Krone v. McCann

Opinion

No. 81-50

I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE OF M N A A O T N

M A X I N E M. KRONE ,

P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,

REX T . McCANN a n d D R T Y G. McCANN, O OH i n d i v i d u a l l y a n d as o f f i c e r s o f , a n d d/b/a SUPERIOR H M S REALTORS, I N C . , O E

Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from: ~ i s t r i c t ourt of t h e Fourteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , C I n a n d f o r t h e County o f M u s s e l s h e l l , The H o n o r a b l e N a t A l l e n , Judge p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel o f Record:

For Appellant:

B o s c h e r t & Z o s c h e r t , B i l l i n g s , Montana

For Respondents :

Keefer, Roybal, and Hanson, B i l l i n g s , Montana

S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s ? August 6 , 1981

~ecided: \Ah! 5.. 1374

Filed: - 8brti K j 4 *1782

v- Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B . D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .

T h i s is an a c t i o n i n n e g l i g e n c e w i t h t h e p l a i n t i f f ,

Maxine K r o n e , s e e k i n g r e c o v e r y o f damages f o r a n i n j u r y s h e

r e c e i v e d w h i l e s h e was a b u s i n e s s i n v i t e e on t h e p r o p e r t y o f

the defendants. D e f e n d a n t s moved for summary judgment on

all issues; plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the

i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y only. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e Four-

teenth Judicial District, Musselshell County, granted the

d e f e n d a n t s ' motion. The p l a i n t i f f a p p e a l s .

On J u n e 1 3 , 1 9 7 6 , a p p e l l a n t wrenched h e r knee w h i l e

she was walking on rural property owned by respondents.

R e s p o n d e n t Rex McCann, a s a r e a l t o r f o r S u p e r i o r Homes, was

showing t h e p r o p e r t y t o a p p e l l a n t f o r h e r p o s s i b l e p u r c h a s e .

At the time of the injury, McCann was l o o k i n g f o r a well

located on the property, and the a p p e l l a n t was following

him.

I n her deposition the a p p e l l a n t gave t h e following

a c c o u n t of how h e r i n j u r y o c c u r r e d :

"Q. Would you e x p l a i n t o m e what happened t h a t d a y t h a t r e s u l t e d i n some i n j u r y t o you? A. Mr. McCann was showing u s t h e p l a c e . Is t h a t what you mean?

"Q. Um-hum, and what h a p p e n e d ? A . W -- e He was d r i v i n g u s a r o u n d i n h i s v e h i c l e . And we s t o p p e d on t h e r o a d , g o t o u t and l o o k e d a t one w e l l t h a t we c o u l d s e e . Or what you want t o c a l l it. And t h e n he was t o show u s a n o t h e r w e l l t h a t was r i g h t -- r i g h t a r o u n d there.

"Q. Go a h e a d . What h a p p e n e d ? A. Well, I was f o l l o w i n g him, and . . . hurt m leg. y

"U. W e l l , how d i d you come t o h u r t y o u r l e g ? A. L i k e I s a i d , I was f o l l o w i n g him, ' c a u s e he c o u l d n ' t f i n d t h i s one w e l l . And . . . I _--_-___--___---__------------------- s o m e - - I r e a l l y _ stumbled o r f e l l over h a t -- some d e b r i c o u l d n ' t t e l l y o u w..................... s o r w h a t e v e r i t was.

"Q. When you say i t was 'debris,' d o you mean t o s a y t h a t -- Can you d e s c r i b e what i t was i n t e r m s o f -- Was i t m e t a l ? Was i t wood? Was i t d i r t ? What was i t ? A. I r e a l l y d o n ' t know. I t was . . . something t h a t was -- T h e r e had been a n o l d c o r r a l a t o n e t i m e t h a t had b e e n . . . oh, I suppose w h a t I would c a l l t h e 'home c o r r a l p l a c e ' where t h e y b r a n d e d t h e c a t t l e o r w h a t e v e r , a n d t h e r e was a l o t o f t h a t l a y i n g a r o u n d .

"Q. I t was i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f a n o l d c o r r a l , i s t h a t r i g h t ? A. Yes. Well, I mean t h e r e was a l o t o f l o g s and s t u f f l a y i n g a r o u n d .

