Korrey Ostler v. United States Postal Service

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedAugust 7, 2024
DocketDE-0752-19-0205-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Korrey Ostler v. United States Postal Service (Korrey Ostler v. United States Postal Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Korrey Ostler v. United States Postal Service, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

KORREY OSTLER, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DE-0752-19-0205-I-1

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, DATE: August 7, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Korrey Ostler , Salt Lake City, Utah, pro se.

Melinda Varszeg i, Esquire, Sandy, Utah, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND From January 7, 2017, to January 1, 2018, the appellant, a preference eligible, held a temporary City Carrier Assistant position in the excepted service. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 32-33. Following a 6-day break in service, on January 7, 2018, the agency appointed him to another excepted -service temporary City Carrier Assistant position. Id. at 31. On November 7, 2018, the agency proposed his removal for unacceptable conduct and afforded him an opportunity to respond, which he did in writing on November 11, 2018. Id. at 8-15. While the proposed removal was pending, the agency converted the appellant from a temporary position to a career Letter Carrier position effective November 24, 2018. IAF, Tab 7 at 5. On November 28, 2018, the agency issued a decision letter affirming the charge and finding termination warranted. IAF, Tab 6 at 5-7. The decision letter indicated that, “[s]ince a grievance has been filed on your behalf, the removal is deferred until your appeal rights have been exhausted.” Id. at 6. A Postal Service (PS) Form 50 processed on March 8, 2019, reflects that the appellant’s termination became effective on December 21, 2018. Id. at 4. 3

The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging his termination and alleging discrimination and prohibited personnel practices. IAF, Tab 1. The agency moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the appellant was not an employee with Board appeal rights because he did not have at least 1 year of current continuous service. IAF, Tab 5 at 8. In response to the administrative judge’s order on jurisdiction, the appellant appeared to argue that he was not separated until March 2019 and that he therefore had more than 1 year of current continuous service. IAF, Tabs 8, 11, 16. Without holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision finding that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the termination appeal because, at the time of his termination, the appellant did not have 1 year of continuous service in the same or similar positions as to be entitled to appeal rights to the Board. IAF, Tab 18, Initial Decision (ID) at 2-3. She further found that, absent an otherwise appealable action, the Board lacked jurisdiction to consider the appellant’s discrimination and prohibited personnel practices claims. ID at 3-4. The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, and the agency has responded. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3

ANALYSIS Only an “employee,” as defined under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, can appeal an adverse action to the Board. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511(a)(1), 7513(d); Winns v. U.S. Postal Service, 124 M.S.P.R. 113, ¶ 8 (2017), aff’d sub nom. Williams v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 892 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B), which concerns preference-eligible employees in the excepted service, an employee with the right to appeal to the Board includes a preference-eligible U.S. Postal Service employee who has completed “1 year of current, continuous service” in the same or similar positions. 2 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)

2 Employees of the U.S. Postal Service also may appeal adverse actions to the Board under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 if they are management or supervisory employees, or employees engaged in personnel work in other than a purely nonconfidential clerical 4

(1)(B)(ii); see 5 U.S.C. § 7511(b)(8); Winns, 124 M.S.P.R. 113, ¶ 8. “Current continuous service” means service immediately prior to the action at issue without a break in service of a workday. 5 C.F.R. § 752.402; see Winns, 124 M.S.P.R. 113, ¶¶ 8, 14 (holding that the ordinary meaning of “current continuous service” in section 7511(a)(1)(B) precludes breaks in service). The appellant bears the burden of proving by preponderant evidence that his appeal is within the Board’s jurisdiction. 3 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). Here, it is undisputed that the appellant is a preference eligible and that the period of service at issue in this appeal began on January 7, 2018, when the agency appointed him to the temporary City Carrier Assistant position. 4 IAF, Tab 6 at 31. The administrative judge found that he did not meet the definition of an employee with chapter 75 appeal rights because, although the appellant was a preference-eligible Postal Service employee in the excepted service, he did not have 1 year of current continuous service at the time of his termination. ID at 2-3. On review, the appellant argues, as he did below, that the agency did not terminate him until March 2019 and that he therefore completed 1 year of current continuous service prior to his termination. PFR File, Tab 1.

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Related

Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Williams v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.
892 F.3d 1156 (Federal Circuit, 2018)

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Korrey Ostler v. United States Postal Service, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/korrey-ostler-v-united-states-postal-service-mspb-2024.