Kunkel v. Stockwell

887 F. Supp. 215, 1995 WL 293887
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedMay 11, 1995
Docket4:93CV02325 GFG
StatusPublished

This text of 887 F. Supp. 215 (Kunkel v. Stockwell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kunkel v. Stockwell, 887 F. Supp. 215, 1995 WL 293887 (E.D. Mo. 1995).

Opinion

887 F.Supp. 215 (1995)

Dale W. KUNKEL, Plaintiff,
v.
Glen STOCKWELL and Hans Gregor, Defendants.

No. 4:93CV02325 GFG.

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

May 11, 1995.

*216 Dale W. Kunkel, Mineral Point, MO, plaintiff pro se and Mark L. Floyd, Walter L. Floyd, Inc., St. Louis, MO, for plaintiff.

Orval E. Jones, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO and Paul M. Rauschenbach, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Louis, MO, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GUNN, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on defendants' motions for summary judgment. Documents ## 17, 20, 24.

Plaintiff Dale W. Kunkel, a Missouri prisoner confined at the Potosi Correctional Center (PCC), commenced this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Glen Stockwell, a sergeant at PCC and Hans Gregor, a corrections officer at PCC, alleging that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from an assault by inmate Vincent Hines. Kunkel sued defendants in their individual and official capacities and sought relief in the form of monetary damages only. Document # 22.[1]

Kunkel alleged that Hines assaulted him twice within a span of a few days in 1992, while Kunkel was working in the Housing Unit 2 of the Administrative Segregation Unit. Hines was charged with violating the prison rule against assaulting fellow inmates following both incidents. Kunkel alleged that on January 5, 1993, he was removed from his cell, his hands were cuffed behind his back, and he was transported by Stockwell to the prison medical unit along with Hines, who also had his hands cuffed behind his back. Id. at 2-3. Kunkel asserted that on the way to the medical unit Hines threatened Kunkel and that Stockwell witnessed the threats. Id. at 3. Upon entering the medical unit, Hines and Kunkel were locked *217 in a room together to await dental treatment. Id.

Kunkel claimed Hines continued to threaten him and suggested that they go into the restroom area to fight. Gregor then entered the cell, ordered Hines out of the restroom and told the two inmates that if they were going to fight they should do so where the guards could watch. Id. at 3. Kunkel alleged that while defendants were watching from the nursing station, Hines slipped his handcuffs under his feet to the front of his body and attacked Kunkel with the handcuffs, hitting him in the head, neck, back and shoulders, and kicking him in the knee, stomach, and chest area. Id. at 4. Kunkel asserted that Stockwell knew that Hines had previously assaulted him and that both defendants were aware of the verbal threats made by Hines which immediately preceded the assault. Id. Kunkel asserted that defendants knew that Hines presented a substantial risk to his personal safety, that placing him in the same cell with Hines evidenced deliberate indifference to his health and safety and that defendants failed to take reasonable measures to abate the risk. Id.

After taking Kunkel's deposition, defendants moved for summary judgment. Defendants argue that Kunkel failed to produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact on whether they were deliberately indifferent to the risk Hines presented to Kunkel's personal safety and that Kunkel's claim fails as a matter of law. Defendants further contend that they acted reasonably under the circumstances. Documents ## 20, 24, 25. Kunkel argues that he has produced sufficient evidence through his deposition testimony to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Stockwell and Gregor knew of and disregarded the substantial risk Hines presented to his personal safety.

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court views the evidence and the inferences which may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adkison v. G.D. Searle & Co., 971 F.2d 132, 134 (8th Cir.1992). The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

In response to a properly supported motion, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations of the complaint, but by affidavit or other admissible evidence must set forth specific facts which demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Instead, the nonmoving party "must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. at 2514.

A prison official's deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm to a prisoner violates the Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1974, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The Supreme Court has held that prison officials must take reasonable measures to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1976. The Court in Farmer adopted a subjective test for deliberate indifference, stating:

[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.

Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1979.

The Court explained, however, that "an Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall *218 an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm." Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1981. Whether a prison official has the requisite knowledge is a factual matter "subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, ... and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious." Id. (internal citations omitted). The Court observed that "prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted." Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1982-83.

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Related

Kentucky v. Graham
473 U.S. 159 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Randle v. Parker
48 F.3d 301 (Eighth Circuit, 1995)
Adkison v. G.D. Searle & Co.
971 F.2d 132 (Eighth Circuit, 1992)

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Bluebook (online)
887 F. Supp. 215, 1995 WL 293887, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kunkel-v-stockwell-moed-1995.