K.R.H. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Cabinet for Health and Family Services

Opinion

RENDERED: AUGUST 21, 2026; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2025-CA-1518-ME

K.R.H. APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE DOUGLAS BRUCE PETRIE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-AD-00009

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES; C.K.H., A MINOR CHILD; AND J.M.W. APPELLEES

OPINION

AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, EASTON, AND L. JONES, JUDGES. COMBS, JUDGE: Appellant, K.R.H. (Mother), appeals from a judgment of the Boyle Family Court terminating her parental rights. After our review, we affirm.

Mother is the biological mother of C.K.H., a female born in 2020.

The child’s father is J.M.W. (Father). The Cabinet first became involved shortly

2

after the child’s birth when it received a referral due to Mother’s testing positive for THC1. During that investigation -- which was unsubstantiated, Mother went to Ohio and left the child with Father and her paternal grandmother.

There were two underlying juvenile court petitions: Boyle Family Court Nos. 22-J-00007-001 and 002. In the first, Father was named as the responding party. The child was removed due to allegations pertaining to Father’s conduct with other children (i.e., who were not Mother’s children). The child was placed in the permanent custody of her paternal grandmother. In the second petition, the paternal grandmother was named as the responding party. The child was removed because the grandmother allowed the child to have contact with Father in violation of a no-contact Order. In September 2023, custody was granted to the Cabinet.

On May 10, 2024, the Cabinet filed the petition now before us for termination of parental rights (TPR). The petition reflects that the child was placed in the temporary custody of the Cabinet in September 2023, was committed to the Cabinet in January 2024, and is presently in a state-approved foster home.

The Cabinet cited three of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights as set forth in KRS2 625.090(2) and alleged: (a) that Mother “ha[d]

1 Tetrahydrocannabinol, the main ingredient in cannabis. Marijuana, in short.

2 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

3

abandoned the child for a period of not less than ninety (90) days”; (e) that for not less than six months, Mother had “continuously or repeatedly failed or refused to provide” or had been “substantially incapable of providing essential parental care and protection for the child” with “no reasonable expectation of improvement in parental care and protection, considering the age of the child”; and (g) that “for reasons other than poverty alone,” Mother “continuously or repeatedly failed to provide” or was “incapable of providing essential food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or education reasonably necessary and available for the child’s well-being” and that there was “no reasonable expectation of significant improvement” in Mother’s conduct “in the immediately foreseeable future, considering the age of the child[.]”

On September 12, 2025, the family court conducted a final hearing on the petition. The parties, their respective counsel, and the child’s guardian ad litem were present. Mother attended virtually because she was incarcerated in Ohio. Cabinet workers, Catherine Hmieleski and Laurie Eldridge, testified -- as did Mother. On October 31, 2025, the court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (FFCL) and entered an Order Terminating Parental Rights and Order of Judgment terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.3

3 It does not appear that Father has appealed.

4

Mother now appeals. Her counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), and A.C. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 362 S.W.3d 361 (Ky. App. 2012), accompanied by a motion to withdraw. By Order of this Court entered on March 2, 2026, the motion to withdraw was passed to this merits panel, and Mother was permitted to proceed pro se and to file a supplemental and a reply brief if desired. Mother has filed a supplemental brief. We proceed with our review.

Where -- as here -- counsel files an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw, “we are obligated to independently review the record and ascertain whether the appeal is, in fact, void of nonfrivolous grounds for reversal.” A.C., 362 S.W.3d at 372. (That is, we must determine if any meritorious grounds exist.) However, “Anders procedures do not require appellate courts to flesh out every conceivable argument appellant could have raised on appeal; instead, our review is akin to palpable error review requiring us only to ascertain error which ‘affects the substantial rights of a party.’ CR 61.02.” Id. at 370.

