Kozevnikoff v. Tanana Village Council

89 P.3d 757, 2004 Alas. LEXIS 52, 2004 WL 870154
CourtAlaska Supreme Court
DecidedApril 23, 2004
DocketNo. S-10881
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 89 P.3d 757 (Kozevnikoff v. Tanana Village Council) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Alaska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kozevnikoff v. Tanana Village Council, 89 P.3d 757, 2004 Alas. LEXIS 52, 2004 WL 870154 (Ala. 2004).

Opinion

OPINION

CARPENETI, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

A losing party interpreted notations made by a court clerk on the final judgment (to the effect that costs or attorney’s fees had not yet been awarded) as constituting a denial of the opponent’s motion for costs and attorney’s fees. Because the superior court correctly rejected that interpretation, we affirm the superior court’s award of costs and fees.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Aaron Kozevnikoff sued for a declaration that a tribal court order concerning the custody of his two children was null and void on the grounds that it violated his due process and parental rights. The Tanana Village Council (TVC) moved to dismiss Kozevni-koffs claim on jurisdictional grounds and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In July 2002 Superior Court Judge Niesje J. Steinkruger granted TVC’s motion to dismiss on both grounds.

In August TVC timely requested attorney’s fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82.1 Ko-zevnikoff opposed the motion and filed a notice of appeal. The superior court subsequently entered final judgment dismissing KozevnikofPs claims with prejudice on September 12, 2002. Regarding attorney’s fees the order read:

FURTHER ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Defendant, Tanana Village Council, is awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $_; together with costs in the amount of $_, for a total judgment of $_, on which interest shall accrue at the- rate of 4.25% which is the statutory rate per annum until paid in full.

(The underlined passage was handwritten by Judge Steinkruger.)

The spaces where a monetary amount would be entered were left blank and a court clerk wrote “w/ out cost or atty fees” on the [759]*759certificate of distribution. The order was distributed on September 16, 2002.

A clerk’s order dated October 1, 2002 held Kozevnikoff liable for $220.48 in costs. The final judgment was redistributed to the parties on October 2 with the clerk’s notation “w/ costs (no atty fees yet).”

On October 15 Kozevnikoff and TVC agreed to dismiss the merits appeal. Their Dismissal by Agreement stated that: (1) “This case having settled in full, the parties agree that the appeal should be dismissed under Appellate Rule 511(a)” and (2) “Each party will bear its own costs and fees for the purposes of this appeal.” Lloyd Miller, counsel for TVC, stated that Marissa Flannery, who handled the superior court litigation for TVC, proposed the fee language in the agreement to Ella Anagick, Kozvenikoff s attorney, “as part of an expressed understanding that the Appellant would remain responsible for any fees or costs that might be awarded in the superior court.”

On October 13 Judge Steinkruger dismissed without prejudice TVC’s August motion for fees due to the insufficiency of the affidavit filed in support of the motion and inconsistency within the motion itself.2 Judge Steinkruger gave TVC ten days to file a supplemental motion for fees. TVC filed its supplemental motion on October 22 stating that its actual fees were $15,732.15 and requesting an award of $3,146.43. Kozevni-koff opposed TVC’s motion as being untimely and violating principles of res judicata. In November Judge Steinkruger awarded TVC $3,146.43 in attorney’s fees.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion.3 When a review of an award of attorney’s fees and costs requires an interpretation of the Alaska Civil Rules, we apply our independent judgment.4

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The September 12th Final Judgment Was Not a Denial of TVC’s Motions for Costs and Attorney’s Fees.

Kozevnikoff argues that the clerk’s notation “w/ out costs or atty fees” denied TVC’s motions for attorney’s fees and costs. Ko-zevnikoff essentially claims that notations made by a court clerk and not signed by the judge should be considered part of a judicial order. We reject this argument.

Alaska Civil Rule 58 mandates that the entry of judgment not be delayed while the court determines fees and costs,5 making it appropriate for the court to enter the judgment on the merits without waiting for a final determination of fees and costs. Rule 58.1 draws a distinction between a judicial order and a clerk’s certificate of distribution, providing that judgments are effective when they are signed and will thereafter be distributed by the court clerk.6 Furthermore, if the September 12 order had been a judicial order denying fees, the superior court would have had to provide the parties with an explanation as to why the court was not following the fee schedule set out in Rule 82.7

Because notations made by a clerk on the certificate of distribution are not judicial orders and because a final judgment may be issued without waiting for the court to calculate attorney’s fees and costs, we reject Ko-zevnikoff s argument that the September 12 order denied TVC’s August 16 motions for fees and costs.

[760]*760B. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Allowed TYC To Supplement Its Original Motion for Attorney’s Fees.

Under Alaska Civil Rule 82 parties must file motions for attorney’s fees within ten days of the clerk’s distribution of the judgment or within a reasonable time determined by the court.8 The question here is whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting TVC ten days to supplement its original motion for attorney’s fees.9 A trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion in allowing a party additional time to supplement its original motion under Rule 82 unless the additional time (1) was unreasonable or (2) resulted in prejudice to the opposing party.10

1. The amount of time granted was reasonable.

On October 13 Judge Steinkruger gave TVC ten days to file a supplemental motion for attorney’s fees because its original motion and supporting affidavit were not sufficiently clear. The superior court has the discretion to allow for supplementation when the moving party fails to adequately support its claim for fees.11 Alaska Civil Rule 60 also allows a party to correct a clerical error “arising from oversight or omission”12 and has been used by this court to allow a party to supplement its original motion for attorney’s fees when the original motion contained a clerical error.13 Because the superior court has the power to correct clerical errors, omissions, and ambiguities in a party’s motion for attorney’s fees and because ten days was a reasonable amount of time, it was not unreasonable for Judge Steinkruger to allow TVC ten days to file a supplemental motion for fees.

2. The supplemental motion did not prejudice Kozevnikoff.

Allowing a party to supplement its original motion for attorney’s fees may constitute an abuse of discretion if it prejudices the opposing party.14

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
89 P.3d 757, 2004 Alas. LEXIS 52, 2004 WL 870154, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kozevnikoff-v-tanana-village-council-alaska-2004.