Krouskoff v. Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist.

Opinion

Krouskoff v Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist.

2026 NY Slip Op 04846

August 5, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

John Krouskoff, respondent,

v

Clarkstown Central School District, appellant.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 5, 2026

2025-02851, (Index No. 35241/22)

Angela G. Iannacci, J.P.

Valerie Brathwaite Nelson

Paul Wooten

Janice A. Taylor, JJ.

Jaspan Schlesinger Narendran LLP, Garden City, NY (Stanley A. Comhi of counsel), for appellant.

Liston Abramson LLP, New York, NY (Gina K. Kim and Catherine A. Christian of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Larry J. Schwartz, J.), dated February 5, 2025. The order denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granted the plaintiff's cross-motion, in effect, for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

From 2007 to 2014, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant, Clarkstown Central School District (hereinafter the District), as the Director of Instructional Technology and Information Services, a position on the superintendent's staff, under an individual contract of employment between himself and the Board of Education of the District. Paragraph 14 of the employment contract provided: "After five years of full-time, continuous service to the District, serving on the superintendent's staff, you will receive 85% of a district contribution towards retiree health insurance."

In March 2014, the plaintiff resigned and accepted a position with a different school district. In April 2020, the plaintiff retired and applied for retirement benefits. Thereafter, the plaintiff contacted the District requesting retiree health insurance contributions. The District refused the request, claiming that once the plaintiff voluntarily resigned from his position with the District, the employment contract ended and the obligations thereunder did not survive its termination.

In December 2022, the plaintiff commenced this action, alleging breach of the employment contract. After the completion of discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff cross-moved, in effect, for summary judgment on the issue of liability. In an order dated February 5, 2025, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the District's motion and granted the plaintiff's cross-motion. The District appeals.

"The fundamental, neutral precept of contract interpretation is that agreements are construed in accord with the parties' intent and the best evidence of what parties to a written agreement intend is what they say in their writing" (Donohue v Cuomo, 38 NY3d 1, 12 [alteration [*2]and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Greenfield v Philles Records., 98 NY2d 562, 569; Orlando v County of Putnam, 208 AD3d 503, 504). "Thus, a written agreement that is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms" (Greenfield v Philles Records, 98 NY2d at 569; see Donohue v Cuomo, 38 NY3d at 13; Orlando v County of Putnam, 208 AD3d at 504). "[C]ourts may not by construction add or excise terms, nor distort the meaning of those used and thereby make a new contract for the parties under the guise of interpreting the writing" (Reiss v Financial Performance Corp., 97 NY2d 195, 199 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Here, no provision in the employment contract provides for expiration or termination of the employment contract other than by termination of the employment relationship between the plaintiff and the District (cf. M & G Polymers USA, LLC v Tackett, 574 US 427, 430; Donohue v Cuomo, 38 NY3d at 7-9; Village of Old Brookville v Village of Muttontown, 179 AD3d 972, 973). Further, the language of the employment contract must be read as affirmatively providing that the obligation contained in paragraph 14 would survive termination of the employment contract by virtue of termination of the employment relationship. In particular, as paragraph 14 provides for a contribution to retiree health insurance, the provision could only conceivably apply after the plaintiff was no longer employed by the District. Thus, if the obligation contained in paragraph 14 did not survive termination of the employment contract by virtue of termination of the employment relationship it would be illusory (cf. M & G Polymers USA, LLC v Tackett, 574 US at 441 [an interpretation of a provision in a collective bargaining agreement, which is "negotiated on behalf of a broad category of individuals," in such manner as benefits some classes of retirees but does not benefit all retirees equally, is not illusory]).

The District does not dispute that paragraph 14 was meant to apply once the employment contract, with its various provisions regarding salary, vacation days, etc., was no longer operative. Its position is that the right to District contributions toward retiree health insurance would only vest in the event that the plaintiff retired directly from the District and did not, after his five-years of full-time, continuous service, take a position with another District as he did or, as he might have done, chose not to be employed for a period of time prior to his reaching the retirement age. In other words, the District reads the employment contract to require not only five years of full-time, continuous service on the superintendent's staff to entitle the plaintiff to 85% contributions to retiree health insurance, but also to require that the plaintiff remain employed by the District until he reaches retirement age and retires. This reading of the employment contract is inconsistent with ordinary principles of contract interpretation, as the District seeks to add terms that are not stated or implied (see generally Donohue v Cuomo, 38 NY3d at 12).

Further, the Supreme Court correctly declined to insert a durational limitation to the obligation imposed in paragraph 14 since, as previously noted, neither that paragraph nor the employment contract in general provided for such a limitation. In that respect, the present case differs from Donohue v Cuomo (38 NY3d 1), which dealt with collective bargaining agreements containing four-year durational clauses. In a breach of contract action commenced by retirees, the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York had determined that "the CBAs at issue did not create a vested interest in the perpetual continuation of premium contribution rates at a specific level'" but were "'subject to the general durational clauses and that [the] obligation ceased upon the termination of each respective CBA'" (id. at 10, quoting Donohue v New York, 347 F Supp 3d 110, 129, 131 [ND NY]). On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Circuit Court certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals, asking "under what circumstances, if any, New York law permits an inference of vested post-retirement benefits under a state-law CBA, notwithstanding the absence of any express specification that those benefits extend beyond the term of the CBA" (id., quoting Donohue v New York, 980 F3d 53, 84 [2d Cir] [emphasis added]). The New York Court of Appeals concluded that such an inference in favor of vested rights would "conflict with this State's established contract law, which focuses on the parties' chosen language" (id. at 18).

In the present case, however, the plaintiff is not asking this Court to employ an inference that the contribution to retiree health insurance vested for life so as to extend the [*3]employer's obligation beyond a general durational clause contained in the employment contract (cf. Village of Old Brookville v Village of Muttontown, 179 AD3d at 975 [the "CBA is silent as to the duration of the health benefits promised therein and, therefore, it must be assumed that those benefits were promised only until the expiration of that agreement"]). Instead, the plaintiff is asserting, correctly, that in the absence of a durational limitation as to either the employment contract generally or the obligation created by paragraph 14, the District should not be permitted to insert one post hoc (see generally Reiss v Financial Performance Corp., 97 NY2d at 199). Indeed, neither in support of its own summary judgment motion nor in opposition to the plaintiff's cross-motion has the District provided or referred to any extrinsic evidence that might support a durational limit on the obligation imposed under paragraph 14. Rather, the District merely took the position that it was not obligated to contribute to the plaintiff's retiree health insurance at all, for any period.

Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff's cross-motion, in effect, for summary judgment on the issue of liability, determining that the employment contract required the District to contribute 85% of retiree health insurance premiums, without durational limitation, and that the plaintiff was entitled to reimbursement of 85% of retiree health insurance premiums he had already paid. Furthermore, the fact that the retiree health insurance that the plaintiff selected may also cover his wife does not alter the District's obligation to contribute 85% toward his retiree health insurance. There is no language in paragraph 14 that can be read as requiring the plaintiff to select retiree health insurance that only covers himself individually and does not also cover his wife.

Finally, in accordance with the foregoing determinations, the Supreme Court properly denied the District's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The District's remaining contention is without merit.

IANNACCI, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, WOOTEN and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court