Kory v. Bonta

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedNovember 27, 2024
Docket24-2946
StatusUnpublished

This text of Kory v. Bonta (Kory v. Bonta) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kory v. Bonta, (9th Cir. 2024).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 27 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PIERRE KORY, M.D.; LE TRINH No. 24-2946 HOANG, D.O.; BRIAN TYSON, D.C. No. M.D.; PHYSICIANS FOR INFORMED 2:24-cv-00001-WBS-AC CONSENT; CHILDREN'S HEALTH DEFENSE, MEMORANDUM* Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

ROB BONTA, in his official capacity as Attorney General of California; REJI VARGHESE, in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Medical Board of California; ERIKA CALDERON, in her official capacity as Executive Officer of the Osteopathic Medical Board of California,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 4, 2024 Pasadena, California

Before: SCHROEDER, W. FLETCHER, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges. Concurrence by Judge CALLAHAN

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Plaintiffs-Appellants are California physicians and non-profit organizations

with which they are affiliated. They filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the

California Attorney General and the executive officers of the boards that regulate

the medical profession in California. Pursuant to California Business &

Professions Code § 2234(c), the boards are to take disciplinary action against

physicians who engage in “unprofessional conduct” by deviating from the

“standard of care.” Plaintiffs raised First Amendment challenges to prevent any

enforcement that might arise from Plaintiffs’ expression of views regarding Covid-

19 treatment and vaccination. The district court denied a preliminary injunction

because Plaintiffs failed to establish a likelihood of success on either a facial

challenge or a challenge to the statute as applied to Plaintiffs.

To the extent that Plaintiffs on appeal seek to maintain a facial challenge, we

must affirm, because the statute regulates conduct, not speech. See Tingley v.

Ferguson, 47 F.4th 1055, 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 33

(2023). It provides for enforcement of the standard of care, which is the standard

for physicians’ treatment of patients. See Flowers v. Torrance Mem’l Hosp. Med.

Ctr., 884 P.2d 142, 145 (Cal. 1994) (explaining that the standard of care creates

requirements for “treatment of [the] patient” (citation omitted)). The statute does

not purport to regulate speech unrelated to treating patients or require any

particular communication. It is therefore unlike the statute in National Institute of

2 24-2946 Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, which required communication of a

particular message “regardless of whether a medical procedure [wa]s ever sought,

offered, or performed.” See 585 U.S. 755, 770 (2018). Plaintiffs have not

established any likelihood of success on a facial challenge, and in their reply brief

and at oral argument, they have disclaimed pursuing one.

To establish standing for their as-applied challenge, Plaintiffs must show a

credible threat that the Defendants will prosecute them under the statute. See

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 159 (2014). None of the

Plaintiffs have been prosecuted under the statute, and Defendants have not

threatened enforcement against them. So far as the record discloses, the only

disciplinary proceedings against a physician related to Covid-19 communications

or treatment involved a physician encouraging her patient to use veterinary

ivermectin and resulted in the stipulated surrender of her license.

Plaintiffs nonetheless contend there is a threat that Defendants may

prosecute them under the statute for making protected speech. To determine

whether a purported threat is sufficient to establish an injury for Article III

standing, we consider three factors: (1) whether Plaintiffs have a “‘concrete plan’

to violate the law”; (2) whether Defendants have “communicated a specific

warning or threat to initiate proceedings” against them; and (3) whether there is a

“history of past prosecution or enforcement.” See Tingley, 47 F.4th at 1067

3 24-2946 (quoting Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th

Cir. 2000) (en banc)). Plaintiffs have not shown that any of these factors are

present here. The district court therefore correctly ruled Plaintiffs lack standing to

bring an as-applied challenge to § 2234(c).

AFFIRMED.

4 24-2946 FILED NOV 27 2024 CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring in the Judgment: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS I believe Plaintiffs have standing to bring an as-applied challenge, but

concur in the judgment because Plaintiffs have not established a likelihood of

success on the merits at this stage of the proceedings.

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Related

Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center
884 P.2d 142 (California Supreme Court, 1994)

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