Krista Dandridge-Barnett v. Barnes and Noble, Inc.

Ninth Circuit

Krista Dandridge-Barnett v. Barnes and Noble, Inc.

671 F. App'x 452

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedNovember 23, 2016

Docket15-55994

StatusUnpublished

This text of 671 F. App'x 452 (Krista Dandridge-Barnett v. Barnes and Noble, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Krista Dandridge-Barnett v. Barnes and Noble, Inc., 671 F. App'x 452 (9th Cir. 2016).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Krista Dandridge-Barnett appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing for failure to prosecute her action alleging federal and state law claims arising from an incident at a Barnes and Nobles store. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

Because the records shows that Dan-dridge-Barnett stood on her complaint, the district court abused its discretion in converting the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of Dandridge-Barnett’s claims into a Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) sanction. See id. at 1064-65 (dismissal under Rule 41(b) is not appropriate where the plaintiff makes an affirmative choice not to amend the complaint).

Nevertheless, dismissal of Dandridge-Barnett’s federal claims was proper because Dandridge-Barnett failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claims. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); see also Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC, 447 F.3d 1138, 1144-45 (2006) (setting forth elements of a § 1981 racial discrimination claim); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth elements of a § 1985(3) conspiracy claim); Trerice v. Pedersen, 769 F.2d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985) (a cause of *453 action is not provided under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 absent a valid claim for relief under § 1985).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Dandridge-Barnett’s state law claims after dismissing her federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(8); San Pedro Hotel Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 478 (9th Cir. 1998) (standard of review).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Krista Dandridge-Barnett appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing for failure to prosecute her action alleging federal and state law claims arising from an incident at a Barnes and Nobles store. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

Because the records shows that Dan-dridge-Barnett stood on her complaint, the district court abused its discretion in converting the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of Dandridge-Barnett’s claims into a Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) sanction. See id. at 1064-65 (dismissal under Rule 41(b) is not appropriate where the plaintiff makes an affirmative choice not to amend the complaint).

Nevertheless, dismissal of Dandridge-Barnett’s federal claims was proper because Dandridge-Barnett failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claims. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); see also Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC, 447 F.3d 1138, 1144-45 (2006) (setting forth elements of a § 1981 racial discrimination claim); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth elements of a § 1985(3) conspiracy claim); Trerice v. Pedersen, 769 F.2d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985) (a cause of *453 action is not provided under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 absent a valid claim for relief under § 1985).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Dandridge-Barnett’s state law claims after dismissing her federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(8); San Pedro Hotel Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 478 (9th Cir. 1998) (standard of review).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

San Pedro Hotel Co., Inc., a California Corporation John Fentis, as Trustee for the Fentis Family Marital Trust B John M. Fentis, an Individual Pearle Fentis, an Individual Maria C. Fentis, an Individual John Fentis, as Trustee for the Fentis Family Survivor's Trust v. City of Los Angeles, a California Municipal Corporation Rudy Svorinich, Jr., an Individual, San Pedro Hotel Co., Inc., a California Corporation John Fentis, as Trustee for the Fentis Family Marital Trust B as Trustee for the Fentis Family Survivor's Trust, and as an Individual: Pearle Fentis Maria C. Fentis v. City of Los Angeles

159 F.3d 470 (Ninth Circuit, 1998)

Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc.

356 F.3d 1058 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)

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671 F. App'x 452, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/krista-dandridge-barnett-v-barnes-and-noble-inc-ca9-2016.

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