Kolal v. Galen Robotics, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedFebruary 24, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-00721
StatusUnknown

This text of Kolal v. Galen Robotics, Inc. (Kolal v. Galen Robotics, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kolal v. Galen Robotics, Inc., (D. Md. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND * VISHNU KOLAL, * Plaintiff,

V. * Civil No. 24-721-BAH GALEN ROBOTICS, INC., ET AL., ' * Defendants. * * me * * * * we * * * * * ® *

- ‘MEMORANDUM OPINION Vishnu Kolal (“Plaintiff’) brought suit against his former employer Galen Robotics, Inc. (“Galen”) and its President and CEO, Bruce Lichorowic (“Lichorowic”), alleging violations of the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”), Md. Code. Ann., Lab. & Empl. (“LE”) §§ 3-501 to 3-509. See ECF 1 (complaint). Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment (the “Motion”) against Galen. ECF 9. Galen did not file an opposition. All . filings include memoranda of law and exhibits.' The Court has reviewed all relevant filings and finds that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED without prejudice. I. BACKGROUND oo. A. Factual Allegations □ Galen Robotics is a company that develops and sells medical equipment located: in Baltimore, Maryland. ECF 1, at 2 {{[ 2-4. Plaintiff, a resident of Pennsylvania, was employed by Galen as a software engineer from May 2022 through November 2023. Jd at 419. Lichorowic,

' The Court references all filings by their respective ECF numbers and page numbers by the ECF- . generated page numbers at the top of the page.

who is sued in his individual capacity, id. at 1, “served as Galen’s managing and controlling officer,” and “acted as Plaintiff's most senior manager and supervisor,” who “held full authority to direct and/or modify Plaintiff's job duties and responsibilities,” including “negotiating and setting Plaintiffs rate and method of compensation,” Jd. at2 47-11. Plaintiff alleges he was an employee who was directed “to perform substantial and ongoing employment duties,” but nevertheless did not receive his full and timely payment of earned wages. id. at 2-3 712-13. Plaintiff alleges that between May 2022 through March 2023, and from September 2023 through November 2023, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff $47,736.00 in earned and promised wages. ld. {{ 20-31, 37. Plaintiff asserts that the failure to fully and timely pay him “was not the result of any bona fide dispute between plaintiff and Defendants, and was not made in good faith” and is a “per se violation of Plaintiff's wage payment rights under the MWPCL.” ECF 1, at 8 9] 39-40. He seeks “a judgment against Galen and Lichorowic, jointly and severally,” for the “MWPCL statutorily prescribed damages in the amount of three times (3x) Plaintiff's earned, promised, and unpaid wages” totaling $143,208.00. Jd 141. In addition to the damages award, Plaintiff requests $5,365.00 in attorney’s fees and costs. ECF 9, at 12. B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed the Complaint on March 11, 2024. ECF 1. Plaintiff served the summons on the Defendants on March 25, 2024. ECF 3 & 4. After neither Defendant filed a responsive pleading, the clerk entered defaults against each of them on May 8, 2024. ECF 7 & 8. On May 20, 2024, the Plaintiff filed the instant motion for default judgment. ECF 9. However, on June 11, 2024, Lichorowic filed a Motion to Vacate the Notice of Default. ECF 10. The Court granted Lichorowic’s motion, but the Motion remained pending as to Galen. ECF 12. Galen failed to

respond to the Motion, and the time to do so has now expired. As such, the Motion is now ripe for review. Il. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), “[w]hen a party against whom a judement for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” The Court may conduct hearings or make referrals when necessary to determine the damages, establish the truth of any allegation by evidence, or investigate any other matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Thereafter, the court may enter default judgment at the plaintiffs request and with notice to the defaulting party. Id Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has announced a “strong policy” in favor of deciding cases on their merits, United States v. Schaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 453 (4th Cir. 1993), default judgment may be appropriate when a party is unresponsive. S.E.C. v. Lawbaugh, 359 F. Supp. 2d 418, 421 (D. Md. 2005) (citing Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). Plaintiff, however, is not automatically entitled to default judgment simply because. the defendant has not responded. Rather, entry of default judgment is left to the sound discretion of the court. See, e.g., Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. Jai Shree Navdurga, LLC, Civ. No. DKC-11-2893, 2012 WL 5995248, at *1 (D. Md. Nov. 29, 2012); see also Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Austin Area Hospitality, Inc., Civ. No. TDC-15-0516, 2015 WL 6123523, at *1 (D. Md. Oct. 14, 2015). With respect to liability, the court takes as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint. Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 780 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6) (“An allegation—other than one relating to the amount of damages—is admitted - if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied.”). The court applies the

3 .

pleading standards announced in Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 US. 544 (2007), in the context of default judgments. See, e.g., Balt. Line Handling Co. v. Brophy, 771 F. Supp. 2d 531, 544 (D. Md. 2011). A complaint that avers bare legal conclusions or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement,” is insufficient to award default judgment. Jd. (“The record lacks any specific allegations of fact that ‘show’ why those conclusions are warranted.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court “must, therefore, determine whether the well-pleaded allegations in [the] complaint support the relief sought.” Ryan, 253 F.3d at 780. “The party moving for default judgment has the burden to show that the defaulted party was properly served and that the unchallenged factual allegations constitute a legitimate cause of action.” Harris v. Blue Ridge Health Servs., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 3d 633, 638 (M.D.N.C. 2019) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). If the complaint avers sufficient facts from which the court may find liability, the court next turns to damages. See Ryan, 253 F.3d at 780-81. The court must make an independent determination regarding damages and cannot accept as true factual allegations of damages. See Lawbaugh, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 422. Damages are restricted to that which is requested in the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54

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