Krueger v. Gautier

83 F.2d 832, 23 C.C.P.A. 1128, 1936 CCPA LEXIS 94
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJune 1, 1936
DocketNo. 3623; No. 3624
StatusPublished

This text of 83 F.2d 832 (Krueger v. Gautier) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Krueger v. Gautier, 83 F.2d 832, 23 C.C.P.A. 1128, 1936 CCPA LEXIS 94 (ccpa 1936).

Opinion

Geai-iam, Presiding Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The present appeals originally involved two interferences, namely, interferences Nos. 60,810 and 60,811. The appeals were designated here as cases Nos. 3623 and 3624, respectively. On the hearing here, counsel for Krueger, the appellant in both cases, moved to dismiss the appeal in No. 3623, and moved to dismiss the appeal in No. 3624 as to counts 1, 2, and 3 thereof. No objection was interposed by the other parties and accordingly the motions are allowed.

This leaves for consideration only counts 4 and 5 in interference No. 60,811, case No. 3624, Theodore H. Krueger v. Ephraim H. Chabot. These counts are as follows:

4. In a strip serving machine of the type described, a supply of gummed tape, strip moistening means, strip severing means, strip feeding means including means to grasp the strip and feed it from the machine, a visual measuring device for measuring the length of strip fed out consisting of a stationary measuring scale in the form of a dial, a pointer movable on the dial in synchrony with the feeding of the tape and means to return the pointer to normal position when the feeding of the tape is stopped.
5. In a strip serving machine of the type described, a supply of gummed strip, moistening means, a strip severing means, strip feeding means including means to grasp the strip and feed it from the machine, a visual measuring device for measuring the length of strip fed out consisting of a stationary measuring scale in the form of a dial, a pointer movable on the dial in synchrony with the feeding of the tape and means to return the pointer to normal position when the feeding of the tape is stopped, said means comprising a spring secured to the machine and to the indicator.

On August 9, 1927, the appellant presented an application to the United States Patent Office, praying- that a patent be issued to- him for a claimed new and useful improvement in tape serving machines, and, on January 7, 1930, letters patent No. 1,742,603 were issued to him on said application. The application upon which this patent was issued was said to be a continuation in part of appellant’s co-pending application, serial No. 696,907, which was filed March 4, 1924, and which ripened into patent on August 9,1927, as No. 1,638,816.

An interference was declared on December 19, 1930, between the said letters patent No. 1,742,603 of appellant, and a reissue application of the appellee, serial No. 488,167, filed October 11,1930, for a reissue of patent No. 1,732,635, dated October 22, 1929, issued on an application dated October 12, 1925.

As the interference was originally declared, it consisted of three counts which were claims 1,2, and 3 of Krueger’s patent No. 1,742,603. [1130]*1130An application under rule 109 of the Patent Office for the addition of counts to the interference having been allowed, counts 4 and 5 were added to the interference by order of the examiner on June 9, 1932. These counts were claims 4 and 5, respectively, of appellant’s patent No. 1,742,603. The interference was therefore redeclared with five counts, only two of which are now involved in this apxDeal, namely, counts 4 and 5. Afterwards, various motions, the consideration of which is not important to the issues here involved, were made by the parties and appear in the record. Among these was a further motion to amend the interference and to add a reissue application filed by Krueger, which motion was denied by the Examiner of Interferences. Then followed an untimely motion on the part of Krueger to dissolve the interference and to amend the same, and to add counts, which motion was also denied by the Examinen of Interferences. A petition was then filed with the commissioner, by the appellee, to reformulate the issues of the interference, which was also duly denied by the commissioner. Other motions were made and actions taken, a further recapitulation of which is deemed unnecessary.

Finally, testimony having been taken, the matter was argued and, on November 14, 1933, a decision of the Examiner of Interferences was rendered awarding priority of invention of the subject matter in issue on all counts to Ephraim H. Chabot, the appellee. Krueger afterwards-made a motion to reopen the interference and take further testimony, which was denied.

An appeal was taken to the Board of Appeals by the party Krueger from the decision awarding priority to Chabot, and, upon hearing, the Board of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Examiner of Interferences. From that decision, the appellant has brought the matter to this court.

In order to understand the exact issues presented, it will be necessary to'detail, at considerable length, the substance of the decisions of the Patent Office tribunals. The Examiner of Interferences stated that the appellant Krueger, on April 15, 1931, had moved to shift the burden of proof in the interference, relying upon an earlier patent, No. 1,638,816, the application for which was filed March 4, 1924, as hereinbefore recited. The motion was denied without prejudice to its renewal at final hearing, and, on the hearing, Krueger reasserted his right to the benefit of his earlier case. The examiner further states that the party Krueger, in presenting his “case” in patent No. 1,742,603, with respect to the claims corresponding to the counts of the issue here, specifically pointed out to the examiner wherein these claims did not read upon his earlier patent. This position, it is said, was taken in response to a final rejection by the Primary Examiner on the ground of double patenting. From this the Examiner of Interferences here deduces the conclusion: “Pre[1131]*1131sumably its supposed validity constituted the basis for the allowance of the claims in the later case.”

Following this conclusion, the Examiner of Interferences expressed doubt whether Krueger is not estopped to take an opposite position at this time, and held that the counts must be strictly construed in view of .the former position taken by Krueger. The Examiner of Interferences was also of the opinion that Krueger’s earlier patent, No. 1,638,816, did not support counts 1, 2, and 3 of the interference, because of a failure to disclose certain elements of the strip feeding* means and indicator.

As to counts 4 and 5, the Examiner of Interferences made this statement:

Counts 4 and 5 recite means to' return the pointer to- normal position when the feeding of the tape is stopped. In the early Krueger patent there is no mechanical relation between the return of the pointer and the. termination of the tape feeding. In Fig. 0 of the later patent there is an invariable and mechanical relation between these operations. That is, when the upper feeding roller is raised, thus terminating tape feeding, the friction roller 200 is also raised allowing the clock spring 206 to return the pointer to initial position. But in the earlier Krueger construction no such relation exists. The termination of tape feeding and the return of the pointer are here ■ independently controlled at the will of the operator, and the pointer is not necessarily returned upon termination of tape feeding. There is certainly no mechanism for effecting this result, and should it occur, it is due entirely to the sequence of operations which .&©<• operator elects to perform on the machine. In fact, in the normal machine operation frequently the pointer is not returned, to normal position after a .termination in tape feeding.

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Bluebook (online)
83 F.2d 832, 23 C.C.P.A. 1128, 1936 CCPA LEXIS 94, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/krueger-v-gautier-ccpa-1936.