I'Q . Now w a s t h e r e a p a t h ? Were you f o l l o w i n g s o m e t h i n g , o r were you-- A. I was f o l l o w i n g Mr. McCann.

"Q. Okay. Now, was h e i m m e d i a t e l y i n f r o n t o f you? Was h e 5 0 f e e t i n f r o n t o f you? How much d i s t a n c e s e p a r a t e d you f r o m Mr. McCann? A. I d o n ' t remember e x a c t l y , a b o u t 1 5 f e e t .

"Q. Was y o u r s o n w i t h you? A. M s o n was y with me, yes. "Q. Was h e a t y o u r s i d e , o r was h e b e h i n d you o r i n f r o n t o f you? A. He was w a l k i n g b e s i d e me, I t h i n k . "Q. Now, d i d you f a l l t o t h e g r o u n d ? A. No, I d i d n ' t go c l e a r t o t h e g r o u n d . "Q. So what y o u ' r e s a y i n g i s -- k i n d o f l i k e you t w i s t y o u r a n k l e , you t w i s t e d y o u r k n e e ? Would t h a t be a f a i r s t a t e m e n t ? A. Yes. Well i t happened a w f u l f a s t - l i k e . And s o I j u s t -- And t h a t ' s b e e n a few y e a r s a g o , and I j u s t . . . Whatever h a p p e n e d , i t h u r t l i k e -- t e r r i b l e a t t h e t i m e .

"Q. What t i m e o f t h e d a y was t h i s ? A . It was a b o u t 2:00 o'clock i n the afternoon. Approximately. NOW, I c o u l d n ' t p u t i t r i g h t on t h e -- p i n p o i n t i t r i g h t a t t h e m i n u t e . "Q. Any problem w i t h v i s i b i l i t y i n t h a t a r e a ? A. No. Hum-um* ( * n e g a t i v e r e s p o n s e ) . "Q. Were you w e a r i n g your glasses at the time? A. Yes. Um-hum. "Q. Was t h i s a n a r e a t h a t was o v e r g r o w n w i t h bushes or shrubs o r . . .? A. T h e r e was t a l l g r a s s and weeds. "Q. And was i t d e e p g r a s s , o r was i t . . .. 3

A. I d o n ' t remember, b u t I t h i n k a b o u t knee h i g h o r more.

"Q. T h e r e w a s n ' t a n y t h i n g t h a t p r e v e n t e d you f r o m s e e i n g t h e g r o u n d a s you w a l k e d o v e r i t , was t h e r e ? A. Yes, b u t I j u s t w a l k e d a n d was f o l l o w i n g Mr. McCann and w e w e r e l o o k i n g for this w e l l . And he s h o u l d h a v e been where t h e w e l l was r i g h t away. And i f we'd h a v e gone r i g h t from t h e c a r up t o where i t w a s , t h e w e l l was a t , i t w o u l d n ' t h a v e happened. And t h e r e -- i f h e had had a l l t h a t s t u f f c l e a n e d o f f , c l e a r e d o f f , l i k e we d i d a f t e r w a r d s , it w o u l d n ' t have happened.

"Q. So what y o u ' r e s a y i n g i s t h a t t h e r e was s o m e t h i n g t h a t was on t h e g r o u n d t h a t was what y o u t r i p p e d o n , b u t you d o n ' t remember -- what it was? A . Well, I w o u l d n ' t know what -r r a l p o l e , o r mound o f d i r t . i t w a s e x a c t l y , b u t a p p a r e n t l y i t was a n o l d co

"Q. And you d o n ' t know i f i t was a n a t u r a l a c c u m u l a t i o n o f d i r t o r r o c k o r i f i t was a n u n n a t u r a l a c c u m u l a t i o n , i s t h a t r i g h t ? A. A n a t u r a l -- N a t u r a l o r u n n a t u r a l . Could h a v e been b o t h .

"Q. It wasn't something t h a t you f e l l in? A. No.

