Kump v. Basnight

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Kump v. Basnight

297 A.D.2d 639, 746 N.Y.2d 904, 746 N.Y.S.2d 904, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8285

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedSeptember 9, 2002

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 297 A.D.2d 639 (Kump v. Basnight) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Kump v. Basnight, 297 A.D.2d 639, 746 N.Y.2d 904, 746 N.Y.S.2d 904, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8285 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2002).

Pincite

Opinion

In his motion to dismiss the mother’s paternity petition, the appellant sought to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to support his claim that it would be inequitable to him and contrary to the best interests of the child to allow the mother to assert a claim of paternity 12 years after the child was born. The appellant’s motion to dismiss the petition was properly denied. “The paramount concern in applying equitable estoppel [in paternity cases] has been, and continues to be, the best interest of the child” (Jean Maby H. v Joseph H., 246 AD2d 282, 285; see Matter of Ettore I. v Angela D., 127 AD2d 6). The appellant failed to demonstrate how a legal declaration of paternity will cause the child to suffer irreparable loss of status, destruction of his family image, or other harm to his physical or emotional well-being (see Matter of Carol S. v Gerard D., 276 AD2d 377).

The appellant’s remaining contentions are either without merit or need not be reached in light of this determination. Florio, J.P., S. Miller, Townes and Cozier, JJ., concur.

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In his motion to dismiss the mother’s paternity petition, the appellant sought to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to support his claim that it would be inequitable to him and contrary to the best interests of the child to allow the mother to assert a claim of paternity 12 years after the child was born. The appellant’s motion to dismiss the petition was properly denied. “The paramount concern in applying equitable estoppel [in paternity cases] has been, and continues to be, the best interest of the child” (Jean Maby H. v Joseph H., 246 AD2d 282, 285; see Matter of Ettore I. v Angela D., 127 AD2d 6). The appellant failed to demonstrate how a legal declaration of paternity will cause the child to suffer irreparable loss of status, destruction of his family image, or other harm to his physical or emotional well-being (see Matter of Carol S. v Gerard D., 276 AD2d 377).

The appellant’s remaining contentions are either without merit or need not be reached in light of this determination. Florio, J.P., S. Miller, Townes and Cozier, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

297 A.D.2d 639, 746 N.Y.2d 904, 746 N.Y.S.2d 904, 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8285, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kump-v-basnight-nyappdiv-2002.

Opinion

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