Kramer v. Peres

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedDecember 7, 2022
Docket3:22-cv-03803
StatusUnknown

This text of Kramer v. Peres (Kramer v. Peres) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kramer v. Peres, (N.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 ANDREW KRAMER, Case No. 22-cv-03803-WHO (PR)

Plaintiff, 11 ORDER OF SERVICE;

v. 12 ORDER DIRECTING DEFENDANT TO FILE A DISPOSITIVE MOTION 13 PACHYINSKI, et al., OR NOTICE REGARDING SUCH MOTION; Defendants. 14 INSTRUCTIONS TO CLERK

16 17 INTRODUCTION 18 Plaintiff Andrew Kramer alleges a physician at San Quentin has violated his 19 constitutional and statutory rights. His 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint containing these 20 allegations is now before the Court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 21 Kramer has stated cognizable claims against Dr. Pachyinski, Chief Medical 22 Executive at San Quentin. All other defendants and claims are DISMISSED. The Court 23 directs defendant Pachyinski to file in response to the complaint a dispositive motion, or a 24 notice regarding such motion, on or before March 6, 2023. 25 DISCUSSION 26 A. Standard of Review 27 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 1 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 2 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 3 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 4 from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. 5 See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 6 A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 7 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 8 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial 9 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 10 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting 11 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, a court “is not required to accept legal 12 conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably 13 be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 14 (9th Cir. 1994). 15 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 16 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 17 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 18 color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 19 B. Legal Claims 20 Kramer alleges that Dr. Pachyinski, Chief Medical Executive at San Quentin State 21 Prison, has failed to provide adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations, and 22 therefore has violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and plaintiff’s rights under 23 the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12010 and section 504 of the 24 Rehabilitation Act (RA), 29 U.S.C. § 794.1 When liberally construed, these claims are 25 cognizable and shall proceed. 26

27 1 In the complaint, Kramer names a Dr. Peres as a defendant. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) In 1 Kramer’s claims against Warden Ron Broomfield are DISMISSED. There is no 2 respondeat superior liability under § 1983, see Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 3 Cir. 1989), which means that a person is not automatically held responsible simply because 4 he or she is a supervisor of an employee who commits a wrong. It is not enough that the 5 supervisor merely has a supervisory relationship over the defendants; the plaintiff must 6 show that the supervisor “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the 7 violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Id. Furthermore, supervisor defendants are 8 entitled to qualified immunity where the allegations against them are simply “bald” or 9 “conclusory” because such allegations do not “plausibly” establish the supervisors’ 10 personal involvement in their subordinates’ constitutional wrong. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675- 11 82. Simply put, people cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. 12 § 1983 unless they were integral participants in the unlawful conduct. Keates v. Koile, 883 13 F.3d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 2018). Kramer’s allegations do not plausibly establish that 14 Broomfield was an integral participant. 15 Kramer’s claims against the California Department of Corrections and 16 Rehabilitation (CDCR) are also DISMISSED. “State agencies . . . are not ‘persons’ within 17 the meaning of § 1983 and are therefore not amenable to suit under that statute.” 18 Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004). “The [CDCR] is a state agency 19 and thus not a ‘person’ under § 1983.” Johnson v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 20 2009 WL 2425073, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2009); see also Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 21 931 F.2d 1320, 1326 (9th Cir. 1991) (“arms of the State such as the Arizona Department of 22 Corrections are not persons under section 1983”). 23 CONCLUSION 24 For the foregoing reasons, I ORDER that: 25 1. Service of the first amended complaint (Dkt. No. 1), and all attachments 26 thereto, be effected on defendant Dr. Pachyinski, Chief Medical Executive at San Quentin 27 State Prison, and further order that this defendant respond to the cognizable claims raised 1 2. Service on these defendants shall proceed under the California Department 2 of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s e-service program for civil rights cases from prisoners 3 in CDCR custody. In accordance with the program, the Clerk is directed to serve on 4 CDCR via email the following documents: the complaint (Docket No. 1) and its 5 attachments; this order; a CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver form; and a summons. The 6 Clerk also shall serve a copy of this order on the plaintiff. 7 3. No later than 40 days after service of this order via email on CDCR, CDCR 8 shall provide the court a completed CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver advising the court 9 which defendant(s) listed in this order will be waiving service of process without the need 10 for service by the United States Marshal Service (USMS) and which defendant(s) decline 11 to waive service or could not be reached.

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Related

West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
United States v. Don Phillip Deangelo
13 F.3d 1228 (Eighth Circuit, 1994)
Earnest Woods, II v. Tom Carey
684 F.3d 934 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
In Re Olson
37 Cal. App. 3d 783 (California Court of Appeal, 1974)
Juan Albino v. Lee Baca
747 F.3d 1162 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Taylor v. List
880 F.2d 1040 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)
Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc.
931 F.2d 1320 (Ninth Circuit, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
Kramer v. Peres, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kramer-v-peres-cand-2022.