Kropp Ex Rel. Kropp v. Maine School Administrative Union 44

471 F. Supp. 2d 175, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2538
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maine
DecidedJanuary 10, 2007
DocketCivil No. 06--81-P-S
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 471 F. Supp. 2d 175 (Kropp Ex Rel. Kropp v. Maine School Administrative Union 44) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kropp Ex Rel. Kropp v. Maine School Administrative Union 44, 471 F. Supp. 2d 175, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2538 (D. Me. 2007).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

KRAVCHUK, United States Magistrate Judge.

S.K. is a sixth grade student at Wales Central School in Wales, Maine. Her parents brought this lawsuit on her behalf against School Union # 44, its superintendent, and the principal of the Wales Central School. In a fourteen-count complaint S.K. and her parents claim various violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Maine Human Rights Act, as well as a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, all arising from the defendants’ alleged failure to reasonably accommodate S.K., who suffers from allergic reactions and asthma allegedly aggravated by environmental factors at the Wales Central School.

Currently before the court are two related motions: (1) defendants’ motion to exclude expert testimony from Dr. Glass, S.K.’s primary treating physician, relating to multiple chemical sensitivities and (2) a responsive motion by the plaintiffs for a more definite statement regarding the motion to exclude, brought pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket Nos. 30 & 39.) Oral argument held before me in Portland, Maine, on December 15, 2006, clarified the scope of the dispute between the parties as to the nature of the expert testimony defendants seek to exclude. Therefore, without discussing the merits of defendants’ procedural arguments concerning the use of Rule 12(e) in this situation, I am dismissing Docket No. 32 as moot because the plaintiffs are now fully apprised of what evidence the defendants seek to exclude. 1 In particular, defendants’ counsel indicated at oral argument that she is not arguing that expert testimony regarding S.K’s allergies to mold, pollens, pet dander or other scientifically-recognized environmental allergens should be excluded. Rather, the defendants are asking the court to exclude evidence of the aborted methacho- *177 line challenge test 2 and the resulting “phenol sensitivity” opinion put forth by Dr. Glass, which is based upon the aborted test, the “clinical” follow up undertaken when phenol was deleted as an ingredient in S.K.’s allergy shots, and Dr. Glass’s observations of S.K’s progress following the removal of “phenol related” products from the parents’ home.

The Applicable Legal Standard

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the Supreme Court discussed the gate-keeping role federal judges play under Rule 702 in screening from introduction in evidence expert testimony that, although relevant, is nevertheless based on unreliable scientific methodologies. Id. at 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786. That role is “to ensure that an expert’s testimony ‘both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.’ ” United States v. Mooney, 315 F.3d 54, 62 (1st Cir.2002). In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997), the Supreme Court explained that a judge exercising this duty must evaluate whether the challenged expert testimony is based on reliable scientific principles and methodologies in order to ensure that expert opinions are not “connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.” Id. at 146, 118 S.Ct. 512. To aid in this task, the Court assigned the following non-exclusive, four-factor standard:

(1) whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested; (2) whether the technique has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the technique’s known or potential rate of error; and (4) the level of the theory or technique’s acceptance within the relevant discipline.

Mooney, 315 F.3d at 62 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786). In addition to these factors, the trial court may consider other factors that are probative of reliability in light of the particular facts and circumstances of the case at hand. Id. Ultimately, the proponent of the expert testimony must simply establish that it is reliable. The proponent is not required to prove that the expert’s opinion is correct. Id. at 63. “Once a trial judge determines the reliability of the expert’s methodology and the validity of his reasoning, the expert should be permitted to testify as to inferences and conclusions he draws from it and any flaws in his opinion may be exposed through cross-examination or competing expert testimony.” Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 402 F.Supp.2d 303, 308 (D.Me.2005). “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible *178 evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786.

If the claimed “phenol sensitivity” opinion offered by Dr. Glass is but a subspecies of a multiple chemical sensitivity (“MCS”) diagnosis, it is helpful in framing the legal standard to look at how other courts have dealt with similar expert opinions. In Coffin v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 20 F.Supp.2d 107 (D.Me.1998), the court noted that: “Every federal court that has addressed the issue of admissibility of expert testimony on MCS under Daubert has found such testimony too speculative to meet the requirement of ‘scientific knowledge.’ ” Id. at 110 (quoting Frank v. State of New York, 972 F.Supp. 130, 136-37 (N.D.N.Y.1997)). The Coffin court granted the defendant’s motion in limine to exclude testimony concerning the plaintiffs alleged MCS diagnosis, and as a result granted summary judgment to the defense. Other federal courts that have considered the issue have also ruled that evidence of MCS is inadmissible because it does not meet the Daubert standard. See, e.g., Gabbard v. Linn-Benton Hous. Auth., 219 F.Supp.2d 1130, 1134 (D.Or.2002) (collecting cases).

Discussion

In Dr. Glass’s expert opinion, S.K’s inability to complete the methacholine challenge test and S.K’s subjective report that she felt less tired when she was given allergy shots that did not contain phenol are sufficient when taken together with the adjustments made to S.K.’s home and S.K’s reported improvement thereafter, to support the conclusion that S.K. has a hypersensitivity to environmental phenol, such as the vapors that might be found at a school following the use of cleaning agents or paints that contain any amount of phenol. According to Dr. Glass, S.K’s allergies are aggravated by the presence of phenol in the air she breathes. 3

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Bluebook (online)
471 F. Supp. 2d 175, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2538, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kropp-ex-rel-kropp-v-maine-school-administrative-union-44-med-2007.