Konan v. George
This text of 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 509 (Konan v. George) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The Plaintiff, James M. Konan
(“Konan”), brought this action against the Defendants, Ernest George (“George”), William Crane (“Crane”) and Sterling Suffolk Race Course, LLC (“Suffolk”) upon counts of strict liability and negligence. On February 4, 2002, Suffolk moved for summary judgment pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 56. On February 20, 2002, George filed a concurrence with and joined Suffolk’s summary judgment motion. Konan did not object to the manner in which George joined the summary judgment motion, but opposed it upon the same grounds stated in his opposition to Suffolk’s motion. After a hearing on the summary judgment motion, the Court denies the motion for summary judgment.
FACTS
Suffolk owns and operates Suffolk Downs Racetrack (“Suffolk Downs”), a horse racing facility located in East Boston, Massachusetts. On November 21, 1997, Konan, a self-employed thoroughbred horse trainer, was riding a horse named “Adriatic King” (“King”) at Suffolk Downs for the purpose of evaluating it for potential purchase. King was owned by George, trained by Crane and stabled at Suffolk Downs. Suffolk displayed signs at its racetrack that read:
WARNING: Under Massachusetts law, an equine professional is not liable for injury to, or the death of, a participant in equine activities resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities, pursuant to section 2D of chapter 128 of the General Laws.
[510]*510Upon entering the racetrack, Konan turned King to the left and rode it approximately twenty lengths in the direction opposite the normal course of track traffic. Konan rode King in this direction to avoid other horses that were coming off the track at the time. King abruptly turned to the right and threw Konan, causing him to fall to the ground and injure his left knee.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate when no material facts are in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mass.R.Civ. 56(c); Highlands Ins. Co. v.Aerovox, Inc., 424 Mass. 226, 232 (1997). The moving party bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the absence of triable issues and showing that the summary judgment record entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 16-17 (1989). A party moving for summary judgment who would not bear the burden of proof at trial may demonstrate the absence of triable issues by either submitting affirmative evidence negating an essential element of the non-moving party’s case or by showing that the non-moving party would have no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of its case at trial. Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991). To overcome a summary judgment motion, the non-moving party must articulate specific facts establishing the existence of general issues of material facts. Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. at 17. Bare assertions or conclusions regarding an individual’s understandings and assumptions are insufficient to withstand a well pleaded motion for summary judgment. Polaroid Corp. v. Rollings Envtl. Servs., 416 Mass. 684, 696 (1993).
Suffolk and George request summary judgment in their favor on the basis of G.L.c. 128, §2D, entitled “Sponsors of, and Liability in Connection With, Equine Activities; Required Warnings; Definitions.”1 Specifically, these defendants maintain that they are “equine professionals” within the meaning of the statute, and that the plaintiff was engaged in an “equine activity" as defined by the statute at the time of his injury. The Court agrees with these characterizations, based on the facts of the case and the plain meaning of the statute. This, according to the defendants, renders them immune from liability for the plaintiffs injury under G.L.c. 128, §2D(b).
However, subsection (c) of the statute significantly curtails the immunity afforded by G.L.c. 128, §2D. For example, an equine professional is liable under subsection (c) if he provides an equine without ”mak[ing] reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity, and determin[ing] the ability of the participant to safely manage the particular equine based on the participant’s representations of his ability.” An equine professional is also liable under subsection (c) if he “commits an act of omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant, and that act of omission caused the injury.”
These limitations are significant in this case because the parties dispute whether Konan was warned of King’s dislike of being ridden in the “wrong” direction on the racetrack. The defendants maintain that prior to riding King, the plaintiff was warned that the horse was temperamental and disliked being ridden the “wrong” direction on the racetrack. However, Konan states under oath in his answers to Crane’s interrogatories that Crane first informed him of King’s dislike two days after the accident. This raises questions as to whether the defendants made reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the plaintiffs ability to safely ride King, given the horse’s alleged erratic tendencies; and whether the defendants’ alleged failure to warn Konan was an act of omission constituting willful or wanton disregard for Konan’s safely, resulting in his injury. The defendants have not met their burden of affirmatively demonstrating the absence of triable issues, nor have they shown that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law under G.L.c. 128, §2D. Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. at 16-17. There are therefore material questions of fact which preclude summary judgment.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, defendant Sterling Suffolk Race Course, LLC’s motion for summary judgment, with which defendant Ernest George concurred and joined, is DENIED.
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14 Mass. L. Rptr. 509, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/konan-v-george-masssuperct-2002.