"Q. I t ' s s o m e t h i n g t h a t you t r i p p e d o v e r , i s that right? A. I j u s t cannot r e a l l y say what it was, because it happened, l i k e I s a i d , s o f a s t t h a t -- t h a t -- And when i t h a p p e n e d , i t was v e r y p a i n f u l . L e t ' s p u t it t h a t way. " (Emphasis added. )

After twisting her knee, appellant went back to

McCann's c a r and r e t u r n e d t o B i l l i n g s . S h e d i d n o t go t o a

doctor a t t h a t time. About a y e a r l a t e r , s h e went t o s e e a

doctor for a c h e c k u p and t o a s k a b o u t h e r knee. S h e was

r e f e r r e d t o a n o t h e r d o c t o r who l a t e r o p e r a t e d on h e r knee.

She was i n t h e h o s p i t a l f o r f i v e d a y s and was i n a c a s t f o r

about s i x weeks. She stated in her deposition that the

s u r g e r y d i d n o t s t o p t h e p a i n s h e s t i l l h a s from h e r knee.

The p a r t i e s a g r e e t h a t t h e o n l y i s s u e on r e v i e w i s

whether the District Court e r r e d by granting respondents'

m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t . Under Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., a summary judgment is proper only if the record discloses no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Reaves v. Reinbold (1980), Mont . - I

615 P.2d 896, 37 St.Rep. 1500; Rumph v. Dale Edwards, Inc.

(19791, - Mont . -, 600 P.2d 163, 36 St.Rep. 1022. The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the complete absence of any genuine issue as to all facts which are deemed material in light of those substantive principles which entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. Big Man v. State (1981), - Mont . -, 626 P.2d 235, 38 St-Rep. 362; Harland v. Anderson (1976), 169 Mont. 447, 548 P.2d 613. Once the movant has established that no material issues of fact exist, the burden shifts to the opposing party to raise an issue of fact. As we stated in Rumph: "While the initial burden of proof must at- tach to the moving party, that burden shifts where the record discloses no genuine issue of material fact. Under these circumstances, the party opposing the motion must come for- ward with substantial evidence raising the issue. [Citations omitted. 1 Once the burden has shifted, the party opposing the motion is held to a standard of proof which is as sub- stantial as that initially imposed upon the moving party. [Citation ommitted.] " 600 P.2d at 167. It is also well established in Montana that " [a]ctionable negligence arises only from a breach of legal duty." Rennick v. Hoover (1980), Mont. , 606 P.2d 1079, 1081, 37 St.Rep. 308, 310, quoting Jonosky v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. (1920), 57 Mont. 63, 72, 187 P. 1014, 1015, and Cassady v. City of Billings (1959), 135 Mont. 390, 393, 340 P.2d 509, 510. As we stated recently in Rennick: ". . . i n o r d e r f o r t h e r e t o be a genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t i n a n e q l - i q e n c e c a s e t h e r e m u s t b e a d u t y imposed upon t - f e n - h e d- e d- n t a n d a l l e g a t i o n s w h i c h , i f p r o v e n , would --a s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g of a- a c h o f t - d u t y . " b r- e he 606 P.2d a t 1 0 8 1 .

The p a r t i e s a g r e e t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t was a b u s i n e s s

invitee when she wrenched her knee while walking on the

respondents' property. It is well settled in this state

that a property owner's duty toward an invitee is t o use

o r d i n a r y c a r e t o keep t h e premises r e a s o n a b l y s a f e and t o

warn t h e i n v i t e e of any h i d d e n o r l u r k i n g d a n g e r s . C a s s a d y ,

supra, 340 P.2d a t 510, quoting Milasevich v. Fox W e s t e r n

Montana T h e a t r e C o r p . ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 1.18 Mont. 265, 1 6 5 P.2d 1.95,

197.

W h i l e t h e p r o p e r t y owner h a s t h e a b o v e - s t a t e d duty,

i t h a s been r e c o g n i z e d many t i m e s by t h i s Court t h a t t h e

p r o p e r t y owner i s n o t a n i n s u r e r a g a i n s t a l l a c c i d e n t s and

injuries to invitees. S c o t t v. Robson (1979), Mont.

