Kornegay v. John Doe

Second Circuit

Kornegay v. John Doe

371 F. App'x 178

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedMarch 30, 2010

Docket09-0690-pr

StatusUnpublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 371 F. App'x 178 (Kornegay v. John Doe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Kornegay v. John Doe, 371 F. App'x 178 (2d Cir. 2010).

Pincite

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Leon Kornegay, pro se, appeals a judgment in favor of defendants on this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging principally that corrections officers subjected him to excessive force. Although Kornegay’s failure to state the basis for his appeal arguably warrants affirmance, see Otero v. Bridgeport Housing Auth., 297 F.3d 142, 144 (2d Cir.2002), we construe the appeal as challenging the grant of defendants’ pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). Such a motion may be granted only where “a reasonable jury could reach but one conclusion.” Hannex Corp. v. GMI, Inc., 140 F.3d 194, 203 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the grant of a Rule 50 motion de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Tuccio v. Marconi, 589 F.3d 538, 540-41 (2d Cir.2009). In applying this standard, we assume familiarity with the facts and procedural history, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

It is well settled that “personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” Farid v. Ellen, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be sure, the “general principle of tort law that a tort victim who cannot identify the tort-feasor cannot bring suit” may be “relaxed ... in actions brought by pro se litigants,” “particularly ... where the plaintiff is incarcerated.” Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir.1997) (internal citation omitted). Kornegay is no longer incarcerated, however, and he was permitted discovery. Nevertheless, in his own sworn testimony before the jury, Kornegay failed to attribute specific actions to any individual defendant. Even if we were to treat Kornegay’s opening statement as evidence, which we do not, it serves only further to illustrate his inability to demonstrate which, if any, of the defendants engaged in the challenged conduct. Thus, we detect no error in the district court’s conclusion that Kornegay failed to present evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he had satisfied his “burden of establishing that something was done to [him] and by whom it was done.” Trial Tr. at 30 (emphasis supplied).

We have considered Kornegay’s remaining arguments on appeal, and they are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

SUMMARY ORDER

Leon Kornegay, pro se, appeals a judgment in favor of defendants on this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging principally that corrections officers subjected him to excessive force. Although Kornegay’s failure to state the basis for his appeal arguably warrants affirmance, see Otero v. Bridgeport Housing Auth., 297 F.3d 142, 144 (2d Cir.2002), we construe the appeal as challenging the grant of defendants’ pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). Such a motion may be granted only where “a reasonable jury could reach but one conclusion.” Hannex Corp. v. GMI, Inc., 140 F.3d 194, 203 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the grant of a Rule 50 motion de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Tuccio v. Marconi, 589 F.3d 538, 540-41 (2d Cir.2009). In applying this standard, we assume familiarity with the facts and procedural history, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

It is well settled that “personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” Farid v. Ellen, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be sure, the “general principle of tort law that a tort victim who cannot identify the tort-feasor cannot bring suit” may be “relaxed ... in actions brought by pro se litigants,” “particularly ... where the plaintiff is incarcerated.” Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir.1997) (internal citation omitted). Kornegay is no longer incarcerated, however, and he was permitted discovery. Nevertheless, in his own sworn testimony before the jury, Kornegay failed to attribute specific actions to any individual defendant. Even if we were to treat Kornegay’s opening statement as evidence, which we do not, it serves only further to illustrate his inability to demonstrate which, if any, of the defendants engaged in the challenged conduct. Thus, we detect no error in the district court’s conclusion that Kornegay failed to present evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he had satisfied his “burden of establishing that something was done to [him] and by whom it was done.” Trial Tr. at 30 (emphasis supplied).

We have considered Kornegay’s remaining arguments on appeal, and they are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

371 F. App'x 178, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kornegay-v-john-doe-ca2-2010.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack