1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Jennifer Lynn Kraemer, No. CV-20-01636-PHX-DJH
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) 16 Commissioner’s decision denying her application for SSA disability benefits. Plaintiff 17 filed an Opening Brief (Doc. 16) on April 6, 2021. Defendant filed a Response Brief (Doc. 18 17) on April 23, 2021. Plaintiff filed her Reply Brief (Doc. 18) on May 7, 2021. The Court 19 has reviewed the briefs and the Administrative Record (Doc. 15, “R.”). For the following 20 reasons, the Court affirms the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision. 21 I. Background 22 On December 12, 2016, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for a period of 23 disability and disability benefits with an alleged onset date of August 2, 2016. (R. at 53). 24 An ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on September 25, 2019. (R. at 50). The Appeals 25 Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (R. at 1). This appeal followed. 26 The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from several severe impairments including 27 cervical degenerative disc disease, degenerative joint disease, chronic pain syndrome, 28 obesity, adjustment disorder with depressed mood, and attention deficit hyperactivity 1 disorder. (R. at 55). During the hearing, Plaintiff testified that her symptoms consisted of 2 pain in her back and below the right shoulder blade, as well as numbing in her hands. 3 (R. at 101). The ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s symptom testimony because her “statements 4 concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely 5 consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record . . . .” (R. at 58). 6 Ultimately the ALJ found Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) permitted 7 light work with some physical restrictions limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks, that 8 make up simple, unskilled work. (R. at 57). In addition, the ALJ found Plaintiff was able 9 to perform past relevant work as an attendant. (R. at 61). 10 II. Standard of Review 11 In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews only 12 those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 13 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability 14 determination only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. 15 Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence 16 that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion considering the 17 record as a whole. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the 18 Court must consider the record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a 19 “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. Generally, “[w]here the evidence is 20 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s 21 decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 22 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 23 To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 24 follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of 25 proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. 26 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines 27 whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 28 404.1520(a)(4)(i). At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” 1 medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At 2 step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 3 impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 4 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically 5 found to be disabled. Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and determines 6 whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 7 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where she 8 determines whether the claimant can perform any other work in the national economy 9 based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 10 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 11 III. Discussion 12 Plaintiff raises two issues. First, Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to fully develop the 13 record in support of his RFC finding. (Doc. 16 at 7). Second, Plaintiff argues the ALJ 14 failed to properly consider her symptom testimony by overstating the impact of Plaintiff’s 15 activities. (Id. at 11). 16 a. Whether the Record was Sufficient 17 Initially, a claimant carries the burden of producing evidence to prove a disability. 18 Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2005). ALJs have a “duty to develop 19 the record further . . . only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is 20 inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.” Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 21 453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff argues the record with respect to Plaintiff’s physical 22 and mental RFC was inadequate and ambiguous such that the ALJ should have developed 23 it further. 24 i. Plaintiff’s Physical RFC 25 As to Plaintiff’s physical RFC, Plaintiff argues the evidence before the ALJ was 26 inadequate because most of the medical opinions that the ALJ evaluated took place before 27 the alleged onset of disability. (Doc. 16 at 10). The ALJ evaluated six medical opinions 28 that were conducted before the alleged onset date, and he gave them no weight to partial 1 weight. (R. at 59–60). The ALJ also considered two physical medical examinations from 2 2019 showing Plaintiff was capable of a full range of motion without pain. (Id.) The ALJ 3 also considered a 2019 MRI showing a normal cervical cord. (Id.) In addition to these 4 medical records, the Court considered Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. Overall, the Court 5 finds that this is a substantial amount of evidence and does not require further development. 6 See Orn, 495 F.3d at 630. 7 Plaintiff also argues that there was an ambiguity in the evidence that should have 8 been resolved with further medical opinion. (Doc. 16 at 9). This ambiguity, Plaintiff 9 argues, stems from Dr. Matthew Bean’s opinion that Plaintiff should be limited to two 10 hours of sitting and one hour of standing or walking in an eight-hour workday. (R. at 59).
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Jennifer Lynn Kraemer, No. CV-20-01636-PHX-DJH
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) 16 Commissioner’s decision denying her application for SSA disability benefits. Plaintiff 17 filed an Opening Brief (Doc. 16) on April 6, 2021. Defendant filed a Response Brief (Doc. 18 17) on April 23, 2021. Plaintiff filed her Reply Brief (Doc. 18) on May 7, 2021. The Court 19 has reviewed the briefs and the Administrative Record (Doc. 15, “R.”). For the following 20 reasons, the Court affirms the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision. 21 I. Background 22 On December 12, 2016, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for a period of 23 disability and disability benefits with an alleged onset date of August 2, 2016. (R. at 53). 24 An ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on September 25, 2019. (R. at 50). The Appeals 25 Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (R. at 1). This appeal followed. 26 The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from several severe impairments including 27 cervical degenerative disc disease, degenerative joint disease, chronic pain syndrome, 28 obesity, adjustment disorder with depressed mood, and attention deficit hyperactivity 1 disorder. (R. at 55). During the hearing, Plaintiff testified that her symptoms consisted of 2 pain in her back and below the right shoulder blade, as well as numbing in her hands. 3 (R. at 101). The ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s symptom testimony because her “statements 4 concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely 5 consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record . . . .” (R. at 58). 6 Ultimately the ALJ found Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) permitted 7 light work with some physical restrictions limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks, that 8 make up simple, unskilled work. (R. at 57). In addition, the ALJ found Plaintiff was able 9 to perform past relevant work as an attendant. (R. at 61). 10 II. Standard of Review 11 In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews only 12 those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 13 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability 14 determination only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. 15 Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence 16 that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion considering the 17 record as a whole. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the 18 Court must consider the record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a 19 “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. Generally, “[w]here the evidence is 20 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s 21 decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 22 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 23 To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 24 follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of 25 proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. 26 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines 27 whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 28 404.1520(a)(4)(i). At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” 1 medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At 2 step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 3 impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 4 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically 5 found to be disabled. Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and determines 6 whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 7 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where she 8 determines whether the claimant can perform any other work in the national economy 9 based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 10 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 11 III. Discussion 12 Plaintiff raises two issues. First, Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to fully develop the 13 record in support of his RFC finding. (Doc. 16 at 7). Second, Plaintiff argues the ALJ 14 failed to properly consider her symptom testimony by overstating the impact of Plaintiff’s 15 activities. (Id. at 11). 16 a. Whether the Record was Sufficient 17 Initially, a claimant carries the burden of producing evidence to prove a disability. 18 Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2005). ALJs have a “duty to develop 19 the record further . . . only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is 20 inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.” Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 21 453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff argues the record with respect to Plaintiff’s physical 22 and mental RFC was inadequate and ambiguous such that the ALJ should have developed 23 it further. 