Kristine Woldanski v. Department of Defense

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedApril 22, 2024
DocketAT-0752-22-0628-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Kristine Woldanski v. Department of Defense (Kristine Woldanski v. Department of Defense) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kristine Woldanski v. Department of Defense, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

KRISTINE A. WOLDANSKI, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-0752-22-0628-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: April 22, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Kristine A. Woldanski , Titusville, Florida, pro se.

Ashley Rutherford , Jacksonville, Florida, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her termination appeal because the Board lacks jurisdiction over nonappropriated fund (NAF) employees under 5 U.S.C. § 2105(c). On petition for review, in addition to briefly describing her employment history with the agency, the appellant argues that, while employed on base, she had to follow the same rules and regulations applicable to all Government employees, she describes

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

and challenges the merits of certain alleged actions taken by the agency relating to past write ups and the agency’s investigation that led to her termination, and she asserts that she does not have a neutral body to which she may appeal her case. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). The undisputed record reflects that the appellant worked and was terminated from the agency’s Morale, Welfare & Recreation Department, Key West, Florida, a NAF instrumentality. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1, Tab 3 at 7-8, 16. The appellant has not refuted the declaration of the agency’s NAF Human Resources Director who declared that the appellant held, and was terminated from, a NAF position and was not an appropriated -fund employee during the relevant period. IAF, Tab 3 at 7. Thus, we find that the agency’s sworn statement to be sufficient evidence the appellant was a NAF employee. See Jordan v. Department of Justice, 54 M.S.P.R. 609, 611 (1992) (finding that sworn statements that are not rebutted are competent evidence of the matters asserted therein). The appellant has not alleged otherwise. Therefore, we agree with the administrative judge’s determination that the appellant was a NAF 3

employee. 2 IAF, Tab 5, Initial Decision at 3. The Board previously has found that 5 U.S.C. § 2105(c) excludes NAF employees from those employees with rights to appeal adverse actions to the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d). Clark v. Army and Air Force Exchange Service, 57 M.S.P.R. 43, 44-45 (1993). Therefore, the administrative judge correctly found that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s termination appeal. 3 Additionally, the alleged new documents the appellant attached to her petition for review are not material because they are not relevant to the jurisdictional issue but rather speak to the merits of the agency’s actions, over which, as just discussed, we have no jurisdiction. Petition for Review File, Tab 1 at 5-34; see Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980) (holding that the Board generally will not grant a petition for review based on new evidence absent a showing that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision). Additionally, she has made no showing that the information in these documents was unavailable before the record closed. Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980). We therefore discern no basis to disturb the initial decision, which dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 2 It is also clear that the appellant was a NAF employee of a military exchange. IAF, Tab 1 at 1, Tab 3 at 8, 16; see 10 U.S.C. § 1063(e). 3 For the same reasons, the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appellant’s claims of suspension for more than 14 days and negative suitability determination, which she indicated she was appealing along with her termination claim in her initial appeal filing. IAF, Tab 1 at 2. As a NAF employee, she has no right to appeal her alleged suspension because she does not qualify for coverage under Title 5 of the U.S. Code, as she was serving in a position paid from nonappropriated funds. See 5 U.S.C. § 2105(c); Clark, 57 M.S.P.R. at 44-45. The appellant also has no right of appeal from the alleged negative suitability action, as defined by 5 C.F.R. part 731, because such an action relates to a regulation administered by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). See 5 U.S.C. § 2105(c); 5 C.F.R. § 731.101 (noting that OPM has been directed to examine suitability for competitive Federal employment) . The administrative judge not acknowledging these claims did not prejudice the appellant’s substantive rights because, as discussed above, the unrefuted evidence shows that the appellant was a NAF employee at the time of these alleged actions. See Karapinka v. Department of Energy, 6 M.S.P.R. 124, 127 (1981). 4

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

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Kristine Woldanski v. Department of Defense, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kristine-woldanski-v-department-of-defense-mspb-2024.