Kristopher Joseph Lalonde v. State
Opinion
ACCEPTED
12-16-00070-CR
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
TYLER, TEXAS
9/20/2016 12:24:44 PM
Pam Estes
CLERK
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS TYLER, TEXAS FILED IN 12th COURT OF APPEALS
TYLER, TEXAS
KRISTOPHER JOSEPH LALONDE § 9/20/2016 12:24:44 PM § PAM ESTES Clerk
§ APPEAL No. 12-16-00070-CR V. § §
STATE OF TEXAS §
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
APPEALED FROM THE 145th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR NACOGDOCHES COUNTY, TEXAS, THE HONORABLE CAMPBELL COX, JUDGE
GENA A. BUNN
State Bar No. 00790323
CLIFTON “SCRAPPY” HOLMES
State Bar No. 09907000
HOLMES & MOORE, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Drawer 3267
Longview, Texas 75606
Phone No. (903)758-2200
Facsimile No. (903)758-7864
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE NO.
Table of Contents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii Index of Authorities.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii Argument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
I. This Court should abate the instant appeal to allow Lalonde to file an out-
of-time motion for new trial in the trial court in light of new evidence that Chief Deputy Stephen Godfrey – the State’s principle witness in the pretrial suppression hearing – has been indicted for aggravated perjury.
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. The evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Lalonde was guilty of possession of a controlled substance.. . . . . . . . . . 5
Prayer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Certificate of Service.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Certificate of Compliance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
-ii-
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE NO.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 40.001 (West 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
-iii-
ARGUMENT
I. This Court should abate the instant appeal to allow Lalonde to file an out-
of-time motion for new trial in the trial court in light of new evidence that Chief Deputy Stephen Godfrey – the State’s principle witness in the pretrial suppression hearing – has been indicted for aggravated perjury.
Lalonde requests that this Court abate the instant appeal and remand to the district court to permit Lalonde to file and litigate an out-of-time motion for new trial regarding the first issue in this appeal: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to suppress the fruits of the warrantless search of Lalonde’s garage apartment. This request is based on new evidence, unavailable to the trial court when it ruled on Lalonde’s suppression motion, that Chief Deputy Stephen Godfrey – the State’s principle witness in the pretrial suppression hearing (and at trial) – has been indicted by a Nacogdoches County grand jury on four counts of aggravated perjury.1 Lalonde has argued in his appeal before this Court that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to suppress the fruits of the warrantless search of Lalonde’s garage apartment. Contrary to the State’s argument, the record of the suppression hearing does not support a conclusion that Lalonde consented to the search. Rather, the evidence shows that Lalonde only consented to the officers’ entrance into the apartment for the limited purpose of allowing them to identify the woman, Michelle
1 See State’s Second Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer to Appellant’s Brief, filed in this Court on August 2, 2016, at Page 2.
Reeves. The record shows that Godfrey initiated the “knock and talk” by telling Lalonde they had received information that he was possessing, selling, and manufacturing methamphetamine; Godfrey then sought Lalonde’s consent to search his residence. Lalonde declined to grant consent to search, stating that Godfrey needed to obtain consent from the owners of the property, his mother and stepfather, who were not present. Lalonde even offered to contact them on the telephone, but Godfrey declined. Then after Godfrey questioned Lalonde for more than twenty minutes about Lalonde’s knowledge of local drug trafficking, Godfrey asked if there was anyone else on the premises. And when Lalonde advised him that there were other people present, Gofrey immediately halted the questioning and sought permission to identify the woman upstairs. At that point, Lalonde gave Godfrey consent to enter the upstairs apartment for the limited purpose of identifying the woman. But Godfrey exceeded the scope of Lalonde’s consent to enter the premises when he did not stop after identifying Reeves, but instead continued to search the entire residence.
In its brief, the State makes much of the fact “that three separate officers testified that [Lalonde] gave valid consent,” see State’s Brief at 4, apparently seeking to minimize the significance of Godfrey’s testimony at the suppression hearing. But the State fails to acknowledge that Godfrey was its principle witness at the hearing
(and at trial), and that he was the only officer who testified unequivocally that he received Lalonde’s consent to search. Three of the officers present that day testified at the suppression hearing: Godfrey, deputy-in-training Mario Reyna, and Captain Michael Davidson. The officers agreed that Lalonde had refused consent to search the residence, at least initially, advising the officers that they would have to obtain consent from his parents. 2 RR 9; 2 RR 16, 18; 2 RR 24. But according to Godfrey, once he explained that Lalonde had authority to consent to the search since he was residing there, Lalonde consented to the search. 2 RR 9. Reyna and Davidson agreed with Godfrey that Lalonde had eventually consented to the search (2 RR 16-17; 2 RR 24-25), but then admitted that it was Godfrey who had main contact with Lalonde, indicating they were not certain about the scope of consent given by Lalonde. 2 RR 16-17, 20; 2 RR 27.
The following exchange occurred between defense counsel and deputy-in-
training Reyna:
Defense counsel: What did he say that made you think he was giving consent to search and not just secure the house and people?
Reyna: By allowing us officers to go upstairs and take a look.
Defense counsel: Okay. Did he say that you could search or you could go upstairs and make sure that person’s okay and safe?
Reyna: We thought we could search.
2 RR 19. Therefore, contrary to the State’s urging, Godfrey’s testimony was critical to the trial court’s suppression ruling, and new evidence showing that Godfrey has now been charged with four counts of aggravated perjury warrants an abatement of this appeal and out-of-time motion for new trial in the trial court.2 In light of Lalonde’s testimony, the various inconsistencies in the officers’
testimony, and the lack of any audio or video recording of the encounter, the State has failed to show clear and convincing evidence that Lalonde voluntarily consented to the search of his apartment, and the trial court abused its discretion by concluding otherwise. For all these reasons, the erroneous admission of this evidence constitutes reversible error necessitating a new trial.
2 The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides, “[a] new trial shall be granted an accused where material evidence favorable to the accused has been discovered since trial.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 40.001 (West 2015).
II. The evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Lalonde was guilty of possession of a controlled substance.
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