, 597 P.2d 1150, 1155, 36 St.Rep. 1273, 1279-1280,

c i t i n g Dunham v . S o u t h s i d e N a t i o n a l Bank o f M i s s o u l a ( 1 9 7 6 ) ,

1 6 9 Mont. 466, 548 P.2d 1 3 8 3 , and C a s s a d y , supra, 340 P.2d

a t 510-511. I n R e n n i c k , we n o t e d :

"'The t r u e ground of l i a b i l i t y is h i s [ t h e p r o p e r t y owner ' s ] s u p e r i o r knowledge o v e r t h a t of business i n v i t e e s of t h e dangerous c o n d i t i o n and h i s f a i l u r e t o g i v e w a r n i n g o f the risk, however, --- i s n o t a n i n s u r e r he a g a i n s t -- l l a c c i d e n t s w h i c h may b e f a l l them a upon h i s p r e m i s e s . ' . . . McIntosh v . Linder- Kind Lumber Co. ( 1 9 6 4 1 , 144 Mont. 1, 6 , 393 P.2d 7 8 2 , 7 8 5 . " 606 ~ . . 2 da t l ( J 8 1 . ( . ~ r n ~ h a s i s added. )

I n ~ l a 6 e yv . Associated Subdivisions, Inc. (1963),

97 R.I. 34, 1 9 5 A.2d 234, 3 A.L.R.3d 970, a real estate

a g e n c y was h e l d l i a b l e f o r injuries t o the plaintiff when

she fell in a rodent hole while looking at a partially c l e a r e d l o t o f f e r e d f o r s a i e ~y t h e dgency. i l h i s l o t was i n

t h e C i t y o f C r a n s t o n , Rhode I s l a n d , a n d was b e i n g d e v e l o p e d

t o r home s i t e s .

Blahey is readily distinguishable from the case

before us. I n Blak-ney, t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r i e s o c c u r r e d on

a city lot. She was n o t aware t h a t r o d e n t h o l e s were i n t h e

lot. Here, t n e a p p e l l a n t was w a l k i n g t h r o u g h a n o p e n f i e l d

In r u r a l country. She stumbled over something s h e charac-

terized as "debris," a "mound o f dirt," or an "old c o r r a l

pole." while s h e was unsure of e x a c t l y what she tripped

over, she could see t h a t t h e r e were " l o g s and s t u f f lying

arouna." Since she knew of the general c o n d i t i o n of the

g r o u n d , no d u t y r e s t s o n t h e d e f e n d a n t t o w a r n h e r o f i t .

More importantly, the fact is undisputed that the

a p p e l l a n t cannot d e s c r i b e what caused h e r i n j u r y . She d o e s

n o t know i f i t was m e r e l y a mound o f d i r t o r a n o l d c o r r a l

pole.

I n a n a c t i o n f o r n e g l i g e n c e , a p l a i n t i f f must produce

evldence from which it can be reasonably inferred that

n e g l i g e n t conduct on t h e p a r t of t h e defendant o r its a g e n t s

was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.

F l a n s b e r g v . M o n t a n a Power Company ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 1 5 4 Cfiont. 53, 460

P.2d 263, approved i n S c o t t v. Robson, supra, 597 P.2d at

1155. H e r e , t h e a p p e l - l a n t s i m p l y d o e s n o t know e x a c t l y w h a t

caused her injury. A s noted above, the respondents cannot

be the insurers of the a p p e l - l a n t and held liable for her

i n j u r y m e r e l y b e c a u s e a n a c c i d e n t happened on t h e i r l a n d .

Upon r e s p o n d e n t s ' showing t h a t no m a t e r i a l i s s u e s o f

genuine f a c t were s t i l l i n d i s p u t e , t h e burden s h i f t e d t o

t n e a p p e l l a n t t o come f o r w a r d by a f f i d a v i t a n d s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e and r a i s e a n i s s u e ot n a t e r l a l t a c t . H p p e l . l ~ n th a s

f a i l e d t o meet t h i s burden. She h a s p r e s e n t e d no s u b s t a n t i a l

evidence indicating that respondents had breached a duty

owed t o her or that respondents' a c t i o n s were a p r o x i m a t e

cause of her i n j u r y .

The summary judgment i s a f f i r m e d .

- 4 Justice

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