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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 KRYSTLE J. LYONS, 9 Plaintiff, Case No. C25-1168-MLP 10 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 11 OAK HARBOR SCHOOL DISTRICT, 12 Defendant. 13
14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 This matter is before the Court on Defendant Oak Harbor Public Schools’ (“Oak 16 Harbor”) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Mot. 17 (dkt. # 21).) Plaintiff Krystle J. Lyons (“Ms. Lyons”) filed an opposition (Resp. (dkt. # 23)), and 18 Defendant filed a reply (Reply (dkt. # 25)). No party requested oral argument. Having considered 19 the parties’ submissions, the governing law, and the balance of the record, the Court hereby 20 GRANTS Defendant’s Motion (dkt. # 21).1 21 22 23
1 The parties consented to proceed before the undersigned Magistrate Judge. (Dkt. # 18.) 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) may be based on “the lack of a 3 cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal 4 theory.” Godecke v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation
5 omitted). To survive such a motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 6 as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 7 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible 8 when a plaintiff pleads facts that permit the court to reasonably infer the defendant’s liability for 9 the alleged misconduct. Id. A complaint does not suffice if it offers only “labels and 10 conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the elements,” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further 11 factual enhancement.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). 12 When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual 13 allegations as true and construe all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving 14 party. Barker v. Riverside Cnty. Office of Educ., 584 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations
15 omitted). The court need not, however, “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, 16 unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 17 266 F.3d 979, 988, opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). 18 Furthermore, although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 19 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010), the court “may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not 20 initially pled.” Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (Oct. 9, 1992). 21 Where a district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should generally provide leave to 22 amend unless it is clear the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 1 III. BACKGROUND2 2 In September 2021, Ms. Lyons alleges she disclosed her asthma disability to Oak Harbor 3 at a hiring event. (Am. Compl. (dkt. # 5) at 6; Suppl. (dkt. # 5-1) at 1.) She contends that despite 4 this disclosure, Oak Harbor rigidly enforced its mask mandate and refused to consider
5 accommodations or alternative placements. (Id.) Ms. Lyons asserts she engaged in protected 6 activity by objecting to this policy, which she argued excluded her from employment due to her 7 disability. (Id. at 2.) She claims Oak Harbor then terminated her from a mandatory training 8 program in October 2021 in retaliation for this protected activity. (Id.) Ms. Lyons alleges this 9 termination denied her an equal employment opportunity and caused a substantial deterioration 10 in her medical condition. (Id.) 11 The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) issued Ms. Lyons a 12 right-to-sue notice in September 2022.3 (Suppl. at 3.) Ms. Lyons filed this action in June 2025 13 (dkt. # 1), asserting claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 14 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (Am.
15 Compl. at 6; Suppl. at 1-2). 4 She concedes she missed the ninety-day filing window but seeks 16 equitable tolling due to psychological and physical hardship. (Suppl. at 3.) She seeks $550,000 in 17 compensatory damages for emotional distress, medical harm, lost income, and educational 18 disruption. (Am. Compl. at 7; Suppl. at 3.) 19
20 2 The Court accepts the following factual allegations from Ms. Lyons (dkt. ## 5, 5-1) as true for this Motion. See Snyder & Associates Acquisitions LLC v. United States, 859 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017). 21 3 A plaintiff must file suit within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue notice. See 29 U.S.C. §794(a)(1) (“remedies, procedures, and rights” applicable to Title VII employment claims apply to RA claims); 42 22 U.S.C. § 12117 (ADA provision incorporating Title VII procedures); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(f)(1) (establishing ninety-day time period to file civil action); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e). 23 4 In her opposition, Ms. Lyons clarifies she proceeds under Title II of the ADA, not Title I. (Resp. at 6.) 1 IV. DISCUSSION 2 A. Equitable Tolling 3 Ms. Lyons requests equitable tolling of the ninety-day filing period, arguing that 4 psychological incapacity prevented her from filing suit after receiving her EEOC right-to-sue
5 letter in September 2022.5 (Suppl. at 3; Resp. at 2-5 (citing Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238 (9th 6 Cir. 1999), as amended (Mar. 22, 1999) and Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010)).) Oak 7 Harbor opposes, contending Ms. Lyons has not shown the required diligence or extraordinary 8 circumstances. (Mot. at 5; Reply at 2-5.) 9 The equitable tolling doctrine “enables courts to meet new situations that demand 10 equitable intervention, and to accord all the relief necessary to correct particular injustices.” 11 Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe,
