Kolwitz v. Lincoln County Ex Rel. Lincoln County Sheriff's Office

Ninth Circuit

Kolwitz v. Lincoln County Ex Rel. Lincoln County Sheriff's Office

520 F. App'x 570

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMay 23, 2013

Docket11-35593

StatusUnpublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 520 F. App'x 570 (Kolwitz v. Lincoln County Ex Rel. Lincoln County Sheriff's Office) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Kolwitz v. Lincoln County Ex Rel. Lincoln County Sheriff's Office, 520 F. App'x 570 (9th Cir. 2013).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Robert A. Kolwitz and Nancy Kolwitz appeal pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal constitutional violations and state law claims for defamation, false light, and intentional interference with economic relations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Luchtel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir.2010), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the Kolwitzes’ § 1983 claim because the Kolwitzes failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the alleged federal constitutional violations resulted from an official custom, policy, or a failure to train. See Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir.2007) (discussing requirements for municipal liability under § 1983); see also Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir.2011) (“To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must set forth non-speculative evidence of specific facts, not sweeping con-clusory allegations.”).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the state law claims because the Kolwitzes failed to raise a triable dispute as to required elements of each of the claims. See Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1061; see also Allen v. Hall, 328 Or. 276, 974 P.2d 199, 202 (1999) (elements of an intentional interference claim under Oregon law); Reesman v. Highfill, 327 Or. 597, 965 P.2d 1030, 1034 (1998) (for a statement to be actionable under Oregon law, the statement at issue must be both defamatory and false); Muresan v. Phila. Romanian Pentecostal Church, 154 Or.App. 465, 962 P.2d 711, 716-17 (1998) (to state a claim for false light under Oregon law, the plaintiff must establish actual malice).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam). *571 We do not consider any documents that are not part of the district court record. See Fed. R.App. P. 10(a); Kirshner v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 842 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.1988).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Robert A. Kolwitz and Nancy Kolwitz appeal pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal constitutional violations and state law claims for defamation, false light, and intentional interference with economic relations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Luchtel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir.2010), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the Kolwitzes’ § 1983 claim because the Kolwitzes failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the alleged federal constitutional violations resulted from an official custom, policy, or a failure to train. See Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir.2007) (discussing requirements for municipal liability under § 1983); see also Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir.2011) (“To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must set forth non-speculative evidence of specific facts, not sweeping con-clusory allegations.”).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the state law claims because the Kolwitzes failed to raise a triable dispute as to required elements of each of the claims. See Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1061; see also Allen v. Hall, 328 Or. 276, 974 P.2d 199, 202 (1999) (elements of an intentional interference claim under Oregon law); Reesman v. Highfill, 327 Or. 597, 965 P.2d 1030, 1034 (1998) (for a statement to be actionable under Oregon law, the statement at issue must be both defamatory and false); Muresan v. Phila. Romanian Pentecostal Church, 154 Or.App. 465, 962 P.2d 711, 716-17 (1998) (to state a claim for false light under Oregon law, the plaintiff must establish actual malice).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam). *571 We do not consider any documents that are not part of the district court record. See Fed. R.App. P. 10(a); Kirshner v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 842 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.1988).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.

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520 F. App'x 570, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kolwitz-v-lincoln-county-ex-rel-lincoln-county-sheriffs-office-ca9-2013.

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