Kroll v. Fruchter

69 A.D.3d 904, 892 N.Y.2d 796

Opinion

The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment on his counterclaim for a conversion divorce pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6). A stipulation entered into by the parties in April 2004 is not a separation agreement within the meaning of Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6) for the purpose of awarding the defendant a conversion divorce, as it contains affirmative language that its purpose was to settle certain issues pendente lite (see Sint v Sint, 225 AD2d 606, 607 [1996]; Frasca v Frasca, 213 AD2d 589, 590 [1995]; Stone v Stone, 45 AD2d 967, 968 [1974]).

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit (cf. O’Halloran v O’Halloran, 58 AD3d 704, 706 [2009]). Rivera, J.E, Dillon, Belen and Roman, JJ., concur.

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Kroll v. Fruchter, 69 A.D.3d 904, 892 N.Y.2d 796 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010).

69 A.D.3d 904 (Kroll v. Fruchter) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

O'Halloran v. O'Halloran
58 A.D.3d 704 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2009)
Stone v. Stone
45 A.D.2d 967 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1974)
Frasca v. Frasca
213 A.D.2d 589 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1995)
Sint v. Sint
225 A.D.2d 606 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1996)