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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 KRYSTLE J. LYONS, 9 Plaintiff, Case No. C25-1168-MLP 10 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 11 OAK HARBOR SCHOOL DISTRICT, 12 Defendant. 13
14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 This matter is before the Court on Defendant Oak Harbor Public Schools’ (“Oak 16 Harbor”) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Mot. 17 (dkt. # 21).) Plaintiff Krystle J. Lyons (“Ms. Lyons”) filed an opposition (Resp. (dkt. # 23)), and 18 Defendant filed a reply (Reply (dkt. # 25)). No party requested oral argument. Having considered 19 the parties’ submissions, the governing law, and the balance of the record, the Court hereby 20 GRANTS Defendant’s Motion (dkt. # 21).1 21 22 23
1 The parties consented to proceed before the undersigned Magistrate Judge. (Dkt. # 18.) 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) may be based on “the lack of a 3 cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal 4 theory.” Godecke v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation
5 omitted). To survive such a motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 6 as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 7 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible 8 when a plaintiff pleads facts that permit the court to reasonably infer the defendant’s liability for 9 the alleged misconduct. Id. A complaint does not suffice if it offers only “labels and 10 conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the elements,” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further 11 factual enhancement.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). 12 When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual 13 allegations as true and construe all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving 14 party. Barker v. Riverside Cnty. Office of Educ., 584 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations
15 omitted). The court need not, however, “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, 16 unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 17 266 F.3d 979, 988, opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). 18 Furthermore, although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 19 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010), the court “may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not 20 initially pled.” Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (Oct. 9, 1992). 21 Where a district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should generally provide leave to 22 amend unless it is clear the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 1 III. BACKGROUND2 2 In September 2021, Ms. Lyons alleges she disclosed her asthma disability to Oak Harbor 3 at a hiring event. (Am. Compl. (dkt. # 5) at 6; Suppl. (dkt. # 5-1) at 1.) She contends that despite 4 this disclosure, Oak Harbor rigidly enforced its mask mandate and refused to consider
5 accommodations or alternative placements. (Id.) Ms. Lyons asserts she engaged in protected 6 activity by objecting to this policy, which she argued excluded her from employment due to her 7 disability. (Id. at 2.) She claims Oak Harbor then terminated her from a mandatory training 8 program in October 2021 in retaliation for this protected activity. (Id.) Ms. Lyons alleges this 9 termination denied her an equal employment opportunity and caused a substantial deterioration 10 in her medical condition. (Id.) 11 The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) issued Ms. Lyons a 12 right-to-sue notice in September 2022.3 (Suppl. at 3.) Ms. Lyons filed this action in June 2025 13 (dkt. # 1), asserting claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 14 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (Am.
15 Compl. at 6; Suppl. at 1-2). 4 She concedes she missed the ninety-day filing window but seeks 16 equitable tolling due to psychological and physical hardship. (Suppl. at 3.) She seeks $550,000 in 17 compensatory damages for emotional distress, medical harm, lost income, and educational 18 disruption. (Am. Compl. at 7; Suppl. at 3.) 19
20 2 The Court accepts the following factual allegations from Ms. Lyons (dkt. ## 5, 5-1) as true for this Motion. See Snyder & Associates Acquisitions LLC v. United States, 859 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017). 21 3 A plaintiff must file suit within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue notice. See 29 U.S.C. §794(a)(1) (“remedies, procedures, and rights” applicable to Title VII employment claims apply to RA claims); 42 22 U.S.C. § 12117 (ADA provision incorporating Title VII procedures); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(f)(1) (establishing ninety-day time period to file civil action); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e). 23 4 In her opposition, Ms. Lyons clarifies she proceeds under Title II of the ADA, not Title I. (Resp. at 6.) 1 IV. DISCUSSION 2 A. Equitable Tolling 3 Ms. Lyons requests equitable tolling of the ninety-day filing period, arguing that 4 psychological incapacity prevented her from filing suit after receiving her EEOC right-to-sue