24 i. Plaintiff’s Physical RFC 25 As to Plaintiff’s physical RFC, Plaintiff argues the evidence before the ALJ was 26 inadequate because most of the medical opinions that the ALJ evaluated took place before 27 the alleged onset of disability. (Doc. 16 at 10). The ALJ evaluated six medical opinions 28 that were conducted before the alleged onset date, and he gave them no weight to partial 1 weight. (R. at 59–60). The ALJ also considered two physical medical examinations from 2 2019 showing Plaintiff was capable of a full range of motion without pain. (Id.) The ALJ 3 also considered a 2019 MRI showing a normal cervical cord. (Id.) In addition to these 4 medical records, the Court considered Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. Overall, the Court 5 finds that this is a substantial amount of evidence and does not require further development. 6 See Orn, 495 F.3d at 630. 7 Plaintiff also argues that there was an ambiguity in the evidence that should have 8 been resolved with further medical opinion. (Doc. 16 at 9). This ambiguity, Plaintiff 9 argues, stems from Dr. Matthew Bean’s opinion that Plaintiff should be limited to two 10 hours of sitting and one hour of standing or walking in an eight-hour workday. (R. at 59). 11 Because the ultimate RFC does not contain any limitations to how long Plaintiff can sit, 12 walk, stand at one time, Plaintiff argues the ALJ has failed to address an ambiguity. 13 The Court finds the record as it relates to Plaintiff’s ability to sit, stand, or walk does 14 not present the type of ambiguity that warrants further development of the record. First, 15 the ALJ only gave partial weight to Dr. Bean’s opinion because of the 2019 examinations 16 showing Plaintiff could undergo a full range of motion without pain. (Id.) Second, the 17 ALJ also gave partial weight to the opinion of Dr. Keith Cunningham’s opinion that 18 Plaintiff had no sever impairments at all. (R. at 60). Therefore, the record contains several 19 data points from which, when viewed as a whole, the ALJ could reasonably draw a 20 conclusion. In this sense, the record is not ambiguous. The record contains substantial 21 evidence in support of the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was capable of light work. See 22 Mayes, 276 F.3d 460 (holding that a record was not ambiguous when it contained 23 substantial evidence in support of an ALJ’s finding). 24 ii. Plaintiff’s Mental RFC 25 Plaintiff argues there was inadequate evidence with respect to Plaintiff’s mental 26 abilities for the ALJ to determine the RFC. (Doc. 16 at 11). ALJ evaluated two medical 27 opinions that were conducted after the onset date, that of Dr. Celia Drake and Dr. Luz 28 Mogrovejo. (R. at 60). He gave significant weight to Dr. Drake’s opinion, which found 1 that Plaintiff would have difficulty making decisions in a work setting and would have 2 problems responding to stress. (Id.) He gave little weight to Dr. Mogrovejo’s opinion, 3 which was that Plaintiff would succeed in jobs with “static tasks and where changes can be 4 explained.” (Id.) Because the Plaintiff testified that she could manage herself and her 5 finances, and because she was attempting to regain her driver’s license, the ALJ found that 6 Plaintiff’s ability to adapt and manage tasks was stronger than Dr. Mogrovejo’s opinion 7 suggests. (R. at 60–61). The Court finds the ALJ’s consideration of these opinions and 8 Plaintiff’s testimony constitutes substantial evidence in support of his RFC determination 9 that does not require further development of the record. See Mayes, 276 F.3d 460. 10 b. Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony 11 Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to properly consider her symptom testimony by 12 overstating the impact of Plaintiff’s claimed activities. (Doc. 16 at 11). When an ALJ 13 evaluates a claimant’s symptoms, he considers symptom testimony, objective medical 14 evidence, and other evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). The ALJ may “reject 15 the claimant’s testimony about the severity of [the] symptoms” provided that the ALJ also 16 explains his decision “by providing specific, clear, and convincing reasons for doing so.” 17 Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488–89 (9th Cir. 2015). 18 Plaintiff testified that “she has constant pain in her back and underneath her right 19 shoulder blade” and that “her hands are numb several times a day.” (R. at 57). The ALJ 20 found that Plaintiff’s statements “concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects 21 of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence 22 in the record . . . .” (R. at 58). The ALJ cited to Plaintiff’s April 2019 physical 23 examinations that shows “full range of motion in all extremities without pain” in Plaintiff’s 24 musculoskeletal system. (R. at 58 citing (R. at 487)). The ALJ also cited to a February 25 2019 MRI showing “no abnormalities . . . to suggest a demyelinating process” and a normal 26 cervical cord. (Id. (citing R. at 422)). The Court finds that this evidence, in combination 27 with Plaintiff’s statements that she babysits her young grandchildren, cares for dogs, and 28 helps with household chores, provides a sufficiently clear and convincing reason to discount Plaintiff's symptom testimony. 2\| IV. Conclusion 3 For these reasons, the Court finds the ALJ did not err. 4 Accordingly, 5 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is 6|| AFFIRMED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly. 7 Dated this 31st day of January, 2022. 8 9 fe □□ 10 norable'Diang/. Hunfetewa 1 United States District Fudge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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