Kristen Mendez v. Jack Stoller and Dawn Hill-Kearse

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA GREENVILLE DIVISION

Kristen Mendez, ) ) Plaintiff, ) Civil Action 6:26-cv-01959-TMC ) v. ) ) ORDER Jack Stoller and Dawn Hill-Kearse, ) ) Defendants. ) _________________________________) Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, (ECF No. 6), filed this civil action, asserting the following allegations against the named defendants: (1) “Defendant Dawn Hill- Kearse delayed work”; and (2) “Defendant Jack Stoller tolerated misconduct.” (ECF No. 1). Now before the court is the magistrate judge’s1 report and recommendation (“Report”), recommending the court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. (ECF No. 8). The magistrate judge informed Plaintiff of her right to file objections to the Report, (id. at 5), and the Clerk’s Office mailed the Report to Plaintiff’s last known address, (ECF No. 9). Though it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to inform the court of any changes to her address, the Report was returned to the court with the notation “RETURN TO SENDER. TEMPORARILY AWAY. UNABLE TO FORWARD.” (ECF No. 12). Plaintiff ultimately failed to file objections to the Report, and her deadline to do so has now passed. The recommendations set forth in the Report have no presumptive weight, and this court remains responsible for making a final determination in this matter. Elijah v. Dunbar, 66 F.4th

1 This matter was referred to a magistrate judge for all pretrial proceedings in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B) (D.S.C.). 454, 459 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976)). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which a specific objection is made, and the court may accept, reject, modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the magistrate judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1). Thus, “[t]o trigger de novo review, an objecting party ‘must object to the finding or recommendation on that issue with sufficient specificity so as reasonably to alert the district court of the true ground for the objection.’” Elijah, 66 F.4th at 460 (quoting United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 622 (4th Cir. 2007)). However, the court need only review for clear error “those portions which are not objected to—including those portions to which only ‘general and conclusory’ objections have been made[.]” Dunlap v. TM Trucking of the Carolinas, LLC, 288 F. Supp. 3d 654, 662 (D.S.C. 2017); see also Elijah, 66 F.4th at 460 (noting that “[i]f a litigant objects only generally, the district court reviews the magistrate’s recommendation for clear error only”). Furthermore, in the absence of specific objections to the Report, the court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation. Greenspan v. Bros. Prop.

Corp., 103 F. Supp. 3d 734, 737 (D.S.C. 2015) (citing Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199–200 (4th Cir. 1983)). Additionally, since Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, this court is charged with construing her pleadings and filings liberally in order to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 245 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting that “when confronted with the objection of a pro se litigant, [the court] must also be mindful of [its] responsibility to construe pro se filings liberally”). Accordingly, “when reviewing pro se objections to a magistrate’s recommendation, district courts must review de novo any articulated grounds to which the litigant appears to take issue.” Elijah, 66 F.4th at 460–61. This does not mean, however, that the court can ignore a pro se party’s failure to allege or prove facts that establish a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Stratton v. Mecklenburg Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 521 Fed. App’x 278, 290 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that “‘district judges are not mind readers,’ and the principle of liberal construction does not require

them to ‘conjure up questions never presented to them or to construct full-blown claims from sentence fragments’” (quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277–78 (4th Cir. 1985))). CONCLUSION Accordingly, finding no clear error, the court agrees with and wholly ADOPTS the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations in the Report. (ECF No. 8). This action is hereby dismissed without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process.

s/Timothy M. Cain Chief United States District Judge Anderson, South Carolina June 10, 2026

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL The parties are hereby notified of the right to appeal this order pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.