board to pass on his entitlement to receive an increase in retired pay as provided by the Career Compensation Act, supra. On the other hand, defendant contends that plaintiff’s claim first accrued on June 1, 1950 when he was informed by the naval authorities that his disability at retirement had been rated at 50 percent under Veterans Administration Code 7330. Alternatively defendant contends that plaintiff’s claim accrued on June 12, 1954 when he made an irrevocable election to waive disability pay based upon percentage of disability. Under both dates, defendant argues, plaintiff’s claim would be barred by our 6-year statute of limitations, since his petition was filed in this court on October 20, 1960. However, we need not pass on this issue since we find that on the basis of the record before us2 the Correction Board did not act arbitrarily or contrary to law in refusing to grant plaintiff a hearing.

Plaintiff contends that as of the date of his relief from active duty on March 1,1945 he was suffering from a stricture of the rectum and anus, requiring colostomy, and that pursuant to Veterans Administration Code 73333 he was [490]*490100 percent disabled. Alternatively, plaintiff contends tliat he suffered from cancer of the rectum, a disease which is also 100 percent disabling under Veterans Administration Code 7343.4

We have carefully examined plaintiff’s medical record and nowhere in it do we find that at the time plaintiff was retired for physical disability he was suffering from a stricture of the rectum and anus which required colostomy.5 His medical records reveal that on August 25,1943 plaintiff underwent an operation in which his colon was resected in order to remove an obstructing lesion in the transverse colon. A pathological examination resulted in a diagnosis that plaintiff was afflicted by a carcinoma of the colon, which was later changed. Subsequently, a fecal fistula developed which on three occasions defied attempts at operative closure with the result that on each occasion a colostomy had to be performed to drain the discharge from the fistula. Plaintiff’s condition persisted after he returned to limited duty for six months. Consequently, on November 10, 1944, a Board of Medical Survey was of the opinion that due to the inability to close the fecal fistula, plaintiff was unfit for service. Plaintiff’s diagnosis was changed from “carcinoma, transverse colon” to “fecal fistula.” The Board recommended that he appear before a Naval Retiring Board. The Retiring Board affirmed the Survey Board’s findings and ordered plaintiff’s discharge for reason of physical disability. None of the entries in plaintiff’s medical records reveal that at the time of his discharge he was suffering from a stricture of the rectum and anus. On the contrary, there is an entry which indicates that a proctoscopic examination of the lower sigmoid and rectum was performed which revealed everything to be normal.

[491]*491As to plaintiff’s contention that he was suffering from cancer of the rectum, we find that it also is not supported by the record. The fact that a resection of the colon was performed to remove what was at the time thought to be a cancerous growth does not lend support to plaintiff’s contention. Apparently the resection of the colon remedied this condition. In any event, the Survey Board changed their diagnosis from carcinoma of the colon to fecal fistula. Plaintiff has introduced no evidence which shows that this diagnosis was erroneous.

Under these circumstances we conclude that the action of the Correction Board in refusing to grant him a hearing was neither arbitrary nor contrary to law. Neither the statute which created this Board (65 Stat. 655) nor the applicable regulations (32 CFB § 723.3(e)) require that a hearing be given. The Board had before it not only plaintiff’s naval medical records but also his subsequent civilian medical history. The Board, in denying plaintiff a hearing, determined that the medical records submitted failed to establish a sufficient basis for further action. In other words, the Board, on the basis of the materials furnished, obviously believed that plaintiff’s disability at the time of retirement was correctly diagnosed. In the absence of a clear showing that the Board acted arbitrarily or capriciously and therefore unlawfully we will not disturb its decision. Wales v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 765, 771 (1955); Boland v. United States, ante, 145, 150. We think that plaintiff in this case has not made such a showing.

For the foregoing reasons plaintiff is not entitled to recover and his petition is dismissed.

FINDINGS OP PACT

The court, having considered the evidence, the report of Trial Commissioner Paul H. McMurray, and the briefs and argument of counsel, makes findings of fact as follows:

1. Plaintiff was born in 1889 and is a citizen of the United States residing in California. Plaintiff’s military service is [492]*492as follows: (a) Midshipman, U.S.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
169 Ct. Cl. 486, 1965 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 61, 1965 WL 1444, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kurfess-v-united-states-cc-1965.