Koppey v. Hirsch

36 B.R. 643, 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 6, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 6473
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida.
DecidedJanuary 10, 1984
Docket18-15199
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 36 B.R. 643 (Koppey v. Hirsch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Koppey v. Hirsch, 36 B.R. 643, 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 6, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 6473 (Fla. 1984).

Opinion

*644 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

JOSEPH A. GASSEN, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter was tried on the complaint of the creditors Gundolf Koppey and Carol 0. Koppey objecting to the discharge of the debtors and to the dischargeability of one debt. Plaintiffs object to the debtors’ discharge on the basis that they failed to keep sufficient records, that they are unable to account for losses, that they omitted from their schedules several assets previously owned, and that they hindered, delayed or defrauded their creditors by converting whole life insurance policies to term policies prior to filing for bankruptcy. The Kop-peys also object to the dischargeability of the debtors’ debt to them, alleging that Alan Hirsch obtained the money through false representations.

The facts alleged by both parties in this case are not only rather unusual, but are such that the credibility of the parties is a very significant factor. The heart of the debtors’ defense is that Alan Hirsch is a compulsive gambler, who acted recklessly and who went to great lengths to obtain funds and to continue his gambling activities during the period in question. Alan Hirsch admits that his actions were considerably less than admirable, but denies that they were such as to prevent his discharge in bankruptcy.

The policy of bankruptcy is to grant debtors a fresh start, and although dishonest or uncooperative debtors will be denied discharge in bankruptcy, the plaintiff carries a very heavy burden in proving facts to deny a discharge. The facts of this case certainly gave plaintiffs basis to question the right to discharge of the debtors, but the court concludes, upon a close examination of those facts, that the discharges should not be denied. It also concludes that there are insufficient grounds to deny the dischargeability of the individual debt of the debtors to the plaintiffs.

The evidence presented at trial reviewed the activities of the debtor Alan Hirsch for a period of about two years prior to the filing of the voluntary bankruptcy petition on March 10, 1983; Until approximately December of 1982 Hirsch was working as a licensed real estate agent. He testified that he was also, in effect, a gambling addict. Although there are certain inconsistencies in the testimony of the debtors which could be reconciled in a manner favorable or unfavorable to them, from the totality of the evidence the court is satisfied that Hirsch does, indeed, have a serious gambling problem, and that events occurred essentially as he testified to them.

During this period Hirsch’s regular business activities were subordinated to his interest in trading in stock options. He testified that he traded daily, and made “a couple hundred” trades each month. He traded in only one brokerage house at a time, but worked his way through several different brokers. His trading generally was not profitable, and his net losses on the stock market during this period were approximately $126,000. Hirsch testified that during this time he believed that he was participating in a legitimate investment program, and only later saw that he was using stock option trading as a method of gambling. At this time he also gambled at Jai-Alai, going two to three times a week and losing $50 to $100 on every game.

To finance these activities Hirsch borrowed heavily, especially because he was not devoting enough time to the real estate business to earn much there. He carried a pad of form promissory notes with him, and borrowed a few thousand dollars at a time from a great many friends and acquaintances, obtaining the money by giving, or promising to give, exorbitant interest rates. “Interest” was generally paid immediately, for example, with Hirsch receiving $3,000 and giving a note for $3,500. The notes were generally for a short-term period. Some were repaid, some rolled over, and many remained unpaid and were scheduled in bankruptcy.

As part of his job responsibilities at Midtown Realty Alan Hirsch collected rent for property owners, from which mortgage payments were to be made. Instead, he *645 used several thousand dollars of the rent money himself, making some of the mortgage payments later when he had other funds available. Some mortgage payments, however, were left unpaid by Hirsch. When the problem was discovered, his employer, Carlos Dominguez, made up the deficits and took a third mortgage of approximately $13,000 on the Hirsch home.

Alan Hirsch also obtained his wife’s jewelry, most of which was kept in a safe deposit box which only he entered. He testified that he obtained approximately $1,500 for the jewelry and sold it to some men he knew by first name only at the race track. Ultimately he also sold her wedding ring. Sarina Hirsch works at an auto leasing business owned by her parents and brother. She earned approximately $10,000 per year, as well as being given the use of two automobiles. Both she and her husband testified that she was not aware of his gambling problem or even of his stock trading until the end of 1982. She testified that he had irregular hours in his business, so she had no reason to suspect that he was going to Jai-Alai, and that he was usually able to get the mail so that she did not see the statements from brokerage houses. He testified that he took great pains to prevent her learning of the various activities.

Apparently the day of reckoning for Hirsch came when one of his creditors became impatient, and began using self-help techniques to collect. The family received death threats and there was shooting at their home, although no one was injured. At about the same time the plaintiffs wrote a letter to Mrs. Hirsch, through which she learned of her husband’s indebtedness to them (Defendants’ Exhibit A). As a result of the revelations, the debtors’ marriage suffered some strains, Mrs. Hirsch and the children moved out, and Mr. Hirsch barricaded himself in the house with mattresses against the windows for protection. In about January 1983 he began going to Gamblers Anonymous where he found that he met most of the criteria of a serious gambler. Mrs. Hirsch accompanied him to at least one meeting, but did not learn of the full scope of his gambling activities and did not know of his Jai-Alai gambling until after the bankruptcy petition was filed.

The most serious of plaintiffs’ arguments against granting the debtors their discharges are that they failed to keep adequate records under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3) and that they failed to satisfactorily explain any loss of assets to meet their liabilities under § 727(a)(5). The two issues are related in that it is usually difficult for a debtor to account for losses unless adequate records have been kept.

Gambling is an activity for which records are seldom kept. It is therefore a good way for a debtor to try to explain the disappearance of funds which may be secreted elsewhere. For this reason, where a debtor’s explanation for the loss of substantial assets is that he lost them gambling, a discharge has often been denied. The courts have required corroborating evidence, which did not exist in same cases, or they simply did not believe the debtor’s story. See, e.g., McBee v. Sliman, 512 F.2d 504 (5th Cir.1975); Gaudet v. Cowen,

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Bluebook (online)
36 B.R. 643, 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 6, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 6473, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/koppey-v-hirsch-flsb-1984.