Kotab v. Eight Judicial District Court

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: April 23, 2024
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00324
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 THOMAS X. KOTAB, Case No. 2:24-cv-00324-MMD-NJK

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, et 9 al.,

10 Defendants.

11 I. SUMMARY 12 Pro se Plaintiff Thomas X. Kotab brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 13 Defendants1 for alleged due process violations related to a state court order of summary 14 eviction. (ECF No. 20 (“First Amended Complaint” or “FAC”).) Before the Court is 15 Plaintiff’s emergency motion for preliminary injunction to stay eviction (ECF No. 25 16 (“Motion”)). As explained below, because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 17 this action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court dismisses this action and 18 denies the Motion as moot. 19 II. DISCUSSION 20 Plaintiff challenges a state court order of summary eviction against him and alleges 21 various due process violations in relation to the eviction proceedings and appeal of the 22 eviction order. (ECF No. 20.) The Court sua sponte finds that it lacks subject matter 23 jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Scholastic 24 Ent., Inc. v. Fox Ent. Grp., Inc., 336 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding a court may 25 26 27 1Defendants are the Eighth Judicial District Court, Las Vegas Justice Court, David 28 F. Brown—hearing master of the Las Vegas Justice Court, Supreme Court of Nevada, Clark County, State of Nevada, Cameron Apartments, Las Vegas Cameron Apts LLC, 2 process). 3 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine states that federal district courts may not exercise 4 subject matter jurisdiction over a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.2 See 5 Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-17 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals, et al. v. Feldman, 6 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). The doctrine applies when “a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal 7 wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from the state 8 court judgment based on that decision.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003). 9 As part of a refusal to hear a forbidden de facto appeal, a federal district court “must also 10 refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue 11 resolved by the state court in its judicial decision.” Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th 12 Cir. 2005) (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158). 13 To determine if an action operates as a de facto appeal, the court “pay[s] close 14 attention to the relief sought by the federal-court plaintiff.” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 15 772, 777-78 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 990 (9th Cir. 16 2003)). Where the form of relief would constitute a reversal or “undoing of the prior state- 17 court judgment,” Rooker-Feldman dictates that the lower federal courts lack jurisdiction. 18 Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 900 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 19 Here, Plaintiff asks the Court to declare the state court order of summary eviction 20 and its appeal as “null and void” in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of 21 the U.S. Constitution. (ECF No. 20 at 6.) This requested relief constitutes a forbidden de 22 facto appeal of multiple state court orders. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163 (“It is a forbidden 23 de facto appeal under Rooker-Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district court 24 complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from 25 the judgment of that court.”). To provide Plaintiff with the relief he seeks would require 26 this Court to analyze the state courts’ alleged legal errors and void the original order and 27 2State court litigants may only achieve federal review of state court judgments by 28 filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. See D.C. 2 seeks other related relief, the Court may not review any issues “inextricably intertwined” 3 with issues addressed by the state court. See Doe, 415 F.3d at 1042-43. 4 Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives the Court of subject matter 5 jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, and the Court will dismiss the action and deny the 6 Motion.3 7 III. CONCLUSION 8 The Court notes that Plaintiff made several arguments and cited to several cases 9

10 3Even if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not serve as a jurisdictional bar, Plaintiff could not bring a Section 1983 claim against any of the Defendants as a matter of law 11 and/or as alleged in the FAC.

12 Section 1983 claims against the State of Nevada, Supreme Court of Nevada, the Eighth Judicial District Court, Las Vegas Justice Court, and Supreme Court of Nevada— 13 as a state and arms of the state—are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Howlett By and Through Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990) (reiterating that “the 14 State and arms of the State, which have traditionally enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity, are not subject to suit under § 1983 in either federal or state court”); see also 15 O’Connor v. State of Nev., 686 F.2d 749, 750 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that the Supreme Court of Nevada and a Judicial District Court of Nevada are “agencies of the state” that 16 have Eleventh Amendment immunity).

17 Plaintiff’s claim against David F. Brown, as the hearing master of the Las Vegas Justice Court, fails because judges and those performing judge-like functions, like Brown, 18 have absolute immunity from suit for acts performed in their official capacity. See Miller v. Davis, 521 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 2008) (“It has long been established that judges 19 are absolutely immune from liability for acts ‘done by them in the exercise of their judicial functions.’”); Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir.1981) (“If an official’s role 20 is functionally equivalent to that of a judge, the official will be granted equivalent immunity.”). 21 The Section 1983 claims fail against Cameron Apartments, Las Vegas Cameron 22 Apts LLC, and Sirius Las Vegas, LLC, as private parties against which there are no allegations that they acted under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 23 (1988) (“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged 24 deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”); Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting “the 25 presumption that private conduct does not constitute governmental action”).

26 Lastly, Plaintiff’s claim against Clark County also fails because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing that the alleged violations were the result of a policy or custom 27 of Clark County as opposed to the other Defendants. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (stating that, to state a claim for municipal or county liability 28 under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a constitutional violation that was 1 || not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and 2 || determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the 3 || motion before the Court. 4 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed for lack of subject matter 5 || jurisdiction under the Rooker-Fe/dman doctrine. 6 It is further ordered that Plaintiffs emergency motion for preliminary injunction 7 || (ECF No. 25) is denied as moot. 8 The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. 9 DATED THIS 23" Day of April 2024.

11 MIRANDA M. DU 12 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28