Kramer v. Town of Hempstead

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Kramer v. Town of Hempstead

284 A.D.2d 503, 727 N.Y.S.2d 318, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6789

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 25, 2001

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 284 A.D.2d 503 (Kramer v. Town of Hempstead) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Kramer v. Town of Hempstead, 284 A.D.2d 503, 727 N.Y.S.2d 318, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6789 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001).

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Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Mahon, J.), dated July 10, [504]*5042000, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for injuries she allegedly sustained when she fell in a parking lot owned by the defendant Town of Hempstead. The Supreme Court properly denied the Town’s motion for summary judgment since it failed to make a prima facie showing that it did not receive notice of the defective condition (see, Town of Hemp-stead Code §§ 6-1, 6-2; LaRosa v Town of Hempstead, 237 AD2d 579). Furthermore, the plaintiff’s submissions raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the alleged defect was caused by the Town’s affirmative negligence, which would obviate the need for prior written notice (see, Monteleone v Incorporated Vil. of Floral Park, 143 AD2d 647, affd 74 NY2d 917; Green v City of New York, 138 AD2d 676). Santucci, J. P., Altman, Luciano and H. Miller, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Mahon, J.), dated July 10, [504]*5042000, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for injuries she allegedly sustained when she fell in a parking lot owned by the defendant Town of Hempstead. The Supreme Court properly denied the Town’s motion for summary judgment since it failed to make a prima facie showing that it did not receive notice of the defective condition (see, Town of Hemp-stead Code §§ 6-1, 6-2; LaRosa v Town of Hempstead, 237 AD2d 579). Furthermore, the plaintiff’s submissions raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the alleged defect was caused by the Town’s affirmative negligence, which would obviate the need for prior written notice (see, Monteleone v Incorporated Vil. of Floral Park, 143 AD2d 647, affd 74 NY2d 917; Green v City of New York, 138 AD2d 676). Santucci, J. P., Altman, Luciano and H. Miller, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

284 A.D.2d 503, 727 N.Y.S.2d 318, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6789, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kramer-v-town-of-hempstead-nyappdiv-2001.

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