Kristopher Darwin Robinson, Former Husband v. Sabrina Kay Robinson, Former Wife

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Kristopher Darwin Robinson, Former Husband v. Sabrina Kay Robinson, Former Wife

219 So. 3d 933, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 6409

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMay 5, 2017

DocketCASE NO. 1D16-1490

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 219 So. 3d 933 (Kristopher Darwin Robinson, Former Husband v. Sabrina Kay Robinson, Former Wife) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Kristopher Darwin Robinson, Former Husband v. Sabrina Kay Robinson, Former Wife, 219 So. 3d 933, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 6409 (Fla. Ct. App. 2017).

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Opinion

*934 PER CURIAM.

Kristopher and Sabrina Robinson ended their marriage in 2014. The consent final judgment of dissolution established a parenting plan, provided for certain cost sharing, and required Kristopher Robinson to pay alimony and child support. Sometime later, Kristopher Robinson changed jobs and suffered a resulting decrease- in income. He then moved for a modification, seeking to eliminate the alimony and reduce his child-support obligations.

The trial court denied the request to eliminate alimony, but it did order reduced child support. Kristopher Robinson appeals, contending (among other things) that the trial court should have eliminated alimony and should have reduced the child support even more. Sabrina Robinson cross appeals, contending (among other things) that the trial court should not have reduced the child support at all.

After a careful review of the record, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in altering the agreed child-support obligation. See Bish v. Bish, 404 So.2d 840, 840-41 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (explaining that “[a] fundamental prerequisite to modification based upon change of circumstances is a showing that the change is sufficient, material, involuntary and permanent in nature” and noting that “heavier burden rested upon” the movant seeking a reduction when parties agreed upon original arrangement); see also Overbey v. Overbey, 698 So.2d 811, 813-14 (Fla. 1997). This conclusion moots Kristopher Robinson’s argument that the ¿mount of reduction was insufficient. We also conclude that the trial court erred by requiring child-support payments to be made- through the State Disbursement Unit—relief that neither party requested and that was contrary to the consent final judgment.

We have considered and rejected the parties’ remaining assertions of error.

AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. '

MAKAR, KELSEY, and WINSOR, JJ;, CONCUR.

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*934 PER CURIAM.

Kristopher and Sabrina Robinson ended their marriage in 2014. The consent final judgment of dissolution established a parenting plan, provided for certain cost sharing, and required Kristopher Robinson to pay alimony and child support. Sometime later, Kristopher Robinson changed jobs and suffered a resulting decrease- in income. He then moved for a modification, seeking to eliminate the alimony and reduce his child-support obligations.

The trial court denied the request to eliminate alimony, but it did order reduced child support. Kristopher Robinson appeals, contending (among other things) that the trial court should have eliminated alimony and should have reduced the child support even more. Sabrina Robinson cross appeals, contending (among other things) that the trial court should not have reduced the child support at all.

After a careful review of the record, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in altering the agreed child-support obligation. See Bish v. Bish, 404 So.2d 840, 840-41 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (explaining that “[a] fundamental prerequisite to modification based upon change of circumstances is a showing that the change is sufficient, material, involuntary and permanent in nature” and noting that “heavier burden rested upon” the movant seeking a reduction when parties agreed upon original arrangement); see also Overbey v. Overbey, 698 So.2d 811, 813-14 (Fla. 1997). This conclusion moots Kristopher Robinson’s argument that the ¿mount of reduction was insufficient. We also conclude that the trial court erred by requiring child-support payments to be made- through the State Disbursement Unit—relief that neither party requested and that was contrary to the consent final judgment.

We have considered and rejected the parties’ remaining assertions of error.

AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. '

MAKAR, KELSEY, and WINSOR, JJ;, CONCUR.

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219 So. 3d 933, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 6409, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kristopher-darwin-robinson-former-husband-v-sabrina-kay-robinson-former-fladistctapp-2017.

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