Kroehler v. Scott

391 F. Supp. 1114
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 13, 1975
DocketCiv. A. 74-1175
StatusPublished
Cited by29 cases

This text of 391 F. Supp. 1114 (Kroehler v. Scott) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kroehler v. Scott, 391 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Pa. 1975).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TROUTMAN, District Judge.

In this action under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), plaintiffs seek an injunction prohibiting certain surveillance practices undertaken by defendants and a declaratory judgment that such surveillance deprived them of their constitutional right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment. By Memorandum and Order on August 2, 1974, this Court granted certification under F.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(2) of a class action. 1 Since the parties have filed a set of stipulations and exhibits, attached hereto as an Appendix, there are no outstanding factual issues which bar a decision on the merits.

These stipulations establish, inter alia, the following briefly stated salient facts. Certain of the defendants, in response to complaints of homosexual and drug-related activity occurring in the public men’s room at the Penn Central Railroad Station and at Long Park, both in Lancaster, initiated a program of surveillance designed to enable the defendants to apprehend persons involved in these criminal activities. As part of *1116 this program, holes were drilled in the ceilings directly above the toilet stalls to allow the defendants to peer covertly into the stall below and observe, unnoticed, whatever transpired. These clandestine observations were conducted intermittently during the period from January 10, 1974, to May 13, 1974 (Penn Central Station) and from August 3, 1973, to April 1, 1974 (Long Park) at times of most frequent use for a duration of one to two hours, but up to as much as seven hours. Defendants never sought a warrant or obtained judicial authorization prior to conducting any of this surveillance, which has resulted in approximately twenty arrests. The named plaintiffs have, on occasion, used the toilet facilities between August 3, 1973, and May 13, 1974. The total number of innocent persons covertly observed by defendants is unknown, as is their identity.

At the outset we note that these surveillance activities are not now being conducted so that the exigencies which may have mandated preliminary injunctive relief have abated. See Stipulation 9. Nevertheless, the threat of future surveillance is sufficient to warrant a declaratory judgment. See Stipulation 10; NLRB v. Raytheon Co., 398 U.S. 25, 90 S.Ct. 1547, 26 L.Ed.2d 21 (1970); and 6A Moore, Federal Practice jf 67.08 [2] at 57-40. 2

On the stipulated facts, the plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy while using public toilet stalls and, as such, these expectations trigger the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1969); People v. Triggs, 8 Cal.3d 884, 106 Cal.Rptr. 408, 506 P.2d 232 (1973). These protections, they argue, prohibit the defendants from covertly peering through a hole placed in the ceiling and into the toilet stalls without first obtaining a search warrant based upon a showing of probable cause that criminal activity was taking place therein or demonstrating at least the exigent circumstances which suspend the requirement of a warrant. Defendants counter with the assertion that persons using public toilet stalls are not entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment since no expectation of privacy is reasonably and properly generated in the use of such public facilities. Defendants point to the circum- ' stances which gave rise to the surveillance—namely, numerous complaints of criminal activities, including homosexual and drug-related incidents—and conclude that the surveillance in question was constitutionally proper, prompted by the threat thus posed to the innocent public of which plaintiffs are members. See Stipulations 3, 4, 16 and 26. Defendants rely heavily upon Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir.) cert. denied 382 U.S. 981, 86 S.Ct. 555, 15 L.Ed.2d 471 (1966).

The crucial inquiry is whether a person utilizing a public toilet stall is entitled to be free from governmental intrusion in the form of clandestine observation absent a preliminary demonstration of probable cause warranting the conclusion that criminal activity is occurring. Stated differently, and more simply, the issue is whether the Fourth Amendment protects a person who temporarily occupies a toilet stall in a public restroom from observation through small ceiling vents designed exclusively for that purpose in search of suspected criminal activity of a drug-related or sexually-oriented nature. We look first to Katz v. United States, supra, which articulated the appropriate test to be utilized under the Fourth Amendment. In Katz, the Supreme Court held inad-

*1117 missible, in a criminal prosecution, evidence which was procured by a warrant-less electronic surveillance of a defendant’s conversation in a telephone booth, despite the fact that the booth was designed for public use. “Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures”. 389 U.S. 359, 88 S.Ct. at 515. Concluding that the absence of physical intrusion was not determinative, the Court held:

“ . . . the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection . . . .But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Id. at 351-352, 88 S.Ct. at 511.

Justice Harlan observed:

“. . . there is a two-fold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’.
“The critical fact in this case is that ‘[o]ne who occupies it, [a telephone booth] shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume’ that his conversation is not being intercepted. . . . The point is . that it is a temporarily private place whose momentary occupant’s expectations are recognized as reasonable.” Id. 361, 88 S.Ct. 517.

Once it has been determined that the circumstances justify an expectation of privacy which is subjectively and objectively reasonable, the Fourth Amendment requires that the detached restraint of a neutral official be interposed between the individual and the governmental intrusion.

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Bluebook (online)
391 F. Supp. 1114, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kroehler-v-scott-paed-1975.