KRS 625.090 provides for a tripartite test which allows for parental rights to be involuntarily terminated only upon a finding, based on clear and convincing evidence, that the following three prongs are satisfied: (1) the child is found or has been adjudged to be an abused or neglected child as defined in KRS 600.020(1); (2)

termination of the parent’s rights is in the child’s best

5

interests; and (3) at least one of the termination grounds enumerated in KRS 625.090(2)(a)-(j)[4] exists.

Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. K.H., 423 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Ky. 2014).

The trial court has a great deal of discretion in an involuntary termination of parental rights action. The standard of review in a termination case is confined to the clearly erroneous standard in Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) Rule 52.01, based upon clear and convincing evidence, and the findings of fact of the trial court will not be disturbed unless no substantial evidence exists in the record to support its findings. Clear and convincing proof does not necessarily mean uncontradicted proof. It is sufficient if there is proof of a probative and substantial nature carrying the weight of evidence sufficient to convince ordinarily prudent minded people.

C.A.W. v. Cabinet For Health & Family Services, Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Ky. App. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In the case before us, the family court determined that the child “is an abused or neglected child as defined in KRS 600.020(1) and is hereby adjudged by this Court to be an abused or neglected child as defined by KRS 600.020(1).” The court found as follows:

During the pendency of this action and the underlying juvenile court action, [Mother] continued criminal drug related activity, resulting in felony charges lodged against her in Spring 2024 for Felony Aggravated Possession of Methamphetamine, Felony Trafficking in Methamphetamine, Felony Improper Handling of a Firearm in a Motor Vehicle, for which she was convicted

4 Now KRS 625.090(2)(a)-(k).

6

and sentenced to two (2) to six (6) years in the Ohio Corrections System. Under Kentucky caselaw, a parent choosing a “criminal lifestyle” which results in her being incarcerated and creating a risk of physical or mental injury to her child is relevant can be construed as neglect of her child. J.H. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 704 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Ky. App. 1985).

Testimony presented at hearing provided a substantial evidentiary foundation to support these findings. Thus, the first prong of the tri-partite test is satisfied.

The second prong is the child’s best interest. KRS 625.090(3)

enumerates six factors “to be ‘considered’ in deciding whether termination is in the child’s best interest. They do not necessarily dictate a result and are always subordinate to the best-interest finding that the court is tasked with making.” D.G.R. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 364 S.W.3d 106, 115 (Ky. 2012). Additionally, our standard of review is that of abuse of discretion.

When reviewing a family court’s determination of the best interests of a child, we must apply the abuse of discretion standard. Absent a showing that a decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles, a family court’s determination on the issue will not be an abuse of discretion and will be sustained.

D.J.D. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 350 S.W.3d 833, 837 (Ky. App. 2011) (citations omitted).

Those statutory factors are as follows:

7

In determining the best interest of the child and the existence of a ground for termination, the Circuit Court shall consider the following factors:

(a) Mental illness as defined by KRS 202A.011(9), or an intellectual disability as defined by KRS 202B.010(9) of the parent as certified by a qualified mental health professional, or a disability as defined in KRS 199.011, if the mental illness, intellectual disability, or disability renders the parent consistently unable to care for the immediate and ongoing physical or psychological needs of the child for extended periods of time;

(b) Acts of abuse or neglect as defined in KRS 600.020(1) toward any child in the family;

(c) If the child has been placed with the cabinet, whether the cabinet has, prior to the filing of the petition;

1. Made reasonable efforts as defined in KRS 620.020 to reunite the child with the parent . . . .

....

(d) The efforts and adjustments the parent has made in his or her circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the child’s best interest to return the child to his or her home within a reasonable period of time, considering the age of the child;

(e) The physical, emotional, and mental health of the child and the prospects for the improvement of the child’s welfare if termination is ordered; and

(f) The payment or the failure to pay a reasonable portion of substitute physical care and maintenance if financially able to do so.

KRS 625.090(3).

