Krakowiak v. Lyman (In Re Lyman)

166 B.R. 333, 31 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 59, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 613, 1994 WL 160500
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedApril 28, 1994
Docket19-30240
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 166 B.R. 333 (Krakowiak v. Lyman (In Re Lyman)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Krakowiak v. Lyman (In Re Lyman), 166 B.R. 333, 31 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 59, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 613, 1994 WL 160500 (Ill. 1994).

Opinion

ORDER

KENNETH J. MEYERS, Bankruptcy Judge.

On January 27,1992, John Lyman (debtor) filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. A matrix listing four creditors was filed the same day. On February 11, 1992, debtor filed his schedules and a signed verification of matrix. 1 All of the named plaintiffs in the instant adversary proceeding were listed as unsecured creditors on debtor’s schedules, but none of them were listed on the matrix. As a result, plaintiffs did not receive timely notice of debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding nor of the deadline for filing complaints under 11 U.S.C. § 523. Plaintiffs first learned of the bankruptcy ease on December 28, 1992— seven months after the time for filing dis-chargeability complaints had expired — when counsel for plaintiffs received a letter from debtor’s attorney advising that a bankruptcy proceeding had been filed and that the automatic stay was in effect. 2

On December 20, 1993, one year later, plaintiffs filed the instant adversary complaint alleging that the debts owed by debtor to them are nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2) .and (4). 3 Plaintiffs also alleged that they “were not provided with notice of any deadlines to object to the dis- *335 chargeability of any of John Michael Lyman’s indebtedness in this proceeding.” Plaintiffs Complaint, ¶ 16. In response, debtor filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it was not filed within the time period established by Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c). Debtor also contends that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to the equitable doctrines of laches or estoppel since plaintiffs did not file their complaint until one year after receiving notice of debtor’s bankruptcy case.

Section 523(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:

Except as provided in subsection (a)(3)(B) of this section, the debtor shall be discharged from a debt of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of subsection (a) of this section, unless, on request of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, and after notice and a hearing, the court determines such debt to be excepted from discharge under paragraph (2), (4), or (6), as the case may be, of subsection (a) of this section.

11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1) (emphasis added). Under Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c), section 523(c) complaints must be filed “not later than 60 days following the first date set for the meeting of creditors held pursuant to § 341(a).” Bankr.R. 4007(c). In the present ease, the deadline for filing dischargeability complaints was May 25, 1992, and plaintiffs’ complaint was not filed until December 20, 1993.

Plaintiffs rely on section 523(a)(3)(B) to support their argument that the complaint should not be dismissed and that the debts owed by debtor to them are nondischargeable. That section provides:

(a) A discharge under section 727 ... of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt....
(3) neither listed nor scheduled under section 521(1) of this title, with the name, if known to the debtor, of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, in time to permit. ...
(B) if such debt is of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim and timely request for a determination of discharge-ability of such debt under one of such paragraphs, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing and request....

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(B). Plaintiffs contend that the purpose of this section is to preserve the rights of creditors who are not provided with timely notice of a bankruptcy proceeding. They further contend that because they were not given notice of debtor’s bankruptcy case in time to file a dischargeability action, their complaint falls within section 523(a)(3)(B).

In his motion to dismiss and accompanying brief, debtor argues that plaintiffs fail to meet the statutory requirements set forth in section 523(a)(3)(B). Specifically, debtor contends that because he listed plaintiffs as unsecured creditors in his schedules, 4 plaintiffs do not satisfy section 523(a)(3)(B)’s requirement that they be “neither listed nor scheduled.” According to debtor, section 523(a)(3)(B) is therefore inapplicable. Debt- or asserts that neither the Code nor the rules specify the procedure for the filing of a dis-chargeability complaint by a “scheduled” creditor who receives notice of the bankruptcy filing after the expiration of the deadline for filing 523(e) complaints. Debtor concludes that the Court must apply “federal principles of statutory construction and equity to determine the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’ delay in filing the [instant] complaint. ...” Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint, p. 15.

It is clear that, under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(B), “[a] debt is excepted from discharge if it was not scheduled in time to permit timely action by the creditor to protect the creditor’s rights, unless the creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the ease.” 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 523.13[2] at 523.13 (15th ed. 1993).- “Proper scheduling requires the correct name and address of creditors on the debtor’s schedules and lists.” Ginsberg, Bankruptcy: Text, Statutes, Rules, § 11.06(f) at 918-19 (2d ed. Supp. 1991). “Behind this requirement are basic due process considerations of notice; that is, *336 a creditor must be informed about the bankruptcy to enable it to take necessary steps to protect its interests.” Id. at 919.

In the instant case, the Court must determine whether a debt is excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(3)(B) when the creditor to whom the debt is owed is listed on debtor’s schedules but not on the matrix. The same issue was raised by the court in Gulf Electroquip, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 132 B.R. 991 (E.D.La.1991)., In that case, Gulf Elec-troquip was listed as an unsecured creditor in debtor’s schedules but was omitted from the matrix. As a result, the creditor did not receive formal notice of the deadline for filing dischargeability complaints. Its complaint objecting to dis'chargeability was not filed until six months after the deadline had expired. While the central issue in Gulf Elec-troquip was whether the creditor had received actual notice of the bankruptcy proceeding prior to the expiration of the deadline for filing complaints, the court first explained:

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Bluebook (online)
166 B.R. 333, 31 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 59, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 613, 1994 WL 160500, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/krakowiak-v-lyman-in-re-lyman-ilsb-1994.