5 letter in September 2022.5 (Suppl. at 3; Resp. at 2-5 (citing Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238 (9th 6 Cir. 1999), as amended (Mar. 22, 1999) and Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010)).) Oak 7 Harbor opposes, contending Ms. Lyons has not shown the required diligence or extraordinary 8 circumstances. (Mot. at 5; Reply at 2-5.) 9 The equitable tolling doctrine “enables courts to meet new situations that demand 10 equitable intervention, and to accord all the relief necessary to correct particular injustices.” 11 Kwai Fun Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030, 1052 (9th Cir. 2013), aff’d and remanded sub nom. 12 United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402 (2015) (cleaned up). It is an exceptional remedy, available 13 only in “extreme cases” and “applied sparingly.” Scholar v. Pac. Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 267 (9th 14 Cir. 1992). The party seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of proving that they diligently
15 pursued their rights and that extraordinary circumstances prevented timely filing. Kwai Fun 16 Wong, 732 F.3d at 1052. 17 Mental incapacity may justify tolling, but only where the plaintiff was “completely 18 psychiatrically disabled” during the limitations period. Stoll, 165 F.3d at 1242. For example, 19 tolling was appropriate where a plaintiff was unable to read, open mail, or function in society due 20 to severe trauma and repeated suicide attempts, id., or where a petitioner’s delusions made him 21 incapable of rationally understanding his need to file. Forbess v. Franke, 749 F.3d 837, 840-41 22 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100. 23 5 In her opposition, Ms. Lyons also relies, in part, on a case that does not exist. (See Resp. at 5 (citing “Forbes v. Garza”).) 1 Conversely, tolling does not apply where a plaintiff, despite significant mental health 2 challenges, remains able to function in other complex areas of life. See Orthel v. Yates, 795 F.3d 3 935, 939 (9th Cir. 2015) (no tolling where plaintiff remained “high functioning,” participated in 4 college courses, and displayed good insight); Lacayo v. Catalina Rest. Grp., Inc., 2015 WL
5 993448, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2015) (no tolling where plaintiff applied for disability benefits 6 and requested employment records). Generalized stress or difficulty, without evidence of 7 complete incapacitation, is insufficient. Elshirbiny v. Hewlett Packard Co., 2001 WL 590034, at 8 *5 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2001), aff’d, 23 Fed. Appx. 699 (9th Cir. 2001). 9 Here, Ms. Lyons’ own allegations demonstrate she remained highly functional during the 10 tolling period. She filed multiple administrative complaints, consulted seven attorneys, retained 11 counsel in a separate matter, negotiated for a teaching certificate, completed a master’s degree, 12 relocated for employment, engaged in HR meetings, received ongoing therapy, and ultimately 13 filed this action pro se. (Resp. at 3-5.) While Ms. Lyons undoubtedly faced personal and 14 professional challenges, these difficulties did not constitute the kind of extraordinary, severe
15 incapacity required for equitable tolling. Her ability to manage complex tasks and pursue legal 16 and professional goals shows she was not completely disabled from asserting her rights. 17 Accordingly, Ms. Lyons has not met her burden to justify equitable tolling. 18 B. ADA and RA Claims 19 Ms. Lyons asserts claims under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the RA, alleging that 20 Oak Harbor failed to accommodate her asthma disability during a student teaching internship. 21 (Resp. at 1, 6-8.) Even assuming equitable tolling applies, Oak Harbor argues this action should 22 be dismissed for failure to state a claim. (Mot. at 7-10, Reply at 5-6.) 23 1 Title II “prohibits disability discrimination in the provision of public services[.]” Okwu v. 2 McKim, 682 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2012).6 It requires public entities to “make reasonable 3 modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid 4 discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the
5 modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” 28 6 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). 7 Ms. Lyons’ ADA and RA claims stem from Oak Harbor’s alleged failure to engage in an 8 interactive process and explore accommodations for her asthma to allow her to participate in a 9 student teaching internship. However, it is well settled that Title II addresses discrimination in 10 the provision of public services, not public employment. See Zimmerman v. Oregon Dep’t of 11 Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1184 (9th Cir. 1999). As Ms. Lyons’ claims arise from an employment 12 relationship with Oak Harbor, they necessarily fail. See id. at 1172-74. Ms. Lyons also fails to 13 allege any intentional discrimination by Oak Harbor, which is required to recover monetary 14 damages. Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on denial
15 of reh’g (Oct. 11, 2001). 16 In sum, Ms. Lyons has not adequately alleged a claim for relief against Oak Harbor under 17 the ADA or the RA. Accordingly, Oak Harbor’s Motion to Dismiss (dkt. # 21) is granted. 18 Because the defects in Ms. Lyons’ claims cannot be cured by new factual allegations, this 19 dismissal is with prejudice. Manzarek, 519 F.3d at 1031. 20 21 22
23 6 Because there is no significant difference between the substantive standards of the ADA and RA, the claims may be analyzed together. See Martin v. Cal. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 560 F.3d 1042, 1047 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2009). 1 V. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion (dkt. # 21) is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s 3 Amended Complaint (dkt. ## 5, 5-1) is DISMISSED with prejudice. 4 Dated this 23rd day of December, 2025.
5 A 6 MICHELLE L. PETERSON United States Magistrate Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23