8

The court did consider these necessary factors. It does not appear that KRS 625.090(3)(a) (mental illness) is applicable. We previously discussed the family court’s finding relating to acts of abuse or neglect, KRS 625.090(3)(b); that determination was made. The court found that the Cabinet “has provided or offered to provide all reasonable services” to Mother in deference to KRS 625.090(3)(c). The court carefully considered KRS 625.090(3)(d): that given her criminal drug-related activity, “Mother has not made sufficient efforts or adjustments in her circumstances, conduct, or conditions nor will she within a reasonable period to make it in the child’s best interest to return her to Respondent Mother’s home, considering the age of the child.” The court found that the child’s physical, emotional, and mental health has improved while in foster care and that it will likely continue to improve if termination is ordered per KRS 625.090(3)(e). The court also considered KRS 625.090(3)(f) and found that Mother failed to pay for substitute physical care and maintenance of the child -- and that even when she was gainfully employed, Mother did not provide any support to any of the child’s caregivers for the child’s benefit.

The testimony presented at hearing provided a substantial evidentiary foundation to support the family court’s determination that “[i]t is in the best interest of [the child] that the parental rights of Respondent Mother, [K.R.H.], be

9

involuntarily terminated[.]” We find no abuse of discretion. Thus, the second prong of the tri-partite test is satisfied.

The third prong requires the family court to find that grounds for termination exist under KRS 625.090(2). “[O]nly one of the grounds in that section needs to be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. T.N.H., 302 S.W.3d 658, 663 (Ky. 2010). In the case before us, the family court found that three grounds exist5 -- among them KRS 625.090(2)(e):

Mother, for a period of not less than six (6) months, has continuously or repeatedly failed or refused to provide or has been substantially incapable of providing essential parental care and protection for the child and that there is no reasonable expectation of improvement in parental care and protection, considering the age of the child. She has not parented the child since before the child’s first birthday when she left the child in the care of the child’s paternal grandmother and putative father.

Clear and convincing evidence supports the family court’s determination. At the time of the September 2025 hearing, the child was five years of age, and Mother was incarcerated with release anticipated for October 2025. Mother testified that she had left the child with the paternal grandmother shortly before the child’s first birthday and had only seen the child once since then -- at

5 The court found that grounds exist under KRS 625.090(2)(a), (e), and (g) -- the same grounds the Cabinet alleged in the TPR petition.

10

paternal grandmother’s house when she returned to Kentucky for a court appearance unrelated to the child.

Moreover, Ms. Hmieleski testified that when she received the emergency custody order on September 15, 2023, she contacted Mother to tell her that the child had been placed in the Cabinet’s custody and that they needed to find placement. According to Ms. Hmieleski, Mother said she was in Ohio and unable to come. Mother said to leave the child with Father. When told that he was in prison and that there was a no-contact Order, Mother then said to leave the child with the paternal grandmother. After that, the Cabinet was unable to find Mother and did not hear from her again until approximately August 19, 2024, after the TPR petition had been filed. Clearly, the third prong of the tri-partite test has been met.

We have considered Mother’s supplemental brief. Mother points to an error in one of the findings of fact -- an assertion that she voluntarily consented to the adoption/termination of parental rights when in fact she did not. That error appears to have been an inadvertent drafting mistake. It is quite clear from the evidence, the remaining FFCL, and the Order Terminating Parental Rights and Order of Judgment that Mother did not consent to termination of her parental rights and that they were involuntarily terminated.

11

Mother also attempts to persuade us that the family court erroneously based its decision on the idea that she was not making progress when in fact she had made significant improvements in her life and circumstances. Mother’s efforts to rehabilitate herself are truly commendable. She took advantage of programs and classes offered in the STAR program during her incarceration in Ohio. However, unfortunately, that progress has come far too late for this child -- whose best interests are our paramount concern, consideration, and duty.

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Boyle Family Court granting the termination of parental rights.

We grant the motion to withdraw by separate Order.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Maryann Zoll Dilissa G. Milburn Lancaster, Kentucky Mayfield, Kentucky

K.R.H., pro se Bainbridge, Ohio