Kuechler v. Wilson

18 S.W. 317, 82 Tex. 638, 1891 Tex. LEXIS 1197
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 22, 1891
DocketNo. 7162.
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 18 S.W. 317 (Kuechler v. Wilson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kuechler v. Wilson, 18 S.W. 317, 82 Tex. 638, 1891 Tex. LEXIS 1197 (Tex. 1891).

Opinion

GARRETT, Presiding Judge,

Section B.—Appellant’s first assignment of error relates to the exclusion of the certificates of James Hewlett and G. B. Erath, attached to the sketch of surveys from the Land Office offered in evidence by him, and admitted except as to the certificates, which were excluded on objection by the defendants that they were not competent evidence. The certificate of the Commissioner of the Land Office attached to the sketch was, “that the above is a correct copy of sketch file Ho. 7, Bell County, now on file in this office,” and was admitted with the sketch. Those excluded were: “I certify the above representations to be correct and the connections to be as represented. Caldwell, 6th August, 1850. [Signed] G. B. Erath.” And, “State of Texas, District of Milam: I do certify the above sketch is a correct representation of the survey returned to this office by W. W. Oxsheer, deputy surveyor for said district. Given at Caldwell, this 6tli day of August, 1850. [Signed] James Howlett, district surveyor.” The map or sketch includes the Smith and the Walker surveys and the vacant land north of the Smith, and the configuration of the surveys tends to sustain plaintiff’s contention as to the true position of the northwest corner of the Smith.

As an archive of the General Land Office, the copy of the map duly certified by the Commissioner was proper evidence; but the certificates of the surveyors attached thereto were inadmissible to prove any dis *642 puted fact, and were properly excluded by the court. 1 Whart. on Ev., sec. 120. That the representations on the map were correct was the opinion of the surveyor. .

The second assignment of error is: “The court erred in permitting the defendants to read in evidence to the jury, over plaintiff’s objection, the following words, to-wit: ‘Witness did not understand the first part of intgy. 10, F. P.,’ occurring in the answer of the witness D. D. Felson to the tenth interrogatory propounded by defendants, more fully set out and explained in plaintiff’s bill of exceptions.”

This occurred in taking the deposition of the witness Felson, and was in reply to an interrogatory, it must be presumed, as none appears in the bill of exceptions, as to where, from general reputation in the neighborhood,- the Alexander and Walker lines ran. His answer as written by the notary public was: “To the tenth direct interrogatory witness answers: There was no general reputation in the neighborhood, while I resided there, as to the west line of the W. D. Walker and Alexander surveys. [Witness did not understand the first part of interrogatory 10, F. P.] He now says, that it was generally understood in the neighborhood that the west line of said Walker and Alexander surveys was where the line now runs,” etc. The witness signed the deposition, and the officer certified that he subscribed and swore to the same. The statement contained in the answer is the sworn deposition of the witness, and we do not think it was error to admit it in «evidence.'

Appellant’s refused charges, which are the basis of the third and fifth errors assigned, are as follows:

1. “If they (the jury) believe from the evidence in this case that the southwest corner or the south line of the Eyan (or Atkinson) survey is a marked corner or line, and has been found and identified on the ground, and that the north line of the James Smith one-third league is identical or coincident with the south line of said Eyan or Atkinson survey, then the call in the Esther Clark patent from the northeast corner of the Eyan survey south 30 degrees east to the southwest corner of the same in the north line of the James Smith one-third league survey will control the length of said line as given in the patent, and the said Clark will extend south to the north line of said Smith, in the absence of any other call or fact indicating to your minds with more certainty the true position of the south line of the Clark survey.
3. “If they (the jury) believe from the evidence in this case that the patent or original field notes of the James Smith one-third league survey called for a bearing tree at the northeast corner of the same, and that at the time said survey was originally made such tree actually existed and could be found and identified on the ground, then, in contemplation of law, the north line of said Smith survey was a marked line, and the call in the Esther Clark patent for said north line and *643 northeast corner would control the distance given in said Clark patent, and said north line of the Smith would be the south line of the Clark in the absence of any other call or fact more certainly indicating to your minds the true position of said Clark south line; and in this connection you are charged that when objects, natural or artificial, are called for in the field notes of official surveyors, the law presumes that such officers report their work truthfully and correctly—that such objects actually existed on the ground as called for; and this presumption continues until the contrary is proved.”

There was no call in the field notes of the Eyan survey for the Smith survey at all; and it was made about eleven years later. ¡Nor was there evidence of any marked line or corner on the line of the Smith survey as claimed by the plaintiff. The court in its charge to the jury instructed them that there was no testimony tending to show that the lines of the Esther Clark survey were marked upon the ground, and in the absence of such testimony they would, as to the Walker and Alexander surveys, find the true position of their lines where the Clark abutted upon them, and that these would be the true boundaries; and as to the James Smith survey, they should find whether its north line was run, or when plaintiff’s location was made it was an established or marked line; that in either event, and the locality of the line could be established, it would be the proper boundary as between the Smith and Clark; and this, although the original marks had been effaced. The jury were also told, that if no lines or corners of the surveys could be found or identified on the ground they should look to the field notes of adjacent surveys in evidence before them, and if they could be identified they should begin on them and locate the lines of the surveys in question by running course and distance; but that this should only be done when the boundaries of a survey could not be satisfactorily ascertained by its own calls and field notes. The charge of the court was full and clear on the proposition that the Clark survey would extend to the north line of the Smith survey, and there was no error in refusing the special charges numbered 1 and 3, if, indeed, they were not objectionable as being argumentative and not called for by the facts.

There was no error in the refusal of the second special instruction requested by the plaintiff—to the effect that if the jury believed from the evidence that the south line of the Atkinson (or Eyan) survey was a marked line, and that the north line of the Smith one-third league was identical with the same, then the south line of the Clark survey would be coincident with the north line of said Smith survey—for the same reason that it was proper to refuse the first special instruction requested, and it would also tend to confuse and mislead the jury by giving undue importance to the south line of the Eyan survey.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Prince v. Flukinger
381 S.W.2d 75 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1964)
Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Nash
67 S.W.2d 452 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1934)
Central Federal Fire Ins. Co. v. Lewis
44 S.W.2d 936 (Texas Commission of Appeals, 1932)
Kirby Lumber Co. v. Adams
291 S.W. 279 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1927)
Robbs v. Woolfolk
224 S.W. 232 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1920)
Delaware Underwriters & Westchester Fire Insurance v. Brock
211 S.W. 779 (Texas Supreme Court, 1919)
Harkrider v. Gaut
167 S.W. 164 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1914)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
18 S.W. 317, 82 Tex. 638, 1891 Tex. LEXIS 1197, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kuechler-v-wilson-tex-1891.