Krupula v. State of NH

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: September 13, 1995
• Docket: CV-95-014-B
• Status: Published

Opinion

Krupula v. State of NH CV-95-014-B 09/13/95 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Christopher Krupula

v. Civil No. 95-014-B

State of New Hampshire

O R D E R

The state moves for summary judgment to deny Christopher

Krupula's petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking relief

from his state conviction and sentence. In support of its

motion, the state argues that the grounds asserted in Krupula's

petition are procedurally barred, unripe, not exhausted in state

court, or without merit. Because I find that Krupula has not met

the exhaustion reguirement of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b) (West 1994),

I grant summary judgment dismissing his petition without

prejudice to pursue available state remedies.

I. BACKGROUND

Christopher Krupula plead guilty to six counts of sexual

assault on February 6, 1992, and was sentenced in April to serve

four to ten years at the New Hampshire State Prison. The court

included as a condition of his sentence that he participate meaningfully in a sexual offender program at the prison, and

provided that after serving two years of his sentence and

successful completion of the sexual offender program, Krupula

would have the right to petition for a suspension of the

remainder of his sentence.

When Lance Messinger, Sexual Offender Program Coordinator,

interviewed Krupula in August 1992 for admission into a sexual

offender program at the prison, he reported that Krupula denied

committing the sexual assaults for which he plead guilty. As a

result, Krupula was not admitted into a program. A year later,

in August 1993, Krupula again began efforts to be admitted into a

program and at the same time, through counsel, filed a petition

for writ of habeas corpus in state court. When his petition was

denied, he appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.1

1 Krupula presented the following issues on appeal:

1. Was the petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus improperly denied due to the fact that the facts alleged in the petition, if true, would have entitled the petitioner to relief on the grounds that he was reguired, as a necessary predicate to his admission to sexual offender counselling, to admit to uncharged offenses and thereby waive his State and Federal rights against self-incrimination?

2. Is the petitioner's continued incarceration unconstitutional as it amounts to punishment for the

2 Krupula was admitted into the relapse prevention sexual

offender program in January 1994. In September, the state moved

to dismiss Krupula's supreme court appeal as moot because he had

been allowed to participate in the program. Krupula did not

object to the state's motion to dismiss, and the court dismissed

the appeal as moot on September 26, 1994. At about the same

time, Krupula was terminated from the program for reasons that

remain in dispute. Krupula alleges that he was terminated

because he refused to admit to uncharged crimes. The state

alleges that he was terminated because "of his conduct, including

missing sessions, failing to complete reguired assignments, and

other reasons."

Krupula, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed his

habeas corpus petition here in January 1995, asserting a variety

of constitutional infirmities in the state court proceedings and

challenging his confinement. After review under Rule 4 of the

Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases, the magistrate judge

determined that Krupula's petition included both exhausted and

petitioner's assertion of his right not to incriminate himself in order to avail himself of the rights he obtained by virtue of a negotiated plea agreement that did not involve the waiver of his right against self­ incrimination, that was agreed to by the State and approved by the trial court?

3 unexhausted claims. As directed by the magistrate judge's order,

Krupula chose to proceed on the exhausted grounds that the

conditions of participation in the sexual offender program at the

prison violated his right against self-incrimination and that he

was improperly prevented from completing the program. The state

moved for reconsideration of the magistrate judge's order

allowing the limited version of the petition. In response, I

ordered the state to express its objections in a motion for

summary judgment, which is the motion presently under

consideration.

II. DISCUSSION

In habeas corpus proceedings, as in other civil actions,2

summary judgment is appropriate if the facts taken in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party show that no genuine issue

of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Guzman-

Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 29 F.3d 3, 4 (1st Cir. 1994).

The state argues that Krupula's habeas corpus petition

2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2); see also Williams v. Scott, 35 F.3d 159, 161 (5th Cir. 1994), cert, denied, 115 S. C t . 959 (1995) .

4 should be denied because he has not exhausted his state court

remedies. The statute directs that a petition for habeas corpus

"shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has

exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or

that there is either an absence of available State corrective

process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process

ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner." 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2254(b). The exhaustion reguirement insures that a petitioner

has afforded the state court a fair opportunity to address the

petitioner's federal constitutional claims and correct any

constitutional error prior to review by a federal court. Picard

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Hall v. DiPaolo, 986 F.2d 7,

10 (1st Cir. 1993). A "fair opportunity" means that the claim

must have been presented for consideration on the merits. Keeney

v. Tamavo-Reves, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). Moreover, a petitioner

cannot meet the exhaustion reguirement by showing that he

presented the same legal claim to the state's highest court if

the federal claim arises from a different factual context.

Carillo v. Brown, 807 F.2d 1094, 1099 (1st Cir. 1986) (habeas

claim not exhausted when it is based on new factual allegations

in federal court that cast the claim in a "significantly

different light").

5 Krupula's current claim arises from a significantly

different factual setting than the circumstances that gave rise

to his state court claim. In state court, Krupula challenged the

state's refusal to admit him to the sexual offender program. He

now contends that he was improperly prevented from completing the

program. Assuming, without deciding, that the legal theory

underlying both claims is identical and the issues raised in his

state habeas petition were "presented" to the New Hampshire

Supreme Court for decision, Krupula still has not exhausted his

current claim because the factual settings that gave rise to both

claims are significantly different. Accordingly, his claim must

be dismissed without prejudice to his right to raise the claim in

state court.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the state's motion for summary

judgment (document no. 17) is granted without prejudice to the

petitioner to seek state court remedies.

SO ORDERED.

Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge

6 September 13, 1995 cc: Christopher Krupula, pro se John C. Kissinger, Esq.