Krish Singh v. City of Phoenix, et al.

Opinion

1 WO 2

6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8

9 Krish Singh, No. CV-21-00099-PHX-JJT 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 City of Phoenix, et al., 13 Defendants. 14

15 Qualified immunity is an oft-litigated issue in excessive force claims arising under 16 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case is no exception. On November 11, 2019, Plaintiff was shot 17 during an interaction he had with police officers Smith-Petersen and Batway. Plaintiff 18 survived his injuries and sued the officers and the City of Phoenix on three state-law claims 19 and, as relevant here, one federal law claim against Officer Smith-Petersen for excessive 20 force under § 1983. (Doc. 1-3 ¶¶ 22–60.) Defendants eventually moved for summary 21 judgment (Docs. 52–53), arguing inter alia that the § 1983 claim failed because Officer 22 Smith-Petersen was entitled to qualified immunity. The Court considered various Ninth 23 Circuit cases that, according to Plaintiff, would have clearly put Officer Smith-Petersen on 24 notice that her conduct violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right against excessive force 25 and, if so, would have meant that she was not entitled to qualified immunity. The Court 26 ultimately disagreed with Plaintiff and found that qualified immunity applied. (Order at 27 18–19 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).) The Court entered partial summary 28 1 judgment in favor of Defendants only as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Officer Smith- 2 Petersen and remanded the remaining state law claims to the state court. (Doc. 73 at 20.) 3 Plaintiff appealed, and the Ninth Circuit held that its earlier decision in Glenn v. 4 Washington County, 673 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2011) “put Smith-Petersen on notice that her 5 use of deadly force plausibly violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free of 6 excessive force.” Singh v. City of Phoenix, 124 F.4th 746, 750 (9th Cir. 2024) (See Doc. 7 82). The Ninth Circuit issued its mandate on February 12, 2025 that “reverse[d] the district 8 court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant Smith-Petersen with respect to Plaintiff’s 9 § 1983 claim, reverse[d] the dismissal of the state-law claims, and remand[ed] for further 10 proceedings on the § 1983 claim and for reconsideration of whether to exercise 11 supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims” Id. (See Doc. 82). 12 Upon remand, this Court dismissed two of Plaintiff’s state-law claims and permitted 13 one state-law claim and the § 1983 claim to proceed to trial. (See Doc. 90.) Pre-trial efforts 14 commenced but were soon halted by the surfacing of new evidence regarding Plaintiff’s 15 medical damages (see Doc. 104), and the Court allowed the parties to narrowly reopen 16 discovery on that issue (Doc. 110). Pursuant to the new discovery schedule, the Court 17 ordered that all discovery be completed by January 29, 2027, and dispositive motions be 18 filed by February 26, 2027. (Id.) 19 Meanwhile, Defendants moved the Court to reconsider “the denial of their Motion 20 for Summary judgment based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision” in Zorn v. 21 Linton, 146 S. Ct. 926 (2026). (Doc. 106 at 1.) But, as Plaintiff notes in response, this Court 22 entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the issue of qualified immunity. (See 23 Doc. 112 at 2; see also Doc. 73 (Order granting partial summary judgment).) It was the 24 Ninth Circuit, not this Court, whose decision adversely affected Defendants when it 25 reversed this Court’s holding. Accordingly, the Court construes Defendants’ motion as one 26 urging it to reconsider the Ninth Circuit’s February 12, 2025 mandate (Doc. 82). 27 Under the Rule of Mandate, “[a] district court that has received the mandate of an 28 appellate court cannot vary or examine that mandate for any purpose other than executing it.” Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2012). “But while the 2 mandate of an appellate court forecloses the lower court from reconsidering matters 3 determined in the appellate court, it leaves to the district court any issue not expressly or 4 impliedly disposed of on appeal.” S.F. Herring Ass'n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 946 F.3d 564, ° 574 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). In other words, a mandate does not “shut the 6 courthouse doors” as to matters raised before the district court not decided earlier by the appellate court. /d. 8 Here, the Ninth Circuit considered the issue of qualified immunity, disagreed with ? this Court’s holding, reversed that holding, and remanded the matter to this Court to 16 proceed accordingly. The mandate is clear, and the Court will not disturb it. i While the Court lacks authority to reconsider the Ninth Circuit’s mandate, it is not 12 foreclosed from considering new summary judgment motions based on intervening 13 Supreme Court authority that took place after the mandate issued. Having already re- opened discovery and reauthorized dispositive motion practice as to new evidence of IS Plaintiffs damages, it is appropriate to extend to the parties a chance to raise arguments 6 pertaining to intervening legal authority on the discrete issue of qualified immunity and the M § 1983 claim. Should either party find it appropriate to do so, they may raise those 18 arguments in dispositive briefing pursuant to the applicable scheduling order (Doc. 110). 19 IT IS ORDERED denying Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 106.) 20 Dated this 25th day of June, 2026. CN ‘eh: 23 United State$District Judge 24 25 26 27 28

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