Krabill v. Progressive Southeastern Insurance Co.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Krabill v. Progressive Southeastern Insurance Co.

581 So. 2d 244, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 5502, 1991 WL 101820

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJune 14, 1991

DocketNo. 90-03048

StatusPublished

This text of 581 So. 2d 244 (Krabill v. Progressive Southeastern Insurance Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Krabill v. Progressive Southeastern Insurance Co., 581 So. 2d 244, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 5502, 1991 WL 101820 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

We reverse the summary judgment determining that plaintiff was afforded no coverage under the insurance policy issued by appellee for losses resulting from an accident involving plaintiff’s motor home.

There are fact questions as to whether the vehicle was used for “recreational purposes” and not for “everyday use,” as provided in the policy definition of the covered vehicle, and as to whether the vehicle was used as “a permanent and primary residence,” as provided in the policy’s exclusions from coverage. More specifically, while it appears that the vehicle was the only vehicle owned by the insured, that alone did not establish beyond any doubt [245]*245that it was used for “everyday use,” and there was evidence indicating that the insured’s primary residence was her aunt’s home.

“ ‘[I]f the record raises even the slightest doubt that an issue [of material fact] might exist,’ summary judgment is improper.” Anderson v. Rosetree Village Ass’n, Inc., 540 So.2d 173, 174 (Fla.2d DCA 1989) (quoting Snyder v. Cheezem Development Corp., 373 So.2d 719, 720 (Fla.2d DCA 1979). See also Andrews v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 557 So.2d 85, 89 (Fla.2d DCA 1990).

Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.

SCHOONOVER, C.J., and LEHAN and FRANK, JJ., concur.

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PER CURIAM.

We reverse the summary judgment determining that plaintiff was afforded no coverage under the insurance policy issued by appellee for losses resulting from an accident involving plaintiff’s motor home.

There are fact questions as to whether the vehicle was used for “recreational purposes” and not for “everyday use,” as provided in the policy definition of the covered vehicle, and as to whether the vehicle was used as “a permanent and primary residence,” as provided in the policy’s exclusions from coverage. More specifically, while it appears that the vehicle was the only vehicle owned by the insured, that alone did not establish beyond any doubt [245]*245that it was used for “everyday use,” and there was evidence indicating that the insured’s primary residence was her aunt’s home.

“ ‘[I]f the record raises even the slightest doubt that an issue [of material fact] might exist,’ summary judgment is improper.” Anderson v. Rosetree Village Ass’n, Inc., 540 So.2d 173, 174 (Fla.2d DCA 1989) (quoting Snyder v. Cheezem Development Corp., 373 So.2d 719, 720 (Fla.2d DCA 1979). See also Andrews v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 557 So.2d 85, 89 (Fla.2d DCA 1990).

Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.

SCHOONOVER, C.J., and LEHAN and FRANK, JJ., concur.

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581 So. 2d 244, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 5502, 1991 WL 101820, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/krabill-v-progressive-southeastern-insurance-co-fladistctapp-1991.

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