WIEAND, Judge:
While participating in the second heat of a downhill ski race, Karl Kotovsky failed to negotiate a turn at the fourth gate and collided with a wooden fence post situated along the side of the course. As a result of this accident, he received serious injuries. Alleging negligence in failing to pad the post, Kotovsky and his wife, Sharon, commenced an action for damages against Ski Liberty Operating Corpora
tion (Ski Liberty), the owner of the slope. In its answer to the complaint, Ski Liberty pleaded two exculpatory agreements and releases which Kotovsky had executed prior to participating in the downhill ski race. By the terms of these agreements and releases, which Kotovsky admitted, he expressly assumed the “risks, conditions and hazards which may occur whether they now be known or unknown.” He also released the ski area, as well as the promoters, sponsors, organizers and others, “from any and all liability, whether known or unknown, even though that liability may arise out of negligence or carelessness on the part of persons or entities mentioned above.”
Because of these
exculpatory agreements and releases, the trial court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of Ski Liberty. The plaintiffs appealed.
The standard for reviewing a judgment on the pleadings was stated in
Lyon v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,
390 Pa.Super. 25, 567 A.2d 1100 (1989), as follows:
In reviewing an order granting judgment on the pleadings, we must limit our consideration to the facts set forth in the pleadings, such as the complaint, answer, reply to new matter and relevant documents, and accept as true all of the well-pleaded allegations of the party against whom the motion is granted.
Aughenbaugh v. North American Refractories,
426 Pa. 211, 231 A.2d 173 (1967);
Keystone Automated Equipment Co., Inc. v. Reliance Insurance Co.,
369 Pa.Super. 472, 535 A.2d 648 (1988),
allocatur denied,
519 Pa. 654, 546 A.2d 59 (1988);
Jones v. Travelers Insurance Company,
356 Pa.Super. 213, 514 A.2d 576 (1986);
Gallo v. J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co.,
328 Pa.Super. 267, 476 A.2d 1322 (1984);
Eberhart v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,
238 Pa.Super. 558, 362 A.2d 1094 (1976). Judgment on the pleadings is proper only when no material facts are in dispute.
Groff v. Pete Kingsley,
374 Pa.Super. 377, 543 A.2d 128 (1988);
Vogel v. Berkley,
354 Pa.Super. 291, 511
A.2d 878, 880 (1986),
citing Dudash v. Palmyra Borough Authority,
335 Pa.Super. 1, 483 A.2d 924 (1984);
Del Quadro v. City of Philadelphia,
293 Pa.Super. 173, 437 A.2d 1262 (1981). “In reviewing the court’s decision, we must determine if the action of the court was based on a clear error of law or whether there were facts disclosed by the pleading which should properly go to the jury. The decision will be affirmed only in cases which are clear and free from doubt.”
Groff, supra
374 Pa.Super. at 382, 543 A.2d at 130,
quoting Vogel, supra
354 Pa.Super. at 296, 511 A.2d at 880. Judgment on the pleadings may be appropriate in cases which turn upon the interpretation of a written agreement.
Vogel, supra
354 Pa.Super. at 296, 511 A.2d at 880;
Gallo, supra
328 Pa.Super. at 270-71, 476 A.2d at 1324,
quoting DiAndrea v. Reliance Savings and Loan Association,
310 Pa.Super. 537, 546, 456 A.2d 1066, 1070 (1983).
Id.,
390 Pa.Superior Ct. at 26-27, 567 A.2d at 1101. (footnote omitted).
Downhill skiing is a dangerous activity. Downhill racing is even more dangerous. In recognition of the hazardous nature of such activity, the legislature has expressly provided that assumption of the risk shall be a complete defense to actions for downhill skiing injuries. See: 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(c).
In the instant case, appellant was an experienced skier, who was well acquainted with the hazards of downhill racing. Indeed, he had previously skied on the same slope on which he received his injuries. Despite this knowledge,
he expressly agreed to assume the risk of injury and released the owner and operator of the slope from all liability, even that which might result from negligence.
In
Zimmer v. Mitchell and Ness,
253 Pa.Super. 474, 385 A.2d 437 (1978),
aff'd,
490 Pa. 428, 416 A.2d 1010 (1980), the Superior Court laid down the following standards for a valid exculpatory agreement.
The contract must not contravene any policy of the law. It must be a contract between individuals relating to their private affairs. Each party must be a free bargaining agent, not simply one drawn into an adhesion contract, with no recourse but to reject the entire transaction. In the instant case the validity of the agreement is apparent. However, to be enforceable, several additional standards must be met. First, we must construe the agreement strictly and against the party asserting it. Finally, the agreement must spell out the intent of the parties with the utmost particularity.
Id.,
253 Pa.Superior Ct. at 478, 385 A.2d at 439, citing
Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Greenville Business Men’s Ass’n,
423 Pa. 288, 224 A.2d 620 (1966). See also:
Kotwasinki v. Rasner,
436 Pa. 32, 38-39, 258 A.2d 865, 868 (1969).
The agreement in the instant case was not one of adhesion. Appellant was not required to enter the contract, but did so voluntarily in order to participate in a downhill ski race. This activity was not essential to appellant’s personal or economic well-being; it was purely a recreational activity. See:
Valeo v. Pocono International Raceway, Inc.,
347 Pa.Super.
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WIEAND, Judge:
While participating in the second heat of a downhill ski race, Karl Kotovsky failed to negotiate a turn at the fourth gate and collided with a wooden fence post situated along the side of the course. As a result of this accident, he received serious injuries. Alleging negligence in failing to pad the post, Kotovsky and his wife, Sharon, commenced an action for damages against Ski Liberty Operating Corpora
tion (Ski Liberty), the owner of the slope. In its answer to the complaint, Ski Liberty pleaded two exculpatory agreements and releases which Kotovsky had executed prior to participating in the downhill ski race. By the terms of these agreements and releases, which Kotovsky admitted, he expressly assumed the “risks, conditions and hazards which may occur whether they now be known or unknown.” He also released the ski area, as well as the promoters, sponsors, organizers and others, “from any and all liability, whether known or unknown, even though that liability may arise out of negligence or carelessness on the part of persons or entities mentioned above.”
Because of these
exculpatory agreements and releases, the trial court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of Ski Liberty. The plaintiffs appealed.
The standard for reviewing a judgment on the pleadings was stated in
Lyon v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,
390 Pa.Super. 25, 567 A.2d 1100 (1989), as follows:
In reviewing an order granting judgment on the pleadings, we must limit our consideration to the facts set forth in the pleadings, such as the complaint, answer, reply to new matter and relevant documents, and accept as true all of the well-pleaded allegations of the party against whom the motion is granted.
Aughenbaugh v. North American Refractories,
426 Pa. 211, 231 A.2d 173 (1967);
Keystone Automated Equipment Co., Inc. v. Reliance Insurance Co.,
369 Pa.Super. 472, 535 A.2d 648 (1988),
allocatur denied,
519 Pa. 654, 546 A.2d 59 (1988);
Jones v. Travelers Insurance Company,
356 Pa.Super. 213, 514 A.2d 576 (1986);
Gallo v. J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co.,
328 Pa.Super. 267, 476 A.2d 1322 (1984);
Eberhart v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,
238 Pa.Super. 558, 362 A.2d 1094 (1976). Judgment on the pleadings is proper only when no material facts are in dispute.
Groff v. Pete Kingsley,
374 Pa.Super. 377, 543 A.2d 128 (1988);
Vogel v. Berkley,
354 Pa.Super. 291, 511
A.2d 878, 880 (1986),
citing Dudash v. Palmyra Borough Authority,
335 Pa.Super. 1, 483 A.2d 924 (1984);
Del Quadro v. City of Philadelphia,
293 Pa.Super. 173, 437 A.2d 1262 (1981). “In reviewing the court’s decision, we must determine if the action of the court was based on a clear error of law or whether there were facts disclosed by the pleading which should properly go to the jury. The decision will be affirmed only in cases which are clear and free from doubt.”
Groff, supra
374 Pa.Super. at 382, 543 A.2d at 130,
quoting Vogel, supra
354 Pa.Super. at 296, 511 A.2d at 880. Judgment on the pleadings may be appropriate in cases which turn upon the interpretation of a written agreement.
Vogel, supra
354 Pa.Super. at 296, 511 A.2d at 880;
Gallo, supra
328 Pa.Super. at 270-71, 476 A.2d at 1324,
quoting DiAndrea v. Reliance Savings and Loan Association,
310 Pa.Super. 537, 546, 456 A.2d 1066, 1070 (1983).
Id.,
390 Pa.Superior Ct. at 26-27, 567 A.2d at 1101. (footnote omitted).
Downhill skiing is a dangerous activity. Downhill racing is even more dangerous. In recognition of the hazardous nature of such activity, the legislature has expressly provided that assumption of the risk shall be a complete defense to actions for downhill skiing injuries. See: 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(c).
In the instant case, appellant was an experienced skier, who was well acquainted with the hazards of downhill racing. Indeed, he had previously skied on the same slope on which he received his injuries. Despite this knowledge,
he expressly agreed to assume the risk of injury and released the owner and operator of the slope from all liability, even that which might result from negligence.
In
Zimmer v. Mitchell and Ness,
253 Pa.Super. 474, 385 A.2d 437 (1978),
aff'd,
490 Pa. 428, 416 A.2d 1010 (1980), the Superior Court laid down the following standards for a valid exculpatory agreement.
The contract must not contravene any policy of the law. It must be a contract between individuals relating to their private affairs. Each party must be a free bargaining agent, not simply one drawn into an adhesion contract, with no recourse but to reject the entire transaction. In the instant case the validity of the agreement is apparent. However, to be enforceable, several additional standards must be met. First, we must construe the agreement strictly and against the party asserting it. Finally, the agreement must spell out the intent of the parties with the utmost particularity.
Id.,
253 Pa.Superior Ct. at 478, 385 A.2d at 439, citing
Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Greenville Business Men’s Ass’n,
423 Pa. 288, 224 A.2d 620 (1966). See also:
Kotwasinki v. Rasner,
436 Pa. 32, 38-39, 258 A.2d 865, 868 (1969).
The agreement in the instant case was not one of adhesion. Appellant was not required to enter the contract, but did so voluntarily in order to participate in a downhill ski race. This activity was not essential to appellant’s personal or economic well-being; it was purely a recreational activity. See:
Valeo v. Pocono International Raceway, Inc.,
347 Pa.Super. 230, 500 A.2d 492 (1985).
The releases also did not contravene public policy. They were contracts between private parties and pertained only to the parties’ private rights. They did not in any way affect the rights of the public. See:
Seaton v. East Windsor Speedway, Inc.,
400 Pa.Super. 134, 582 A.2d 1380 (1990);
Valeo v. Pocono International Raceway, Inc., supra.
See also:
Grbac v. Reading Fair Co., Inc.,
521 F.Supp. 1351 (W.D.Pa.1981),
aff'd,
688 F.2d 215 (3d Cir.
1982). Indeed, the legislature’s action in enacting 42 Pa. C.S. § 7102(c) would seem to suggest that the policy in this Commonwealth is to enforce the doctrine of assumption of the risk for persons knowingly engaging in downhill skiing.
The exculpatory agreement and release in this case demonstrated clearly and unequivocally the intent of the parties. Its purpose, as stated expressly therein, was to release the “ski area” from all liability for injury to appellant caused by natural or man made obstacles on the slope, including hazards resulting from negligence by the owner. The fact that the release specifically referred to and included possible liability for acts of negligence distinguishes the release in this case from that in
Brown v. Racquetball Centers, Inc.,
369 Pa.Super. 13, 534 A.2d 842 (1987), where the plaintiff had slipped on a wet tile floor while exiting a shower. Because the owner of the athletic facilities had been charged with negligence, the plaintiff’s action was not barred by a release which failed to absolve the owner from liability for his own negligence. In the instant case, appellee was also released from liability for its own negligence.
There was no compulsion for appellant to participate in the downhill ski race which caused his injuries. In order to participate in this hazardous event, he agreed to assume the risk of injury and released the owner of the slope, as well as others, from all liability for injuries resulting therefrom, including injuries caused by another’s negligence. Appellant’s exculpatory agreement and release bars the present action. Therefore, the trial court properly entered judgment on the pleadings for appellee.
Judgment affirmed.